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Abstract 
 
This thesis brings the concept of humanitarianism sharply into focus within the 
discourse of international political theory. Existing literature examines 
humanitarianism obliquely, via debates on military humanitarian intervention or 
human rights, resulting in an impoverished account of a vital idea. Meanwhile, a 
vibrant discussion among professional humanitarians has recently questioned the 
nature of their endeavour, along lines that clearly fit the remit of international 
political theory. Bringing together these two discussions in the course of its critical 
analysis, the thesis argues that humanitarianism should be conceptualised as a 
political context in which we articulate, negotiate and defend our understandings of 
common humanity. Central to this politics are the ways in which we react to and 
conceptualise human suffering, through humanitarian crises that are often "crises 
of humanity". In sparking concern and mobilising responses to suffering, the 
affective underpinnings of the humanitarian impulse create a complex and shifting 
backdrop to extensions of solidarity and humanitarian action. At the heart of this 
action is the idea of rescue, a crucial "presumptive occasion" of our moral life. But 
an important part of humanitarian action consists in the efforts to institutionalise 
the humanitarian impulse. In this sense human rights and projects of global justice 
represent important crystallisations of humanitarian concern, yet neither can fully 
capture the more contingent workings of the humanitarian impulse. What emerges 
is an understanding of humanitarianism as a broad discussion, central to the 
identity of contemporary liberal international political theory, but with a scope best 
gleaned not from cosmopolitan accounts, but from a more fluid internationalist 
tradition of thought. The thesis concludes that the importance of this theoretical 
approach will be borne out by the complex and far-reaching practical challenges 
that humanitarianism is set to confront over coming decades, not least the "crisis of 
humanity" threatened by climate change. 
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1. Introduction: Humanitarianism in Crisis and the Promise of 
International Political Theory 
 
As part of a major rebranding exercise undertaken in early 2008, Oxfam, a leading 
British non-governmental organisation (NGO) launched a striking new slogan: “Be 
Humankind”.
1
 The exhortation neatly captures the three most significant meanings 
of “humanity”: the “quality of being humane”, implying kindness and benevolence; 
the “condition, quality, or fact of being human”; and “[human] beings collectively”.
2
  
This thesis explores the ways in which we search for and contest the meaning of 
humanity, in all three of the aforementioned senses of the term, through the idea 
of humanitarianism. It does this by bringing together two debates that are 
intimately involved, if not always self-consciously, in these negotiations. 
 Firstly, it examines the debates among professional humanitarians about the 
nature of their calling, drawing on the dilemmas and paradoxes that characterise 
contemporary humanitarian action. A decade into the twenty-first century, the 
“humanitarian impulse” has been institutionalised at international level to an 
unprecedented degree, across inter-governmental organisations (IGOs), non-
governmental organisations, complex bodies of International Humanitarian Law 
(IHL) and International Human Rights Law. Yet many consider that humanitarianism 
is in the throes of a multifaceted crisis of identity. This sense of crisis is most 
strongly felt among those who now pass whole careers in its employ and can 
plausibly be termed professional humanitarians. Their unease feeds on a double 
sense of doubt. They doubt whether, for all the prominence of humanitarianism 
and human rights within contemporary political discourse, the contemporary world 
                                                           
1
 Darren Davidson, "Oxfam Urges Consumers to 'Be Humankind'", brandrepublic.com (18 
April 2008). Available at http://www.brandrepublic.com/News/803123/Oxfam-urges-
consumers-be-humankind/; accessed on 05 July 2010. Oxfam, Be Humankind, TV advert 
(2008). Available at 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eQK6ODxDfDY&feature=player_embedded; accessed 
on 05 July 2010. 
2
 Oxford English Dictionary, "Humanity", Oxford English Dictionary Online (Draft Revision 
June 2010). Available at http://dictionary.oed.com; accessed on 05 July 2010. 
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is in any meaningful sense a more humane place to be than that which preceded it. 
They also doubt, quite simply, whether all their practical endeavours are doing 
much good. They are finding it harder and harder to answer a simple question: what 
is humanitarianism? 
 Secondly, in response to this important question, it juxtaposes these 
debates with the rich discussions in contemporary international political theory on 
the appropriate content and scope of human solidarity. Charles Beitz, a central 
figure in the resurgence of international political theory, once wrote that: “We need 
a political theory of human rights because the international practice of human 
rights is problematic”.
3
 In this thesis, I want to make a similar case for an 
international political theory account of humanitarianism: we need one because the 
international practice of humanitarianism is problematic, and because, I argue, the 
paradoxes and possibilities of humanitarianism really come into focus when we look 
at them through the lens of international political theory. Beyond the discussions 
taking place in the context of professional humanitarian practice, I argue that we 
need to train this lens both on individual acts of solidarity or rescue, and on wider 
discussions about the political traction of ideas of a common humanity. The task of 
international political theory here is to explore humanitarianism “as a personal 
characteristic, as a relation between individuals, and as a political phenomenon”, to 
                                                           
3
 Charles R. Beitz, "Human Rights and the Law of Peoples", in The Ethics of Assistance: 
Morality and the Distant Needy, ed. Deen K. Chatterjee (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2004), 193. Italics in original. In a recent work on human rights, Beitz recognises the 
limitations, which are equally important to the present study of humanitarianism, of an 
ambition to form a single unified theory of human rights: “the aspirations of a theory of 
human rights should be in one way modest. To think of human rights as I have suggested is 
to accept that we should understand their nature and requirements as responses to 
contingent historical circumstances. So it is probably a mistake to expect to discover a basis 
for human rights in one or a few clear moral ideas, to formulate a canonical list of rights, or 
to devise a single authoritative means for bringing them to bear on practical choices. What 
a theory of human rights might rather hope to accomplish is to clarify the uses to which 
they may be put in the discourse of global political life and to identify and give structure to 
the considerations it would be appropriate to take into account, in light of these uses, in 
deliberating about their content and application. It would seek to interpret the normative 
discipline implicit in the practice. Such a theory would not, so to speak, stand outside the 
practice; it would be continuous with it.” Charles R. Beitz, The Idea of Human Rights 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 212. 
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borrow Judith Shklar’s account of how political theory should explore such a 
concept.
4
 
 The thesis argues that such humanitarian debates are really discussions 
about how best to honour our human identity, one among our many different 
identities, through the elaboration of human solidarity, and follows Kwame Anthony 
Appiah in observing that: 
 
if we’re going to deal with identity, it’s reasonable to ask how large a part 
these identities should play in our political lives, whether we take politics in 
the narrow sense of our dealings with the state, or, more broadly, as our 
dealings, in social life, with one another.
5
 
 
The thesis thus examines the “politics of humanity” in this broadest sense of the 
term, without neglecting the particular problems that arise from an international 
political context still largely structured by states. 
 In this introductory chapter, I first situate my starting point in the 
experiences and dilemmas of professional humanitarians, against other plausible 
alternatives, as the most productive way to make sense of the concept of 
humanitarianism. I then set out the reasons why professional humanitarianism is 
currently understood as in crisis, and set out the contours of this crisis according to 
ongoing discussions about its principles, politics and scope. I then question why 
contemporary international political theory has yet fully to engage with this vital set 
of issues, before setting out its potential to bring home the importance of a better 
understanding of the “politics of humanity”. 
                                                           
4
 In her case the particular concept at stake was injustice, which will be examined in 
Chapter 5. Judith N. Shklar, The Faces of Injustice (London: Yale University Press, 1990), 50. 
5
 Kwame Anthony Appiah, "The Politics of Identity", Daedalus 135, no. 4 (2006): 17. Appiah 
usefully elaborates as follows: “I count seven different ways in which I’ve said that you 
might speak of ‘identity politics.’ (1) There are political conflicts about who’s in and who’s 
out. (2) Politicians can mobilize identities. (3) States can treat people of distinct identities 
differently. (4) People can pursue a politics of recognition. (5) There can be a social 
micropolitics enforcing norms of identification. (6) There are inherently political identities 
like party identifications. And (7) social groups can mobilize to respond collectively to all of 
the above.” Appiah, "The Politics of Identity": 22. For two particularly elegant accounts of 
the politics of identity, see Amin Maalouf, Les Identités Meurtrières (Paris: Grasset, 1998). 
Amartya Sen, Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny (London: W.W. Norton & 
Company, 2006). 
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I Locating Humanitarianism: Plausible Protagonists 
 
The question of what sphere of activity, and which group of actors, should ground 
an empirically-informed theoretical study of humanitarianism is by no means a 
straightforward one. There are many plausible locations of humanitarianism in 
contemporary international politics. This section will illustrate and briefly discuss 
the possibilities, before arguing for a consistent starting point in professional 
humanitarianism that allows us to build linkages to other understandings and 
institutionalisations of humanitarianism, and set these relationships in the context 
of contemporary debates in international political theory. 
 When it first entered into common usage, “humanitarian” was frequently 
used in a derogatory sense, synonymous with the equally contemptuous “humanity-
monger” or “humanity-man”, sentimental busybodies all. Today, in common 
parlance, humanitarian has much more positive connotations. What it connotes is 
not always so clear, though, beyond a broad commitment to human welfare. David 
P. Forsythe, a veteran observer of international humanitarianism, recently defined it 
simply as “the transnational concern to help persons in exceptional distress”.
6
 Here 
dictionary definitions advance us little. For example the Oxford English Dictionary 
defines it as follows: 
 
Concern for human welfare as a primary or pre-eminent moral good; action, 
or the disposition to act, on the basis of this concern rather than for 
pragmatic or strategic reasons. Chiefly depreciative in early use, with the 
implication of excessive sentimentality towards criminals and the poor.
7
 
 
                                                           
6
 David P. Forsythe, "Contemporary Humanitarianism: The Global and the Local", in 
Humanitarianism and Suffering: The Mobilization of Empathy, ed. Richard Ashby Wilson 
and Richard D. Brown (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 59. 
7
 Oxford English Dictionary, "Humanitarianism", Oxford English Dictionary Online (Draft 
Revision March 2010). Available at http://dictionary.oed.com; accessed on 15 July 2010. 
Italics in original. 
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When the great Russian cellist Mstislav Rostropovich died in 2007, obituary writers 
paid tribute to him both as a musician and a “humanitarian”, as indeed they had 
done on the passing of his Catalan mentor, Pablo Casals.
8
 Both men defended, 
within and beyond their artistic lives, a claim to a common humanity which they 
saw as having been violated by the ideological clashes of their time. For Casals, our 
common humanity had been threatened by totalitarians of the Right, for 
Rostropovich, totalitarians of the Left. For both, the label “humanitarian”, in its 
common usage, seems appropriate, seems to capture some truth, however slippery, 
about the possibilities of human solidarity. 
 Neither man appears to have much in common with the stereotype of 
today’s professional humanitarian aid workers, clad in white T-shirts that match the 
logos of their shiny white Toyota SUVs. For them, the meaning of humanitarianism 
is much more precise, relating to a specific set of objectives and procedures, the 
articulation of which now often echoes contemporary, thickly-hyphenated, jargon-
filled business-speak. In response to human suffering they offer a host of technical 
fixes and medical treatments, designed to palliate or fend off final moments: life-
support, rather than a vision of the good life. They jealously defend the operating 
principles of a humanitarianism that serves specific ends, not a diffuse sense of 
goodwill to all. Perhaps, then, we merely have an instance of a term with multiple 
usages, both deserving of separate analysis. Yet in generating the means to serve 
their ends, professional humanitarians often find themselves relying on just such a 
sense of vague, generalised goodwill, and attempt to mine its resources. “Be 
Humankind”, indeed. 
 This appeal to human kindness, to the “kindness of strangers” as Blanche 
Dubois has it, raises another point of tension.
9
 Oxfam are requesting that we give 
out of charity to provide services which for Oxfam, as for many of its supporters, 
should precisely not be the object of charity, but rather of entitlement, or justice. 
Humanitarian NGOs are not only learning to speak the language of business, but 
                                                           
8
 The Times, "Mstislav Rostropovich", The Times (28 April 2007). Available at 
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/obituaries/article1717247.ece; accessed on 
12 July 2010. 
9
 Tennessee Williams, A Streetcar Named Desire (London: Penguin, 2009). 
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also, and rather more importantly, that of human rights. Many would like to bring 
about a situation wherein large-scale mortality from preventable diseases, such as 
malaria, would represent a violation of human rights. So what to make of the fact 
that, for many of the world’s poorest people, their best chance of avoiding such a 
fate may depend on the goodwill of the world’s richest man, Bill Gates? Like it or 
not, Gates’ personal fortune, channelled through his philanthropic foundation, 
seems quite likely to save more lives than the most well-intentioned volunteer-
based NGO ever could.
10
 Are the philanthropic enablers of humanitarian action, 
such as the so-called “venture philanthropists”, not, then, equally plausible starting 
points for a study of how we express our humanity?
11
 If not at the level of the Gates 
and Carnegies of the world, then at the level of those who respond with donations 
or direct debit mandates to the entreaties of “chuggers”, the so-called “charity 
muggers” who patrol local high streets? 
 Nor, arguably, should we forget the scientists devoting their career to 
developing a malaria vaccine.
12
 If the on-the-ground aid worker’s technical 
professionalism does not count against a plausible characterisation as 
humanitarian, why should it in the backroom laboratories? 
 Or what of the political enablers of humanitarian action? Should Bernard 
Kouchner, co-founder of Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), be excluded from 
                                                           
10
 See Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation. Available at 
http://www.gatesfoundation.org/Pages/home.aspx; accessed on 12 July 2010. For some 
interesting background see Andy Beckett, "Inside the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation", 
guardian.co.uk (13 July 2010). Available at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jul/12/bill-and-melinda-gates-foundation; 
accessed on 13 July 2010. 
11
 For an overview of current trends in philanthropy see Hudson Institute, The Index of 
Global Philanthropy and Remittances 2010 (Washington, D.C.: Hudson Institute, 2010). 
Available at 
http://www.hudson.org/files/pdf_upload/Index_of_Global_Philanthropy_and_Remittances
_2010.pdf; accessed on 13 July 2010. 
12
 See Malaria Vaccine Initiative. Available at http://www.malariavaccine.org/; accessed on 
12 July 2010. 
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consideration because he has undertaken a political career?
13
 Or Tony Blair, now 
the namesake of many 10 year-old Kosovars?
14
 
 A core concern of this thesis is to provide an account of humanitarianism 
broad enough to situate all of the possibilities briefly outlined above. The danger of 
such a project, though, is clearly to retreat into banal commonalities. Breadth of 
outcome should not come at the expense of depth of analysis. Therefore, the thesis 
will draw primarily on the experiences of professional humanitarians working in the 
sphere of institutionalised humanitarianism, especially as it pertains to the 
negotiation of its international political context. 
 Admittedly, locating “institutionalised humanitarianism” is itself a 
problematic endeavour. Institutionalising the “humanitarian impulse”, in order to 
avoid entirely contingent acts of rescue, has always occupied a variety of different 
conceptual spaces. It has taken the form of sets of guiding principles, such as the 
fundamental principles of the Red Cross; of law, such as IHL; of dedicated agencies, 
such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).
15
 Antonio 
Donini considers that “[the] concept of humanitarianism is fraught with ambiguities. 
It connotes three separate but overlapping realities: an ideology, a movement and a 
profession.”
16
 
 Even a straightforward historical account of all the ways in which the 
humanitarian impulse has been realised and institutionalised could itself easily fill a 
whole thesis. Since such is not the purpose of this one, the approach here will be to 
bring in different practical embodiments of the humanitarian impulse as and when 
                                                           
13
 For commentary on Kouchner’s trajectory see Tim Allen and David Styan, "A Right to 
Interfere? Bernard Kouchner and the New Humanitarianism", Journal of International 
Development 12, no. 6 (2000). Michael Ignatieff, Empire Lite: Nation-Building in Bosnia, 
Kosovo and Afghanistan (London: Penguin, 2003), 45-75. Bernard Kouchner, Le Premier Qui 
Dit La Vérité… Entretiens Avec Eric Favereau (Paris: Robert Laffont, 2002). Bernard 
Kouchner, Les Guerriers De La Paix: Du Kosovo À L'iraq (Paris: Bernard Grasset, 2004).  
14
 The preferred local version appears to be “Tonibler” or “Toni”. Ben Chu, "Named after 
Tony in the Land Where Blair Is King", The Independent (10 July 2010). Available at 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/named-after-tony-in-the-land-where-
blair-is-king-2023127.html; accessed on 12 July 2010. 
15
 For a definitive account of the UNHCR, see Gil Loescher, The UNHCR and World Politics: A 
Perilous Path (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). 
16
 Antonio Donini, "The Far Side: The Meta Functions of Humanitarianism in a Globalised 
World", Disasters 34, no. s2 (2010): 220. 
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it is appropriate to the development of the argument, with the realm of 
professional humanitarianism, that is, the sphere of aid and relief work that 
explicitly labels itself “humanitarian”, as the constant touchstone in terms of 
relating to actually-existing humanitarianism.
17
 But a brief summary of this 
unwritten thesis seems appropriate, as the argument presented here will range 
widely, and an indication of where it plausibly might go will lay down some useful 
markers for what follows, especially when it comes to the later chapters which 
explore such conceptual spaces of institutionalised humanitarianism as human 
rights, global justice, and ultimately liberalism itself. 
 Such a work would firstly have to consider the creation of actors designed to 
carry out humanitarian action. Ian Smillie and Larry Minear identify five types of 
humanitarian actors: “United Nations institutions, government aid agencies, 
international nongovernmental organisations (NGOs), members of the Red Cross 
and Red Crescent movement, and local NGOs and other civil society institutions 
based in countries facing emergencies”.
18
 This list represents the classical core of 
professional humanitarianism, which will be the starting point for the thesis. But it 
is at best a partial list. The role of individuals, acting individually or in concert on an 
ad hoc basis is vitally important, while Chapters 5 and, especially, 6 will explore the 
role of states themselves, beyond their aid departments and incorporating their 
military capacity. We would also want to consider the role of actors within pre-
existing humanitarian projects: a soldier fulfilling his obligations under IHL, or a 
judge adjudicating on a war crimes trial. 
 Indeed, legal embodiments of the humanitarian impulse would have to be 
an important part of a longer account. Here we would need to look at the 
                                                           
17
 This broadly corresponds to “the cluster of enterprises referred to as ‘international 
humanitarian assistance’”, identified by Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, alongside 
international humanitarian law and international human rights law, as one of the three 
main manifestations of humanitarian concern since 1945. They also recommend 
approaching the question of the meaning of “humanitarian” obliquely, through an analysis 
of how practitioners understand it Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse, Humanitarian 
Intervention in Contemporary Conflict: A Reconceptualization (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
1996), 9-10. 
18
 Ian Smillie and Larry Minear, The Charity of Nations: Humanitarian Action in a Calculating 
World (Bloomfield: Kumarian Press, 2004), 11. 
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development of bodies of International Humanitarian Law, Refugee Law, 
International Human Rights Law, International Criminal Law, and at specific pieces 
of Public International Law, such as the Genocide Convention. 
 We would also have to consider more loosely defined practices. Most 
obviously here we would explore professional humanitarianism, international 
human rights advocacy and international development assistance. But a strong 
argument could also be made for the relevance of military humanitarian 
intervention, conflict resolution, peacekeeping, or statebuilding. 
 Finally, cutting across these categories are overarching concepts and 
vocabularies to ground and justify these institutional realisations: universal human 
rights, development, global social justice, perhaps the emerging notion of a 
“Responsibility to Protect” (R2P). 
 This thesis undertakes the groundwork necessary to justify all of the above 
as part of the humanitarian conversation and the “politics of humanity”. Inevitably, 
it is impossible to do justice to all of the possibilities, all of the particular 
crystallisations of the humanitarian impulse, cited above in a work of this scale. 
Therefore, the following approach is adopted as a solid basis for a rigorous and 
revealing conceptual analysis: 
 (1) Build the discussion from the dilemmas and paradoxes of humanitarian 
action as they appear in concentrated form in the experiences of professional 
humanitarians, through subjecting the literature on the humanitarian identity crisis, 
summarised in the next section, to critical analysis. This comes with the caveat that 
the actions of professional humanitarians should be seen as embedded in wider 
social understandings and identities that enable their actions, as will be seen 
especially throughout the thesis. 
 (2) Broaden the discussion out to other putative formulations of or 
alternatives to humanitarian action, such as human rights and global social justice, 
because they are posited by professional humanitarians as possible resolutions to 
the dilemmas that emerge from the analysis, and they provide a way to flesh out 
the normative questions at stake. 
 17 
 
 (3) Explore these areas through the contemporary normative debates on 
them in international political theory, as every point of contention raised in the 
thesis speaks to these debates, and the context of international political theory is 
the suitable one to explore the issues raised by the particular blend of ethics and 
politics that characterises humanitarian action. In section III below, I explain why 
this juxtaposition has not been done before. Though much weight is put on the 
experiences of practitioners, the lived experience of humanitarianism, the thesis 
endorses the view of Peter J. Hoffman and Thomas G. Weiss that “[the] survival and 
success of humanitarianism rests on moving beyond a divide that presents 
practitioners as guardians and scholars as gadflies. In war zones the price of 
humanitarian failure has always been paid in blood.”
19
 As such, it is hoped that the 
conceptual work here may contribute to dispelling some of the fog of war. 
 (4) To illustrate the argument, draw on practical examples from the core 
sites of crisis of recent humanitarianism, such the Rwandan Genocide or Srebrenica. 
But also illustrate the argument with a selection of examples from empirical cases 
and problems that speak to one of the core dilemmas of humanitarianism: that its 
justification in terms of a concern for humanity has implications far broader than 
that which it is willing to accept as falling within the remit of humanitarian 
responsibility. Especially important here are events or problems that do not fit the 
conventional understanding of professional humanitarian action, but the exclusion 
of which would render impossible any plausible definitional attempt. In particular, I 
will return frequently to three cases. 
 Firstly, British abolitionism in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
century.
20
 Martha Finnemore argues that “[the] abolition of slavery and the slave 
trade in the nineteenth century were essential to the universalization of 
‘humanity’”.
21
 As such, the British campaign that led to substantial British political 
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 Peter J. Hoffman and Thomas G. Weiss, "Humanitarianism and Practitioners: Social 
Science Matters", in Humanitarianism in Question: Politics, Power, Ethics, ed. Michael 
Barnett and Thomas G. Weiss (London: Cornell University Press, 2008), 285. 
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Struggle to Abolish Slavery (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2005). 
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and military action to ban the Atlantic slave trade is a particularly useful case. 
Secondly, the acts of rescuers of Jews during the Holocaust.
22
  The Holocaust is 
frequently seen as a foundational episode in the understanding of how we can fail 
to honour our common humanity and the cornerstone of post-Second World War 
moral universalism.
23
 We will see that the exceptional actions of Rescuers come 
close to a quintessence of humanitarian action, yet do not “fit” current accounts of 
what humanitarian action supposedly consists of. Thirdly, the challenge of climate 
change, which not only threatens to massively increase the frequency and intensity 
of humanitarian crises of different kinds, but also arguably represents a watershed 
“crisis of humanity”, challenging in a profound way the political agency and 
responsibility of humanity as a category, and the possibilities of human solidarity.
24
 
 Having set out in broad terms the starting point of the thesis, I will now 
briefly set out the key elements of the humanitarian identity crisis, showing that it 
raises profound normative questions about the politics of our common humanity. 
 
II The Humanitarian Identity Crisis 
 
For professional humanitarians, as indeed for many observers, the two decades 
since the end of the Cold War have been a disorientating period. In 1999, Thomas 
Weiss published an influential dissection of an emerging “humanitarian identity 
crisis” in Ethics & International Affairs.25 1999 was a crucial, yet bittersweet year in 
the recent history of humanitarianism. The French medical humanitarian NGO 
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23
 On the process underlying this, see Jeffrey C. Alexander, "On the Social Construction of 
Moral Universals: The `Holocaust' from War Crime to Trauma Drama", 5, no. 1 (2002). 
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Médecins Sans Frontières won the Nobel Peace Prize, and in accepting it on behalf 
of the organisation, its president James Orbinski delivered one of the most powerful 
humanitarian credos.
26
 But 1999 was also the year of NATO’s intervention in 
Kosovo, which would later be judged legitimate, but not legal by an independent 
commission, and divided the professional humanitarian community.
27
 For some, it 
represented the triumph of pragmatic engagement with international politics, for 
others the corruption and co-option of humanitarianism by politics. This brought 
into focus debates on humanitarianism and its relationship to humanitarian 
intervention that had been brewing since a series of crises in Somalia, Bosnia and 
Rwanda in the first half of the 1990s. A paper written in the aftermath of these 
crises by Alex de Waal and Rakiya Omaar, criticising the failures of relief-led 
approaches to humanitarianism to resolve the problems they dealt with, is widely 
identified, including by Weiss, as the starting point of the literature of 
humanitarianism in crisis.
28
 
 A decade on from Weiss’ seminal intervention, there has been no sign of 
resolution in the humanitarian identity crisis, not least because the aftermath of 
9/11 and the Bush administration’s War on Terror significantly upped the stakes of 
the 1990s debates. During this period, a rich literature has developed, which now 
affords us the luxury of being able to set out an empirically-grounded account of the 
debates without requiring a vast quantity of new fieldwork. In other words, we do 
not need to go and ask humanitarians what they think, as they have, in many cases, 
already told us. Furthermore, they have told us in terms particularly suited to the 
kind of normative analysis characteristic of an international political theory 
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perspective, terms redolent of the tensions between and conceptual problems 
associated with notions of sovereignty, rights and justice.
29
 
 The past decades have witnessed the crystallisation of what we might term a 
literature of humanitarianism in crisis. This critical, indeed often self-critical 
literature has emerged from a number of sources. We can now begin to assemble a 
coherent picture of it. Memoirs and studies by professional aid workers such as 
MSF’s Rony Brauman, James Orbinski, Fiona Terry and Oxfam’s Tony Vaux are 
central texts.
30
 They provide an interesting counterpoint to the autobiographies and 
biographies of figures from within the UN system like Sadako Ogata, Jan Egeland 
and Sergio Viera de Mello.
31
 Most of these works are very much alive to the ethical 
and political dilemmas of the humanitarian calling, presenting a valuable source of 
material for the academic study of humanitarianism.
32
 Closely related to these is 
the reportage work of a number of sometimes critical friends of professional 
humanitarianism such as William Shawcross, Michael Ignatieff and Caroline 
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Moorehead.33 But perhaps most important is the outstanding contribution of David 
Rieff, whose A Bed for the Night captures many of the tensions and paradoxes at 
stake.34  
 These contributions are being enriched by creative cross-disciplinary 
academic work with a strongly applied focus by scholars such as Alex de Waal, David 
Keen and Stephen Hopgood.35 The coming-of-age of this kind of work is exemplified 
by a recent collection edited by Michael Barnett and Thomas G. Weiss, perhaps the 
most important contribution to the academic study of humanitarianism, which 
provides an interesting comparison with an earlier collection, setting out some of 
the problems at stake, by Jonathan Moore.36 Weiss himself is perhaps one of the 
most important figures in the academic study of humanitarianism, having written, 
co-written and edited a series of influential articles and books, in dialogue with 
interlocutors from politics, practice and academia, often within the pages of Ethics 
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& International Affairs.37 Other important voices in this expanding discussion 
include Hugo Slim and Larry Minear, who have both also straddled the worlds of 
academia, practice and policy.38 Some writers identify an emerging new field of 
humanitarian studies.39 
 Assembled together in this way, this literature throws up a number of 
important questions, which might be organized around three key, inter-connected 
themes, already present in Weiss’ 1999 article: (1) the principles that define and 
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guide humanitarianism, which sometimes sit in tension with the dilemmas 
professional humanitarians encounter on the ground; (2) the relationship between 
humanitarianism and politics in all its forms; (3) the boundaries and scope of 
humanitarianism as a concept.40 In the rest of this section, I will briefly summarise 
the problems of contemporary humanitarianism according to this schema, before 
arguing in the next section that an international political theory focus allows us to 
bring these dilemmas to life, for they inevitably lead to a bigger question, 
particularly well suited to the resurgent perspective of international political theory: 
what is humanitarianism?41 As humanitarians work through the contours of 
humanitarian identity, they reveal both a political struggle to safeguard and ring-
fence their own legitimacy, but also much about the ways in which our human 
identity is politicised and enacted in contemporary international politics. Because 
humanitarian identity is so intertwined with ideas about human identity, they are 
constantly faced with a tension described by Hugo Slim. “Laughter is a universal 
good.  What would the world be like if only clowns were allowed to be funny and 
make people laugh?  This would be a terrible world that confined humour to a 
professional class and restricted a universal human desire and capacity.”42 This is 
the constant dilemma of the humanitarian identity crisis: how to simultaneously 
preserve and spread their sense of humanity. 
 
 
                                                           
40 In this classification, I follow the summary by Barnett and Weiss who identify a 
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1. Humanitarian Principles 
 
Attempts to define humanitarianism tend to contain two elements: they indicate 
the kind of action at stake, such as the provision of relief in war zones or in the 
aftermath of natural disasters, or, in a more general sense, the alleviation of 
extreme suffering. They then enunciate the principles that should condition the 
undertaking of such action. As we shall see, it is often ambiguous as to whether the 
principles being enunciated are ethical principles of general resonance, applied 
ethical principles, or simply operating principles. Furthermore, it will be argued that 
the persistent ambiguity stems from two different interpretations of how best to 
ring-fence and protect humanitarianism as a privileged endeavour. A focus on the 
universal ethical applicability of humanitarian principles presents the promise of a 
privileged moral claim or authority, while a rigorous set of operating principles 
suggests the possibility of a clear and unambiguous practical purpose. This is the 
first core tension of humanitarianism, one that will run through the thesis and is 
arguably ultimately irresolvable, due to the constant dual grounding of 
humanitarianism in the worlds of practice and ethics, and the necessity of 
negotiating that through politics. 
 The most famous, and dominant set of humanitarian principles is that of the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), an institution that still retains an 
unsurpassed degree of moral authority within professional humanitarianism.43 
These have been evolving since the publication of Henry Dunant’s seminal A 
Memory of Solferino.44 One of the first descriptions of Red Cross principles by 
Gustave Moynier, then president of the ICRC, in 1875, stresses four: foresight, 
solidarity (among Red Cross societies), centralisation (within each country) and 
                                                           
43 On the politics of moral authority, see Stephen Hopgood, "Moral Authority, Modernity 
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mutuality (close to the current understanding of impartiality).45 These were clearly 
working principles, reflecting the struggle to get the movement on its feet. In 1921, 
the Statutes of the ICRC were revised to focus on four fundamental principles: 
impartiality, independence (political, economic and religious), universality of the 
Red Cross Movement, and equality of Red Cross members.46 Then, from 1946 
onwards, they were systematically revised and expanded, becoming progressively 
more institutionalised until their official proclamation in Vienna in 1965. Though 
representing the view of one particular organisation, they have a canonical status 
within humanitarianism, for they are the ones being either endorsed or contested in 
contemporary struggles for the soul of humanitarianism, including within the ICRC 
itself. Furthermore, many writers and practitioners seem to find themselves 
returning to the ICRC account of humanitarianism. The Dunantist tradition still 
exerts a powerful hold over the consciences of many professional humanitarians. 
For instance, at the end of his life, a leading French humanitarian from MSF, 
François Jean, confided to David Rieff that “he felt closer and closer to the ICRC’s 
approach”.47 
 The most authoritative explanatory voice on their meaning and content is 
that of Jean Pictet, a major figure within the organisation, who produced a major 
analysis of Red Cross principles in 1955.48 The definitive list contains seven 
fundamental principles: humanity, impartiality, neutrality, independence, voluntary 
service, unity, universality. It is now almost conventional to assert the primary 
importance of the first four. Without doubt, they are the most discussed. In the 
words of Barnett and Weiss, they are “the core”.49 Nicholas Leader considers that 
“the principles of humanitarian action show a remarkable degree of continuity”, 
around this central core.50 But it is interesting to note that part of the unease 
                                                           
45 IFRC, "Origin of the Fundamental Principles". Available at 
http://www.ifrc.org/what/values/principles/origin.asp; accessed on 05 July 2010. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Rieff, A Bed for the Night, 331. 
48 IFRC, "Origin of the Fundamental Principles". 
49 Barnett and Weiss, "Humanitarianism", 3. 
50 Nicholas Leader, "Proliferating Principles, or How to Sup with the Devil without Getting 
Eaten", International Journal of Human Rights 2, no. 4 (1998): 22. 
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discernable within the literature of humanitarianism in crisis could plausibly be 
linked to the persistent influence of the last three.51 For example, the principle of 
voluntary service sits in tension with the increasingly professionalised practice of 
humanitarianism. As such, I will give the official Red Cross definition of each 
principle, briefly discuss them, and present the issues that arise from them and that 
permeate the rest of the thesis.52 
 
Humanity 
 
The Red Cross, born of a desire to bring assistance without discrimination to 
the wounded on the battlefield, endeavours – in its international and 
national capacity – to prevent and alleviate human suffering wherever it 
may be found. Its purpose is to protect life and health and to ensure respect 
for the human being. It promotes mutual understanding, friendship, co-
operation and lasting peace amongst all peoples.53 
 
Ramsbotham and Woodhouse consider the principle of humanity to be the “heart 
of humanitarianism”.54 Indeed, it is widely recognised as such. For Pictet: 
 
In the doctrine of the Red Cross, the principle of humanity, from which all 
the other principles flow, obviously has to stand in first place. As the basis of 
the institution, it provides at the same time its ideal, its motivation and its 
objective. It is indeed the prime mover for the whole movement, the spark 
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which ignites the powder, the line of force for all its action. If the Red Cross 
were to have only one principle, it would be this one.55 
 
Tony Vaux sees it as “the fundamental moral value of humanitarianism”, taking 
precedence over all the others, and defining it more concisely as “concern for the 
person in need”.56 However one looks at it, the principle of humanity clearly 
represents a potentially open-ended solidaristic commitment. Its scope goes far 
beyond the traditional activities of professional humanitarianism, and in defining it, 
we are constantly faced with slippage across the three senses of humanity evoked 
in the introduction of this chapter. One way of reading the following principles is 
simply as a way to describe how best to honour the principle of humanity. Another, 
not necessarily opposed one, is as a way of closing down that open-ended scope 
through specification. Many of the tensions professional humanitarians face, I will 
argue, emerge from the need to justify their specific principles, which takes them 
back to the principle of humanity with the uncontrollability of its open-endedness. 
Furthermore, as I will argue in Chapter 2, how to make sense of “human suffering” 
is by no means straightforward. 
 Ramsbotham and Woodhouse see the principle of humanity as recognising 
“the common humanity that lies beneath political divisions even in war”.57 This idea 
of an essential underlying humanity is also the focus of many of the critiques of 
humanitarian action, which caution that in stripping away all politics, all that is left 
is a depoliticised “bare life”.58 Another common theme of critiques is how slippery 
appeals to common humanity can be, and how the claim of acting “in the name of 
humanity” can rapidly become an alibi for unaccountable acts and abuses of power. 
Humanity is the ultimate legitimising principle. To quote Henry Kissinger (perhaps 
an unlikely source of humanitarian wisdom): “[legitimizing] principles triumph by 
                                                           
55 Pictet, The Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross, unpaginated text. 
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being taken for granted.”59 We tend to assume our own humanity, both as a quality 
and as a disposition, and are thus easily seduced by appeals that flatter it, as we will 
see in Chapter 3. Moreover, it is always easier to see another’s humanity as lacking, 
rather than one’s own. Here, the ways in which the principle of humanity has 
become taken for granted, not least debates within liberal international political 
theory, will be explored, as well as those where we seek to impose our own 
conception of humanity on others. 
 
Impartiality 
 
It makes no discrimination as to nationality, race, religious beliefs, class or 
political opinions. It endeavours only to relieve suffering, giving priority to 
the most urgent cases of distress.60 
 
For Pictet, the next principle, impartiality, is already implied in the first. Vaux 
agrees. “Impartiality is an essential quality of humanity because it means that we do 
not distinguish between persons. In other words, we are fair.”61 On the face of it, 
this principle is a logical concomitant of the principle of humanity. If we are serious 
about a common humanity, we must be impartial and non-discriminatory about 
where suffering is most urgent. Impartiality is a clear point of linkage into liberal 
political and international political theory. Impartiality has appeared in various 
guises from Adam Smith’s impartial spectator to Brian Barry’s conception of justice 
as impartiality.62 As Richard Shapcott points out, there is a clear link here between 
the central place of impartiality in humanitarian practice and the importance of an 
external, impartial point of judgement in cosmopolitan theorising.63 But a number 
of difficulties emerge here. For humanitarians, being impartial requires making a 
judgement about whose suffering is worse, most urgent, perhaps even most unjust. 
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It is not clear that a hierarchy of suffering is the best way to honour our sense of 
humanity. Furthermore, as we will see in Chapters 3 and 5, the building blocks of 
our moral concern, both at psychological and political levels, are not situated at an 
impartial position. For instance, there may be a trade-off between maximising 
solidarity in the short term, and impartially assessing the justice of a given situation 
over a longer time-frame.64  
 
Neutrality 
 
In order to continue to enjoy the confidence of all, the Red Cross may not 
take sides in hostilities or engage at any time in controversies of a political, 
racial, religious or ideological nature.65 
 
Hugo Slim playfully remarks that in the Inferno, Dante reserves a special torment for 
those who have been neutral, committing the sin of moral indecision and 
vacillation. They are destined forever to rush after an aimlessly whirling banner 
while being attacked by swarms of hornets. He drily notes that this is not, after all, 
so far removed from the everyday experiences of many aid workers.66 Neutrality 
has been the most obviously controversial humanitarian principle. The most vivid 
illustration of its limitations was the strict neutrality, and silence, maintained by the 
ICRC in relation to Nazi concentration camps during the Second World War. The 
decision not to speak out, in order to enable to ICRC to pursue its core wartime 
functions, has haunted the organisation, and arguably the whole humanitarian 
sector, ever since.67 
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 A quarter of a century later, it was on the question of maintaining strict 
neutrality and belligerent consent that a group of French Red Cross doctors split 
from the organisation during the Biafran crisis, leading to the formation of MSF. The 
highly influential MSF critique, still very much within the Dunantist tradition, 
nevertheless reserves the right not to remain neutral and to speak out, if bearing 
witness is the appropriate response to a situation.68 During the Biafran crisis, Oxfam 
and other NGOs, fearing a genocide, also abandoned neutrality and organised 
airlifts of supplies. Jumping forward, neutrality has clearly been a critical principle in 
terms of recent debates on military humanitarian intervention, as they can 
obviously never be neutral. But with the benefit of hindsight, fears of a genocide in 
Biafra were not borne out and the more cautious ICRC approach may have been 
more justified. Its defenders argue that it remains effective as an operating 
principle, as an enabler of access and guarantor of non-belligerent status, and that 
humanitarianism still has more to lose than to gain from abandoning it.69 
 But in a broader sense, David Kennedy notes that within the practice of war 
“the formal status of neutrality has eroded”.70 In the context of complex 
emergencies, neutrality can appear particularly difficult to operationalise.71 In 
situations such as genocides, it is non-existent. The question then arises of whether 
humanitarianism should seek to collaborate with powerful states to put a stop to 
the killing. 
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Independence 
 
The Red Cross is independent. The National Societies, while auxiliaries in the 
humanitarian services of their Governments and subject to the laws of their 
respective countries, must always maintain their autonomy so that they may 
be able at all times to act in accordance with Red Cross principles.72 
 
As will become clear during the course of the argument, true independence has 
always been something of a chimera for humanitarians, but the struggle for 
independence, especially from states, is at the heart of professional humanitarians’ 
attempts to define themselves.73 This is partly because it is always easier to define 
oneself against another, but mainly because humanitarians fear becoming 
instrumentalised. Famously, many humanitarians were deeply disturbed by Colin 
Powell’s unashamed cooption of their moral authority in the context of the war in 
Afghanistan:  
 
As I speak, just as surely as our diplomats and military, American NGOs are 
out there serving and sacrificing on the front lines of freedom . . . . I am 
serious about making sure we have the best relationship with the NGOs who 
are such a force multiplier for us, such an important part of our combat 
team. [We are] all committed to the same, singular purpose to help every 
man and woman in the world who is in need, who is hungry, who is without 
hope, to help every one of them fill a belly, get a roof over their heads, 
educate their children, have hope.74 
 
The anxiety here is that, in the absence of strict independence, neutrality and 
impartiality are unsustainable, and that anyone will be able to co-opt humanitarian 
moral authority for their “combat team” so long as they claim to act in the name of 
humanity. They fear that their “humanitarian space” is shrinking. 
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Voluntary service 
 
The Red Cross is a voluntary relief organization not prompted in any manner 
by desire for gain.75 
 
The principle of voluntary service raises particularly interesting issues. Rarely 
mentioned explicitly in discussions about humanitarianism, my contention here is 
that anxiety over this principle is at the very heart of the current identity crisis of 
humanitarianism.76 As Pictet notes in his commentary, Dunant himself judged that 
good will was preferable to paid help in the carrying out of humanitarian work.77 
Though for reasons of clarity I will employ the term professional humanitarianism 
throughout this thesis, to contrast with more diffuse actions and wider social 
dispositions, many humanitarians would still baulk at the term. Avoiding paid help 
has become increasingly unviable as humanitarianism has become institutionalised, 
though it remains problematic when it comes to, for instance, pay discrepancies 
between local and international staff. How can an endeavour like humanitarianism 
discriminate against local employees? Yet either solution presents problems: if it 
lowers the pay and worsens the conditions of internationals in line with local 
conditions, they would lose some of the institutionalised humanitarian gains of their 
home countries, if they come from liberal democracies, which they are presumably 
precisely trying to spread. If they raise the salaries for local staff to international 
level, they can create a distorting brain drain effect. 
 Simultaneously, as Hopgood points out, to sustain itself as a professional 
enterprise, humanitarianism is forced to commodify its moral authority, to sell itself 
to achieve its ends, to engage in ruthless competition for lucrative contracts.78 At 
this point, ring-fencing its distinctive, privileged claim to moral authority becomes 
more difficult, and it becomes even more important to try to preserve the essence 
of the voluntary service principle, doing the right thing for the right reason, hence 
the relentless debates about right motive and right intent that have characterised, 
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in particular, debates on humanitarian intervention, but have also been latent in 
discussions about the necessity of independence, that is, of excluding actors with 
suspicious or mixed motives. It also explains the frequent reification of altruism, to 
the point where humanitarianism often becomes synonymous with altruism.79 I will 
attempt to debunk this category error in Chapter 3. 
 The other tension that emerges is that between charitable, discretionary 
action, and action that merely respects, say, a piece of binding humanitarian 
legislation. This is linked to debates on charity versus justice, which I will introduce 
below. The relevant point here is the paradox that much humanitarian action is 
described as the pursuit of justice, and thus presumably of establishing non-
discretionary duties, yet only charitable acts become classified as humanitarian. 
Professional humanitarians are still often smitten with the idea of themselves as 
Good Samaritans.80 But humanitarianism cannot, on this account, bank any moral 
gains, and locks itself in to always being an “emblem of failure”, in David Rieff’s 
words.81 
 
Unity 
 
There can be only one Red Cross Society in any one country. It must be open 
to all. It must carry on its humanitarian work throughout its territory.82 
 
The issues arising from the principle of unity build on those surrounding voluntary 
service. Pictet writes that: 
 
For practical reasons, which are nonetheless imperative, the Red Cross 
Society must be the only one of its kind in the territory of each nation, for 
this is essential to the efficacy of its work. We can well imagine the 
confusion which would prevail in a country if several associations, all 
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proclaiming the same principles, were to advertise that they were carrying 
out the same tasks independently!83 
 
Though unity, in this sense, has been achieved within the Red Cross movement, it 
has long been forsaken in the wider sector of professional humanitarianism. 
Different issue-areas often see a multitude of organisations competing with each 
other for donations, funding and contracts, and rushing to be the first to plant the 
flag. As Pictet predicted, this has often resulted in confusion and in ineffectiveness, 
with organisations feeling they need a presence in X or Y crisis, rather than 
genuinely meeting a need.84 Some of the measures employed to self-regulate will 
be discussed in Chapter 5. But the more profound issue here is that if many 
professional humanitarians feel they need an unquestionable, homogenous identity 
to legitimise their action, such an identity is clearly in tension with the need to 
compete and distinguish oneself from other organisations. 
 
Universality 
 
The Red Cross is a world-wide institution in which all Societies have equal 
status and share equal responsibilities and duties in helping each other.85 
 
The question of universality brings us full circle, back to the issues raised by the 
principle of humanity. Though ostensibly just referring to the organisation of the 
Red Cross, Pictet’s commentary relates this to universality of purpose. For Pictet, 
humanity and impartiality imply universality, and an egalitarian universality at 
that.86 But we face the question of whether universality precedes the principle of 
humanity, or whether the principle of humanity precisely emerges from the lack of 
agreement on universal respect for human dignity, or even on the content of such a 
                                                           
83 Ibid. 
84 Randolph C. Kent, "International Humanitarian Crises: Two Decades before and Two 
Decades Beyond", International Affairs 80, no. 5 (2004): 862. 
85 Pictet, The Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross, unpaginated text. 
86 Ibid. 
 35 
 
concept. It raises the question of how those issues are negotiated and therefore, 
the issue of politics. 
 
2. Humanitarianism and Politics 
 
Professional humanitarians have long been uneasy with the idea that they are 
implicated in politics. Partly this relates to the negative connotation “politics” is 
often seen to have, a zone of compromise and negotiation, which might be 
necessary and valuable, but contrasts sharply with other spheres of activity that are 
understood as without compromise. To give one example, Daniel Barenboim is fond 
of making the distinction between success in music, which requires a determination 
not to compromise, and success in politics, which precisely rewards those skilled in 
cutting deals. Many would like to identify a similar distinction between 
humanitarianism and politics. Barenboim recently described the West-Eastern 
Divan Orchestra, a musical collaboration between young Arab and Israeli musicians 
founded by Barenboim in collaboration with Edward Said, as “a humanitarian idea”. 
He then made clear that: “[we] don’t see ourselves as a political project”.87 Putting 
aside the unlikelihood of any project involving Edward Said being apolitical, this 
seems both an implausible and an unnecessary characterisation. Surely the point is 
to demonstrate that a better kind of politics, collaboration, is possible, in contrast 
with the politics of mutual distrust and violence.88 
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 In recent years, many professional humanitarians have been more willing to 
acknowledge the political dimension of what they do.89 Janice Stein likens this 
recognition to humanitarians “growing up” and argues that: 
 
Humanitarians, belatedly and with difficulty, are acknowledging that they 
have been speaking prose, and have been doing so for a long time. To 
pretend otherwise, to struggle to maintain the fiction that their work is 
apolitical, is to do a disservice to those they seek to help.90 
 
The true contours of humanitarian politics, understood as a “politics of humanity”, 
will gradually take shape as the argument of this thesis proceeds. It is a strong 
contention of the thesis that a truly apolitical humanitarianism is both impossible 
and undesirable. But within the sphere of professional humanitarianism, explicit 
debates on the relationship between humanitarianism and politics have been a 
particularly salient feature of the humanitarian identity crisis. 
 Thomas Weiss posed in his 1999 piece the important question of how the 
intersection between politics and humanitarian action best “can be managed to 
ensure more humanized politics and more effective humanitarian action”.91 He 
distinguished firstly between classicists, of which the ICRC is the archetypal 
example, who see a constant necessity for humanitarian action to be insulated from 
politics, and political humanitarians, including himself, who see the association 
between humanitarian action and politics as both inevitable and desirable.92 Within 
political humanitarianism, he outlined three trends: minimalists, who aim to “do no 
harm”, maximalists, who see humanitarianism as a means to more transformative 
ends, such as ending conflict, and solidarists, “who choose sides and abandon 
neutrality and impartiality as well as reject consent as a prerequisite for 
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intervention”.93 This categorisation is not uncontroversial. For example, he includes 
MSF as an example of solidarism, but MSF certainly would not see themselves as 
abandoning impartiality. On the contrary, a concern to act impartially precisely 
drives their qualification of neutrality, outlined in the previous section. 
 The approach here is to consider all humanitarianisms as embodying 
versions of politics. Classicists clearly see their apolitical nature in terms of their 
commitment to neutrality and impartiality, but Laura Suski makes the point that if 
“the principles of neutrality and impartiality are the only measurements of the 
(a)political nature of humanitarianism, we are certainly employing a limited view of 
the political”.94 I will take seriously, throughout the thesis, the merits of a politics of 
appearing apolitical in different contexts, but ultimately I endorse a more expansive 
view of the political, as set out in the introduction to the chapter. As such, I will not 
adopt this, or any other classification, that describes approaches in terms of “their 
degree of political involvement”.95 It makes sense for Weiss, as for him the key 
types of politics are “the competition among states”, “the struggle for power and 
influence within donor and crisis states”, and “efforts to agree upon desirable 
international public policies within governmental, intergovernmental, and 
nongovernmental arenas”.96 But this thesis will employ, for instance in Chapters 2 
and 3, much broader understandings of social life as a political context. The 
question of politics is not one of degree, but of kind. 
 What Weiss’ classification does help us identify, however, is what 
humanitarians see as the core political issues, and these are important for our 
purposes. The first of these, implicit in the preceding discussion, is how 
humanitarians understand the status of the principles introduced in the previous 
section. That is, which they consider to be ethical principles and which operating 
principles, and how to construct a politics that turns that view into a workable 
package. Secondly, the concern of minimalist political humanitarians, of which Mary 
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Anderson is the best example, to “do no harm”, represents a discussion of the 
political consequences of humanitarian action, including harmful consequences, 
and the problems of responsibility for those.97 Thirdly, the transformative concerns 
of maximalists point to the biggest debate of all: what is the scope of 
humanitarianism? 
 
3. The Scope of Humanitarianism 
 
Craig Calhoun argues that professional humanitarians are haunted by three 
questions, pertaining to the scope of their endeavour: 
 
Do they seek to improve the human condition, the well-being of all 
humanity? Or, do they seek to alleviate suffering, impartially, neutrally, and 
wherever it may occur? Or, do they respond more specifically to 
“humanitarian emergencies,” seemingly sudden crises in which human 
conflict creates concentrated human suffering, in which, perhaps, suffering 
is so extreme as to be dehumanizing?98 
 
This sets out some useful initial parameters about the practical scope of 
humanitarianism. Linked to this is the perennial question of whether 
humanitarianism, in addressing all or any of these practical directions, should be 
addressing the root causes of the suffering in question, or merely dealing with the 
consequences. For example, Roberto Belloni states clearly his view on the subject. 
“Humanitarianism is not about prevention, but damage control.”99 But looking back 
through the history of professional humanitarianism, it rapidly becomes evident 
that such a clear-cut view has never been taken, even by that bastion of classical 
humanitarianism, the ICRC. In its attempts to “humanise” war, the ICRC has always 
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effectively adopted a preventive mode. It is hard to identify any humanitarian actor 
that does not in some way incorporate preventive aspects into their action. 
Nevertheless, there are tensions within professional humanitarianism about 
whether their main focus should be root causes, or immediate consequences of 
suffering. At a deep level, these relate to whether the emphasis is on the possibility 
of human perfectibility, or on a sceptical view of how much suffering can be 
averted. For example, Ignatieff argues that the 1949 Geneva Conventions “accept 
war as a normal anthropological ritual – the only way that certain human disputes 
can be resolved. They seek only to ensure that warriors conform to certain basic 
principles of humanity”.100 
 Linked to these discussions are the kinds and contexts of suffering that 
humanitarians see as most relevant, as suggested by Calhoun’s third item. Is 
suffering to be ring-fenced in “emergencies” or understood in a more diffuse and 
disparate manner, and what normative framework should be established to 
articulate it as a matter for concern. This will emerge clearly in the examination of 
how professional humanitarians conceptualise human suffering in Chapter 2, and 
again in their debates on whether to align themselves with the project of enshrining 
and defending universal human rights, or to dedicate themselves to the pursuit of 
global justice (see Chapter 5). 
 Indeed the question of justice is one of the constant touchstones of debates 
about the scope of humanitarianism. The position of Alain Destexhe is a case in 
point. “Humanitarian action is noble when coupled with political action and justice. 
Without them, it is doomed to failure and … a conscience-salving gimmick.”101 Yet 
much professional humanitarian action takes place in contexts and timescales 
within which it may be difficult to articulate, let alone achieve, justice. One key 
question is, should humanitarians seek an alternative nobility in virtues such as 
charity? This putative dichotomy will be examined in Chapter 5. But whether 
professional humanitarians see themselves as serving the demands of justice or 
charity, the content of their action also implies a debate about scope. At the heart 
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of it are practices of rescue, as will be set out in Chapter 4. But what rescue means 
is as ambiguous as the question of what is being saved. Does it entail providing “a 
bed for the night” or a roadmap to a fulfilled and happy life? 
 Furthermore, however professional humanitarians understand rescue, they 
face questions about the boundaries of the acceptable with regards to the means 
they employ. Important here are questions about the legitimacy of using violence in 
the exercise of humanitarian action (see Chapters 4 and 5). But arguably more 
significant is the question of how to situate different kinds of agents within or 
outside the scope of humanitarianism. The question of how individuals experience 
the humanitarian impulse will be examined in Chapter 3. How the humanitarian 
impulse is best enacted in a world of states, and whether the scope of 
humanitarianism needs to be seen as inclusive of international politics, is the topic 
of Chapter 6. 
 All these debates raise a serious of normative questions that cannot be fully 
understood within debates among professional humanitarians, who can at times 
employ slightly instrumentalised, impoverished accounts of ideas like human rights 
and global justice, and present sometimes limited accounts of the normative 
aspects of international politics, or indeed, the notion of common humanity at the 
core of their concerns and ours. Therefore, it makes sense to look to an area of 
theorising which has rather a lot to say about these issues.  
 
III Why Is There No International Political Theory of Humanitarianism? 
 
In this section I argue that when it comes to contemporary international political 
theory, humanitarianism is frequently discussed but little understood.102 The set of 
problems and dilemmas introduced above could plausibly be the focus for a 
detailed study from a variety of different disciplinary perspectives, including 
international law, development studies, sociology and anthropology. Indeed, a 
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detailed engagement with many particular aspects of the humanitarian endeavour 
necessitates the use of one or more of these perspectives. The contention of this 
thesis is that a particularly productive way to engage with this question is to treat it 
as a problem in international political theory, because more than any other 
perspective, it reveals the fundamental interdependence between the ethical and 
the political dimensions of humanitarianism. Examining humanitarianism and 
international political theory together enables us to explore the vital problems 
raised by this essential concept for our international moral lives, while shining a 
light on some of the less-examined corners of a rich body of work. By doing so, 
concepts such as solidarity and humanity, key to the moral life, are enriched. 
 Nicholas Rengger defines international political theory loosely as a field that 
“consists in ethical, historical and philosophical reflection on the manner and 
matter of international politics”.103 The resurgence of international political theory 
is now well into its third decade. Initially spurred by key texts such as Michael 
Walzer’s Just and Unjust Wars (originally published in 1977) and Charles Beitz’s 
Political Theory and International Relations (1979), it has greatly enriched our 
understanding of the ethical character of international politics.104 The discourse of 
international political theory provides a fertile context in which to discuss our 
international and global interactions as issues in applied political philosophy. A 
focus on international political theory allows us, say, to read Thomas Pogge and 
Paul Collier as interlocutors in a coherent debate on global poverty in a way that 
would perhaps not otherwise be possible, given their divergent disciplinary 
backgrounds in philosophy and economics.105 Furthermore, it demonstrates that 
issues that might previously have been seen as simply political are almost always 
inextricably intertwined with complex ethical debates. Doing international political 
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theory represents an acknowledgement that, for many international or global 
problems, it makes little sense to separate out the ethical from the political. 
 However, the discourse of international political theory, in so far as it can be 
summarised, can display a tendency to privilege certain core issues at the expense 
of other foci which might productively be examined as revealing and central 
concerns for international political theorists. A key claim that I want to advance 
here is that humanitarianism is just such a concern. Central to this claim is the 
proposition that international political theory as a self-conscious discourse has 
instrumentalised and therefore impoverished the study of humanitarianism, 
reducing it to a relatively narrow debate on the specific and controversial practice 
of military humanitarian intervention, instead of focusing on the vital debates 
outlined in the previous section. 
 There is a danger, here, incidentally, in that part of the point of doing 
international political theory is precisely to bring together relevant bodies of 
thought in response to problems in our international moral life, in ways that the 
authors who form the substantive content of the resulting international political 
theory debate had not perhaps anticipated. So to criticise a lack of conscious 
engagement with humanitarianism as a distinct focus is not necessarily a valid 
criticism for an international political theorist to make, it merely directs him or her 
to do the job of identifying an international political theory debate about 
humanitarianism. That is one of the key tasks of this work, and I pointed in the 
previous section to some key sources for that. But the point here is that within 
recent international political theory, humanitarianism has ostensibly been a rather 
prominent concern. Here, I want briefly to demonstrate how, within key debates in 
international political theory, humanitarianism, while prominent, has largely been 
instrumentalised as part of ongoing discussions about sovereignty, rights and 
justice, in a way that is potentially unhelpful as a starting point for our task. As such, 
a conscious move away from the manner in which the discourse of international 
political theory has explicitly treated humanitarianism is necessary, before the 
contributions of leading international political theorists, in terms of their implicit 
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engagement with humanitarianism in a much broader sense, can be brought back 
later in the thesis. 
 
1. International Political Theory’s Core Concerns 
 
Chris Brown has plausibly described contemporary international political theory as 
revolving around three core concerns: sovereignty, rights and justice.106 While his 
characterisation is not meant to be exhaustive, the ease with which the key 
contributions to international political theory of figures like Walzer, Beitz or John 
Rawls can be articulated in response to these concerns is significant. Arguably, the 
rich examination of these three concerns has come at the expense of a substantive 
engagement with humanitarianism as such. 
 Most explicit discussions of humanitarianism within international political 
theory take place in the context of debates on the specific practice of humanitarian 
intervention, to the extent that “humanitarianism” and “humanitarian intervention” 
are sometimes used interchangeably.107 Humanitarian intervention has been a 
defining trope of post-Cold War international political theory discussions, spawning 
a vast literature which continues to expand and embraces new debates such as that 
on the doctrine of the “Responsibility to Protect”. The relevant understanding of 
the term humanitarian intervention has been defined by J. L. Holzgrefe as  
 
the threat or use of force across state borders by a state (or group of states) 
aimed at preventing or ending widespread and grave violations of the 
fundamental human rights of individuals other than its own citizens, without 
the permission of the state within whose territory force is applied.108  
 
This widely cited definition accurately summarises the kind of humanitarian 
intervention at stake for key authors such as Michael Walzer or Nicholas Wheeler. It 
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is also clear that this particular practice within humanitarianism is the dominant 
focus for international political theorists in so far as they explicitly engage with 
humanitarianism.  
 Holzgrefe’s definition highlights four separate assumptions that render the 
explicit international political theory discourse on humanitarianism at best 
incomplete. First, the key agents of humanitarianism are assumed to be states. 
Second, violent means are at least potentially legitimate. Third, human rights 
violations form the problem to which humanitarian intervention is potentially the 
answer. Fourth, a violation of sovereignty in the name of the defence of human 
rights is at stake. I will briefly unpack all four. 
 The role of the state within humanitarianism is a complex one, and will be 
examined in greater depth in Chapter 6. But there is clearly a mismatch between 
the focus within the humanitarian intervention debates on what the state can or 
cannot deliver for humanitarianism and the view of many professional 
humanitarians that operational independence from states is a necessary 
characteristic of humanitarian action. This view often holds that humanitarianism 
precisely implies a lack of self-interest. Therefore, because states are self-interested 
actors, they cannot act on behalf of humanitarianism. This line of argument makes 
strange bedfellows of some of the more idealistic professional humanitarians and 
realist scholars of international relations. Chris Brown notes the intellectual 
contortions this leads to within international political theory. “Humanitarian 
intervention is generally seen as a non-realist, even anti-realist, notion, but the idea 
that there is, or might be, a separate category of state behaviour that can be 
characterized as 'humanitarian' owes its existence to the dominance of realist 
assumptions about international behaviour.”109 
 The means assumed to be at stake are also precisely the most problematic, 
when viewed from the perspective of say, a humanitarian aid worker. The use of 
violence may be called for in response to a particular problem, but cannot be seen 
as forming part of any humanitarian practice. It is often remarked that most 
professional humanitarians are not pacifists, yet many still assert that even a just 
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war can never be a humanitarian war, for the concept is simply an oxymoron in 
humanitarian terms. This issue will be examined in more depth in Chapter 4. But for 
now it raises the question of whether humanitarian intervention as understood by, 
say, a Nicholas Wheeler, is simply too different to be conceptually reconciled with 
the humanitarianism of the ICRC. Alex Bellamy captures the issue nicely. “Read 
through the Red Cross’ understanding of humanitarian principles, not one act of 
armed ‘humanitarian’ intervention discussed by pluralists and solidarists could earn 
the label ‘humanitarian’.”110 
 Arguably the key to this is whether they are both concerned with dealing 
with the same problem. To some extent they are. The justification for humanitarian 
intervention is often seen as being the egregious violation of human rights, 
something that is of course of central concern to many professional humanitarians, 
even if they sometimes see themselves as somewhat distinct from the promotion 
and protection of human rights. What Chapter 5 will attempt to do is reject a 
rigorous distinction between the spheres of humanitarianism and human rights, 
while arguing that by describing the “humanitarian” uniquely as that which comes 
into being in response to human rights violations, international political theory 
often neglects the way the social construction of human rights itself relies on pre-
existing humanitarian commitments. The assumption that humanitarianism 
depends on human rights, which often leads to arguments that humanitarianism 
should ground itself in human rights, is in this sense misleading. Furthermore, it 
risks obscuring the important role of self-help in rights-struggles. 
 It is however, understandable, for in examining humanitarian intervention, 
international political theorists are often actually merely probing the clash between 
their core concerns of sovereignty, rights and justice. Their starting point is not 
humanitarianism as such, but rather the circumstances in which sovereignty may or 
may not be breached in the name of rights, and how this relates to theories of 
(international or global) justice. This is clearly true of English School writers such as 
Wheeler, who notes that “[the] reason for focusing on the subject of humanitarian 
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intervention is that it poses the conflict between order and justice in international 
relations in its starkest form”.111 While the English School has delivered some of the 
key works of interest to international political theorists about humanitarian 
intervention, such as Wheeler’s Saving Strangers, there is a definite sense in which 
it rarely escapes its initial focus on the circumstances in which the norm of non-
intervention might justifiably be overridden.112 English School considerations of 
humanitarianism still broadly take place on the terms laid out by Hedley Bull over 
thirty years ago in his examination of the question of order versus justice.113 This, as 
Alex Bellamy astutely notes, leads us to a situation in which “humanitarianism is 
viewed through the lens of intervention rather than as a self-contained concept or 
group of practices”.114 This creates a fundamental bias in what we think of as 
“humanitarian”. “The key characteristic, therefore, is not the scale or nature of 
human suffering but whether that suffering requires outside intervention to 
alleviate it.”115 Bellamy notes that “[despite] the fact that the term ‘humanitarian’ is 
used so often, English School writers barely consider what it actually means”.116 Yet 
their work is often central to that of international political theorists, such as Simon 
Caney, in their considerations of humanitarian intervention.117 In the part of 
international political theory which draws more explicitly on political theory, much 
of the discussion on humanitarian intervention draws on the debate spurred by 
Walzer’s Just and Unjust Wars. This debate also considers the issue as one of a clash 
between sovereignty and rights, with arguments focusing on the moral basis for 
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sovereignty and the norm of non-intervention on the one hand, and universal 
human rights on the other.118 
 In this context, much analytical work is concerned with setting out the 
demands of justice at an international or global level. Humanitarian intervention is 
one point of discussion here, but a great deal of work is concerned with the scope 
of distributive justice. Much work done here at an ideal theory level assumes a 
strong contrast between duties of justice and “mere” humanitarianism. On a 
practical level, things look rather more complicated. Moreover, since humanitarians 
frequently see themselves as acting in the name of justice, there are clearly 
unresolved issues here, which will be examined in Chapter 5. Added to this is the 
focus on developing theories of responsibility. This is clearly an integral part of any 
serious theory of justice or rights, but inevitably light cast in one direction tends to 
leave others in shade. Arguably one of those areas of shade is the idea of solidarity. 
 
2. The Neglect of Solidarity 
 
This thesis is not trying to develop a theory of humanitarian duties or 
responsibilities, assigned to particular agents. Rather, it is interested in the 
parameters and content of a broader conversation, inclusive of those topics. That 
conversation is about the problem of human solidarity and how we describe our 
common human identity. Solidarity is rarely analysed in a sustained way in 
contemporary international political theory, though it is currently becoming more 
prominent in cosmopolitan scholarship, arguably as a reaction to the difficulty of 
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establishing cosmopolitan responsibilities in practice.119 David A. Hollinger links 
identity and solidarity, arguing that “[to] share an identity with other people is to 
feel in solidarity with them”.120 He defines solidarity as “an experience of willed 
affiliation”.121 Humanitarianism is thus a kind of solidarity, related to the identity of 
humanity. Hollinger explains: 
 
Feminism is a solidarity, but womanhood is not. Judaism is a solidarity, but 
having a Jewish ancestor – even a Jewish mother, to allude to one of the 
classic criteria for being counted as a Jew – is not. The Chinese American 
community is a solidarity for many Americans of Chinese ancestry, but not 
every American of Chinese ancestry is equally invested in it and some may 
be altogether indifferent to it. We will miss the character and scope of the 
problem of solidarity if we conflate solidarity with the mere possession of a 
set of traits or antecedents or confinements. On the other hand, the 
problem of solidarity is real when there is at least some opportunity for 
choice, when people can exercise some influence over just what ‘we’ they 
help to constitute.122 
 
Beitz writes that: “[political] theory arises from a perception of the possibility of 
choice in political affairs”.123 It is solidarity that lies at the heart of humanitarian 
action, and humanitarianism is often described as an instance of solidarity by those 
engaged in it. For example, as James Orbinski writes: 
 
Solidarity implies a willingness to confront the causes and conditions of 
suffering that persist in destroying dignity and to demand a minimum 
respect for human life. Solidarity also means recognizing the dignity and 
autonomy of others, and asserting the right of others to make choices about 
their destiny. Humanitarianism is about the struggle to create the space to 
be fully human.124 
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This struggle takes place in relation to a different set of choices. Referring to 
Rwanda in 1994, Orbinski tells us: “[the] genocide was life as we can choose to live 
it.”125 We will see in Chapter 2 how the “struggle to create the space to be fully 
human”, to expand the possibility of humanity, often takes place in response to 
explicit attempts to close down that space, in choices made to act with inhumanity. 
 But the element of identity means that the discussion of choices does not 
capture everything. At the root of solidarity is identity, and the ways we feel, 
emotionally experience, understand and act on our human identity are not always 
just a matter of considered choices. This relates back to Walzer’s notion that “[the] 
central issue for political theory is not the constitution of the self but the 
connection of constituted selves, the pattern of social relations. Liberalism is best 
understood as a theory of relationship, which has voluntary association at its center 
and which understands voluntariness as the right of rupture or withdrawal.”126 This 
account is complicated by considering the role of the “human” in our selves. How 
we make sense of the “human” in our selves, and how we produce relationships of 
human solidarity, in a broadly liberal sense, is, then, the central question of the 
thesis. 
 
3. A Brief Defence of a Liberal Humanitarian Framework 
 
Our heroes here could be seen as somewhat unlikely, from the point of view of a 
thesis that remains, at heart, a liberal defence of humanitarianism. Like all really 
compelling heroes, they are all seen as flawed, and none provides us with wholly 
satisfactory answers. Rather, the gains that ensue from the crucial questions they 
ask drive the argument forward until, it is hoped, it stands full-square on its own 
two feet (to adopt a shamelessly anthropocentric metaphor for dignified posture). 
As I noted above in Section II, the voices drawn on from the practice and analysis of 
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professional humanitarians are among those who have been most honest about the 
lazy assumptions and contradictions of their practice. Similarly, the political 
philosophers most central to the argument, Richard Rorty, Michael Walzer, Amartya 
Sen, and Judith Shklar have all, in different ways, been instrumental in undermining 
some of the assumptions of the dominant strands of thought in liberal political 
philosophy, or at least moving beyond stale dichotomies. Rorty has argued that a 
liberal humanitarian perspective is strengthened, rather than weakened, when not 
distracted by the pursuit of a true human essence, or the pursuit of an attainable 
political community of humanity. Walzer, by engaging in what Jon Elster disparaged 
as “a phenomenology of the moral life”, has illustrated the extent to which we walk 
the earth not as liberal abstractions but as living, breathing people with complex 
bundles of visceral and ambiguous commitments, some of which, he hopes, will be 
or become liberal.127 Sen, throughout his work, has demonstrated how apparently 
benign abstractions, when they shift from means to ends, can hamper the 
achievement of the very goals they were initially designed to foster. The “rational 
fool” and the starving rights-holder are both victims of such perspectives.128 His 
warning of the dangers of pursuing transcendental ideals will, in particular, 
influence the argument made in Chapter 5.129 Shklar has pointed to the subtle 
differences in perspective that come from paying attention to negative concepts 
like cruelty and injustice, rather than jumping straight into definitive articulations of 
justice. 
 Importantly, though, these figures remain deeply committed to a liberal 
humanitarian worldview. They are all internal, rather than external critics, to this 
intellectual practice. To some extent this takes on board Michael Walzer’s argument 
about the extra perspective that internal criticism affords.130 But somewhat against 
this, we might remember a neat anecdote related by Martha Nussbaum, who, in 
the context of a rural education project for girls, asked an educated urban woman 
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(so herself something of an outsider to the local community) how she would 
respond to the charge that a foreigner could never understand the perspective of 
someone in another nation. After some thought she answered: “I have the greatest 
difficulty understanding my own sister”.131 The point here is that we should not 
reify the position of the internal outsider as being neither too far nor too close from 
the problems at stake, a perfect “Goldilocks” position as it were. There is never a 
perfect distance from which to understand others. Rather, I wish to emphasise 
something else. This is, that for all their criticism of the practices and bodies of 
thought with which they engage, for their recognition of the various contingencies 
that affect the liberal humanitarian outlook, they all retain a visceral commitment 
to a purpose that can sometimes be taken for granted to the extent of 
disappearing: the definition and defence of a shared humanity. It is the 
connectedness and commitment to that liberal humanitarian outlook that allows 
them to contribute so richly to the argument presented in this thesis. Such figures 
are of crucial importance if the aim is not, say, simply to deconstruct ad infinitum 
(and occasionally also ad nauseam). 
 This last point is of particular importance, for many of the most interesting 
insights on the excesses of humanitarianism have been made by more radical and 
critical scholars of various persuasions.132 I will briefly give an example from a writer 
whose work reveals much and who will be used in this thesis, to make the point, 
rather than devote large portions of the argument to a critique of a critique. On the 
final page of Jenny Edkins’ insightful book on famine, Whose Hunger?, she writes: 
“[the] practical political aim of this book is neither to understand famine nor to 
provide a solution. These two logocentric approaches both abstract and 
depoliticize.” Having argued that “there are no technical solutions” she goes on to 
say that “[the] search for technical answers is itself political and supports the 
powerful, not the suffering. It is the buttress for forms of governance that reduce 
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life to calculability”.133 Edkins arrives at this point by drawing on continental 
philosophy with unquestionable rigour. But there is a strong sense in which the 
acceptance of this kind of philosophical worldview ultimately involves a leap of faith 
that it provides the best route towards supporting “the suffering”, a goal that seems 
still to underpin the final sentence. That is a worldview that ultimately, this thesis 
does not share. Moreover, the initial “practical political aim” of this thesis is rather 
different, if not diametrically opposed to Edkins’. To take an extremely relevant 
example, she argues that Sen’s work on famine fails to go far enough in 
acknowledging the problem of seeing famine in a technical sense as a “failure”.134 
 
Famine as failure, as disaster, produces victims. Victims need welfare 
provision or aid, not a political voice. Vulnerable or at-risk households are 
produced as subjects on whom data can be collected. They are then 
controlled by administrative mechanisms of food distribution or food aid. 
This process depoliticizes famine and constitutes it as a site for intervention 
and control.135 
 
As we will see in the course of the thesis, this raises legitimate concerns. But it is 
unsatisfactory for one fundamental reason. There are a number of false choices 
presented here: why not welfare provision and a political voice? Indeed closer to 
the core of Sen’s work than the generalisability of Sen’s account of famine, which 
Edkins disputes, lies precisely that: a concern that a political voice,  a presence in 
public deliberation, will be the crucial enabling factor for the most marginalised 
people. It may not be a solvable “failure”, but that does not mean that we cannot 
legitimately see starvation as a failure of an ambition to curtail suffering, and a 
comprehensible injustice. David Rieff has written that in fact, “even at its best, 
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humanitarian action is always an emblem of failure”.136 The “practical political aim” 
of this thesis is to enable us, in the words of Samuel Beckett, to “fail better”, by 
understanding more about how we negotiate the “politics of humanity”. The first 
step, here, is to understand more about how professional humanitarians 
conceptualise and make sense of human suffering, the visceral subject matter of 
their endeavour. That is the topic of the next chapter. In concluding this one, I will 
briefly set out how the argument will unfold over the course of the thesis. 
 
IV Summary of the Argument 
 
Chapter 2 begins by examining the concept of “humanitarian crisis” or 
“emergency”. A crucial concern of professional humanitarians is that this concept 
should not become an alibi for political failures. Yet already here, we discover a 
reluctance to embrace the political dimension of professional humanitarians’ own 
rejection of the suffering they encounter. The contours of this rejection are then 
examined. Particular attention is paid to the rejection of cruelty, which is fleshed 
out in the context of the work of liberal political philosophers such as Judith Shklar 
and Richard Rorty, for whom cruelty is the worst thing we do to each other. In 
examining the cruelty of those who inflict suffering, we also raise the question of 
the tendency to contrast this with the innocence of those who suffer. I then 
examine how the categories of humanity and inhumanity shift in relation to each 
other, and focus on acts that explicitly try to dehumanise the other. Through the 
analysis of this chapter, two crucial concepts emerge. The idea of “crisis of 
humanity” captures the manner in which moments of rupture in the category of 
common humanity lie at the heart of humanitarian concern, while in responding to 
suffering, humanitarians have to negotiate, through a “politics of humanity”, the 
boundary between the human and the inhuman. In doing so, they come to define 
their own understanding of humanity. 
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 Chapter 3 deepens and broadens the analysis, exploring how humanitarian 
concern might spread beyond the sphere of already-committed professional 
humanitarians. It unpacks the idea of a humanitarian impulse, emphasising the 
importance of the emotional capacities that underpin it, in particular empathy. It 
then explores the countervailing emotional and psychological obstacles that often 
stand in the way of humanitarian action. These present a challenge to those who 
would stir the humanitarian impulse through humanitarian campaigns. As such, the 
chapter goes on to examine the mediation of suffering, the context in which we 
might enact a “sentimental education”, and the importance of taking politics 
seriously in anchoring humanitarian concern in our identities and in generating 
humanitarian action in response. The final section of the chapter argues that, given 
this account, critics of humanitarian action who emphasise its selectivity, as well as 
professional humanitarians who assert the possibility of an impartial stance, 
somewhat miss the point about how the kind of solidarity characteristic of 
humanitarian action comes into being. 
 Chapter 4 focuses on the idea of rescue, arguing that this is a concept at the 
heart of humanitarianism, not least because of extraordinary examples of 
humanitarian action in response to “crises of humanity”, such as the Rescuers who 
saved Jews during the Holocaust. Yet a focus on rescue puts into sharp relief the 
ambiguities and contingencies of humanitarian action. How to understand and 
conceptualise the humanity of those being saved is a deeply problematic 
endeavour, as tensions emerge between bodily rescue and acts that risk neglecting 
bodies in favour of more intangible conceptualisations. Moreover, rescue often 
refers as much to the ways in which we attempt to save our sense of self. This again 
prompts irresolvable tensions. Action is more likely when it is understood as vital to 
preserving the integrity of our identity, yet the action that results often involves an 
imposition of that identity, and its presumptions, on others. The play of motives, 
intentions and consequences in humanitarian action is then examined. It emerges 
that there is a forceful case for a consequentialist focus on saving lives. But the 
wider social context in which such an end can be willed should not be neglected. 
Furthermore the process of different motivations coalescing into agreed-upon 
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intentions to act is vital to understanding how the “politics of humanity” functions. 
Finally, the chapter broaches the troubling ability of humanitarian action to cause 
harm, in its attempt to respond to harms caused. It argues that an injunction to “do 
no harm” evades the difficult questions and the genuine tensions inherent in the 
paradoxical notion of “humanitarian violence”. It suggests that Michael Walzer’s 
notion of the “moral politician” provides a more plausible way forward than that 
suggested by a humanitarian Hippocratic Oath. 
 Chapter 5 then explores three possible ways to pin down the “politics of 
humanity”, attempts to resolve, or at least temper, the contingencies of 
humanitarian action and its capacity to do harm. First, it explores professional 
humanitarians’ attempts to deal with the problem internally, to try and remedy 
their unaccountability though projects such as codes of conduct. Though sometimes 
yielding qualitative improvements in humanitarian action, I argue that these are 
unlikely to render humanitarians accountable to those they aspire to help. As such, 
a much more ambitious project of empowering the suffering is explored. Universal 
human rights, already a vocabulary that permeates humanitarian discourse, has 
been suggested as an overarching grounding for humanitarian action. Yet, the 
analysis demonstrates that humanitarianism remains the broader conceptual 
category, that human rights still leave open the possibility that more contingent 
acts of humanitarian rescue might become necessary. This is brought out through a 
brief engagement with the paradoxes and tensions of the idea of military 
humanitarian intervention, and related debates such as that on R2P. Finally, the 
chapter discusses the potential of theories of justice to provide grounding and 
direction to humanitarian action. In particular, I discuss the twin potential of 
projects of global social justice to deal with the root causes of much suffering, and 
to avoid the contingencies of charity. However, I argue that these claims present us 
with false choices in practice. Moreover, I question, drawing on the work of 
Amartya Sen, the value of transcendental ideals in rendering the world less unjust. 
Judith Shklar’s injunction to take injustice seriously reveals the possibility of 
multiple, shifting injustices that evade definitive resolution or a definitive account of 
justice. As such, it emerges that while humanitarians cannot evade the 
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contingencies of their endeavour, they can, by taking injustice seriously, create 
useful framings to politicise their empathetic responses to suffering. 
 In doing so, the question arises of what conceptual and, especially, political 
space humanitarianism ultimately occupies. Chapter 6 first examines the notion of 
“humanitarian space”, identifying behind it an undesirable attempt to ring-fence 
humanitarian identity and an impossible struggle for complete independence from 
other political actors, most importantly states. The chapter defends the legitimacy 
of the state as a collective actor within the “politics of humanity”, arguing that the 
state, at its best, can come to crystallise and enact many expressions of human 
solidarity. I draw on Peter Lawler’s concept of the “good state” and his suggestion 
to revive an internationalist tradition in international political theory, rather than 
seeing cosmopolitan theories as the only framework to take a more expansive 
human solidarity forward. I illustrate this potential by engaging in depth with the 
internationalism of Michael Walzer, showing that he provides us with a plausible 
account within which to situate the contingent workings of the humanitarian 
impulse, to crystallise humanitarian gains and to reach out at moments of “crisis of 
humanity”. 
 I conclude the analysis of the thesis by suggesting that, taking into account 
both the excesses of humanitarianism and the inevitability, if we still wish to honour 
our common humanity, of engaging in a “politics of humanity”, we should be 
sensitive to a “democratic impulse” in conducting that politics, one that 
acknowledges the presumptions of humanitarian action, but is sensitive to the 
fallibility of those presumptions and the validity of alternate experiences of 
humanity. Finally, I demonstrate that the account given in the thesis of 
humanitarianism and its “politics of humanity” offers the potential of real analytical 
value-added in the context of the major “crisis of humanity” threatened by 
anthropogenic climate change, a problem that promises to challenge our resources 
of human solidarity most profoundly in the decades to come. 
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2. Humanitarianism and Human Suffering  
 
There are no humanitarian solutions to humanitarian problems.1 
 
Sadako Ogata’s oft-repeated caution goes to the heart of the crisis of 
humanitarianism, suggesting as it does a profound mismatch between what 
humanitarians are able to do and what they would like to do. Many of the 
subsequent chapters explore this tension, challenging in the process our 
understanding of what “fits” and defines the category of humanitarianism. But to 
jump straight into this discussion would be to miss a crucial starting point. Ogata’s 
quote implies that we know what a humanitarian problem is, that we know what 
one looks like, and that, presumably, we could describe this. It presumes to know 
the purpose of humanitarianism. 
 Indeed, to some extent this is true: while we might (and do) disagree on the 
causes and responsibilities attaching to fatally malnourished children, few would 
disagree that a thousand starving children constitute a problem, broadly 
describable as a problem of human suffering. There might be disagreement over 
whether it represents a problem of justice, or “merely” of humanity. But the 
identification of human suffering, and its qualification as wrong, seems, in this case, 
relatively uncontroversial. Perhaps, then, we could simply draw up a list of types of 
human suffering and misery and use that to ground our understanding of 
humanitarianism. 
 This immediately raises a problem. Referring to recent anthropological and 
sociological work on the subject, Barnett and Weiss remind us that “suffering is an 
inherently subjective category”.2 Kleinman and Kleinman caution us against 
“essentializing, naturalizing, or sentimentalizing suffering. There is no single way to 
suffer; there is no timeless or spaceless universal shape to suffering.”3 More 
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broadly, though, the purpose of this work is not to formulate a particular, definitive 
and impregnable argument against those who would argue that a thousand starving 
children pose the rest of us no problem at all. Rather, it is to identify 
humanitarianism as the discussion within which we make such arguments and 
attempt to act upon them. Using “humanitarian” merely as an adjective, whether 
attached to “problem”, “emergency” or “solution”, implies the satisfactory 
resolution of such arguments, of an acceptable and agreed-upon list of sufferings 
and potential responses. In the absence of such a resolution, which would 
presumably require a transcendental authority, “humanitarian” risks becoming 
hollowed out as a descriptor, at the mercy of such lazy phrases as “humanitarian 
suffering”.4 
 The task of this chapter, then, is not to provide a definitive list of “bad 
things”, of particular types of suffering that might a priori ground an account of 
humanitarianism and define a singular core problem for humanitarianism. Instead, 
it aims to explore the broad framings through which suffering might plausibly be 
understood and operationalised as a cause for concern within the particular context 
of humanitarian discussions. Following chapters will look at how concern can lead 
to action. This one examines that which is of concern. To this end, it will chart a 
path from the ostensibly practical, technical concepts of “emergency” and “crisis” 
to more abstract categorisations, such as deliberate harm and cruelty. It will make 
the argument that the problem of humanitarianism is the notion of humanity itself, 
and that our understanding of humanity comes into focus, unfortunately, largely 
through experiences of “inhumanity”, in particular during “crises of humanity”. This 
in turn implies a political understanding of humanity, forces putative humanitarians 
to the recognition that they are engaged in a high-stakes “politics of humanity”. 
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I From “Humanitarian Crisis” to “Crisis of Humanity” 
 
Typically, the trigger for humanitarian action, or at least humanitarian concern, is 
described as an “emergency” or a “crisis”.5 The idea of emergency serves to indicate 
human suffering that has become worthy of concern and action at the level of 
humankind. It implies both a threshold breached and a sense of urgency. The 
concept has come under attack. For instance, Alex Bellamy notes that we often 
work with a “partial and restrictive conception of ‘humanitarian emergency’ that 
provides human suffering with temporal and spatial borders”.6 Yet the vocabulary 
of emergency has much intuitive appeal, for it does express quite effectively the 
radical and rapid change in circumstances that can, for instance, lead to a flooded 
village with villagers clinging to rooftops and trees.  The recent floods in Pakistan, or 
the earthquake that devastated Haiti in early 2010 are cases in point, and the 
vocabulary of emergency seems eminently appropriate here. Perhaps Bellamy’s 
point might simply spur us to be more careful about our application of the term, to 
incorporate developmentalist concerns and slow-onset disasters. 
 But a deeper unease persists within the literature. David Rieff writes of 
“what we rather antiseptically and misleadingly call the humanitarian emergencies 
that scar our times”.7 There is a widespread sense that the vector through which 
humanitarianism incorporates suffering simultaneously sanitizes and depoliticises 
it.8 This section discusses how the identity of humanitarianism is linked to 
understandings of humanitarian emergency or crisis. The key problem is eloquently 
expressed by Rony Brauman, long a leading figure within MSF: 
 
The simple fact that the genocide in Rwanda or massacres of civil 
populations and a strategy of terror in Bosnia could be labeled as 
‘‘humanitarian crises’’ is sadly eloquent ... The UN as well as governments, 
the press, and the NGOs are constantly using this formula, which leads me 
                                                           
5 I use the terms interchangeably. 
6 Bellamy, "Humanitarian Responsibilities and Interventionist Claims in International 
Society": 329. 
7 Rieff, A Bed for the Night, 2. 
8 This is, for instance, one of the core concerns of Edkins, Whose Hunger? 
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to wonder if Auschwitz would be considered a ‘‘humanitarian crisis’’ were it 
to happen today.9 
 
Elsewhere, Brauman has made clear his concern that the humanitarian crisis might 
become the perfect crime: one with only victims.10 In that case, humanitarianism 
itself risks becoming the alibi. Perhaps controversially, I want to argue here that 
although Brauman is entirely right to make this point from the perspective of 
humanitarianism as a practical endeavour, his comment obscures the wider sense 
of humanitarianism as a vital discussion in which Auschwitz can, indeed should be 
articulated as a humanitarian crisis in the sense of a “crisis of humanity”, a moment 
when the very category of common humanity is menaced. It is precisely in response 
to such moments of crisis that we come to articulate the markers that divide the 
human from the inhuman, and set out the terms on which our “politics of 
humanity” is to be negotiated.11 
 Bauman’s position within the practice of humanitarianism gives him good 
reason to voice the concern that to describe Auschwitz as a “humanitarian crisis” 
could be deeply dangerous and irresponsible: it is not a problem that professional 
humanitarians can possibly solve, and so to describe it as a humanitarian crisis lets 
those responsible off the hook. As we saw in the previous chapter, professional 
humanitarians function according to a specific sense of what constitutes 
humanitarian action, such as the neutral and impartial provision of relief. The 
danger, sensed by Brauman, is that if we simultaneously articulate a vision of what 
humanitarian action is, and describe a problem that cannot possibly be solved by 
such action as humanitarian, we are creating a dangerous cognitive dissonance 
within international public discourse. Because Auschwitz cannot be stopped by 
relief workers it is dangerous to describe it as a humanitarian problem, or indeed as 
                                                           
9 Brauman, "From Philanthropy to Humanitarianism": 411. 
10 Brauman, Penser Dans L'urgence, 234. 
11 I was able briefly to put the kernel of this argument to Brauman himself at a recent 
seminar at the Humanitarian and Conflict Response Institute at the University of 
Manchester (24 November 2009). While not having a fully articulated response to it, he 
appeared to consider it a valid and challenging position. 
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a problem primarily for humanitarians.12 Brauman’s point is an important one, and 
warns us against the overzealous deployment of humanitarian rhetoric.  
 Certainly, there are strong arguments for a more limited deployment of the 
idea of humanitarian crisis, corresponding to what might be a more rigorous usage 
in Brauman’s terms. Indeed, this is how humanitarianism as a practice has 
developed. For instance, we might think of Henry Dunant’s engagement with the 
context of the battlefield, and the hors de combat soldiers left to die in agony.13 
What Dunant saw here was a space where it might be possible to bring a measure 
of humanity and alleviate suffering (without, incidentally, having to do battle 
himself to defend that space). The hors de combat soldier was located in a space 
effectively abandoned by other actors. In this context, humanitarians could define 
both an independent humanitarian space, and a recognisable type of humanitarian 
emergency, consistent with what humanitarians could realistically aspire to achieve. 
The humanitarian emergency became, not the institution of war as such, but rather 
one of the consequences of war that humanitarians could engage with: battlefield 
wounded. 
 The pattern is similar when it comes to meeting the needs of refugees, 
another sphere in which the Red Cross movement has been a crucial actor. And 
again, there is a great deal of coherence in the idea that we can best identify and 
engage with this problem if we are prepared to define the human suffering at stake 
in quite a narrow way. If several million people cross a border at the same time, 
they will present a set of basic physical needs in terms of food, water, sanitation 
and medication. They need these things if they are to continue to live. Local and 
international humanitarian organisations may well be able to provide these things, 
while they most likely will not be able to organise the safe return of all the refugees 
to wherever they wish to return to. 
 As such, the vocabulary of emergency, as deployed in such contexts, does 
create a space in which to, for example, gather funds to acquire the means to keep 
the people alive, and to engage in the action to do so. The deployment of the 
                                                           
12 In this understanding of humanitarianism, relief workers are effectively the only possible 
kind of humanitarians. 
13 Dunant, A Memory of Solferino. 
 62 
 
vocabulary of emergency may not describe everything “bad” about the situation, 
for instance that the people in question might have been ethnically cleansed from 
their homes. But it might enable the practical work of keeping them alive. In a 
natural disaster (to the extent that there is ever a “natural” determination of how 
much human suffering a disaster will produce) this case seems even stronger. 
 Moreover, for all the criticisms that have been levelled at the way the 
vocabulary of emergency is deployed in articulating a crisis situation, few would 
argue that in these kinds of context there is simply no crisis, no practical problem, 
no hungry or injured people.14 For instance, a brief visit to the ReliefWeb 
practitioner hub run by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) yields a vast array of detailed information about 
current disasters and emergencies and the needs associated with them, together 
with costed appeals detailing practical proposals to meet these needs.15  The UN 
system may or may not provide the best route for those needs to be met. But it 
would be extremely hard to maintain that the assessments of numbers of people at 
risk of malnutrition are purely fictional, or entirely strategic.16 
 Here it is important to acknowledge the point made by Jenny Edkins, among 
others, that concepts such as hunger and malnutrition can vary in their meaning, 
and that this variation is often highly political.17 But there are limits to this kind of 
critique. The first is very simply that of the biological death of bodies.18 But it also 
seems that there is a broader level at which we can meaningfully talk about, for 
                                                           
14 The critiques of emergency here tend to be more along the lines of the following themes, 
which will intervene later in this work: (1) the concept obscures the longer term causes and 
responsibilities associated with the problem; (2) it depoliticises the agents involved; (3) it 
obscures other potential sources of alleviation (such as coping strategies among the 
affected); (4) it obscures other equally or more urgent problems; (5) the response that 
emergencies engender do more harm than good. 
15 ReliefWeb. Available at http://www.reliefweb.int/; accessed on 13 August 2010. 
16 Though, anticipating the argument of following chapters somewhat, the response may be 
highly strategic. The best funded crises are not necessarily those with the highest needs. 
17 Edkins, Whose Hunger? 
18 Even if there are some limited circumstances in which the exact point of biological death 
is difficult to decide, this thesis shares the view of Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum (who 
both experienced criticisms of such “binary” thinking, amusingly related by the latter) that 
it is best simply to consider “death as opposed to life”. Martha C. Nussbaum, "Human 
Capabilities, Female Human Beings", in Global Justice: Seminal Essays, ed. Thomas Pogge 
and Darrel Moellendorf (St. Paul: Paragon House, 2008), 497-498. 
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example, the idea of radical, involuntary shifts in people’s ability to nourish 
themselves or their families. There is clearly a danger of only identifying and 
treating symptoms rather than causes, and of ignoring political choices (e.g. the 
choice of hunger over subordination). But provided it is not the only question asked, 
the question of where in the world, according to some criteria of vulnerability, are 
located the most vulnerable people, regardless of their circumstances, is an 
important one to ask, at least as a starting point for any discussion of what human 
solidarity, kindness or care might entail or require. 
 This line of thinking leads to a fairly classical understanding of humanitarian 
emergency by asking a series of similar, fairly technical questions, such as: what are 
the human consequences of wars? What are the health problems typically 
associated with refugee camps in tropical climates? These questions, whether 
implicit or explicit, specify the kind of emergency situation at stake. In response to 
these, professional humanitarianism has formulated its principles for attempting to 
alleviate this suffering according to this mode of evaluation of what the problem is. 
This leads to formulations such as the fundamental principles of the Red Cross, the 
Red Cross Code of Conduct, or the Sphere Project.19 It follows that a responsible 
usage of the phrase humanitarian crisis or emergency is one where the possibilities 
of a humanitarian response match the delimitation of suffering encapsulated 
therein. 
 A key concern of this perspective is to avoid humanitarianism becoming the 
cover for a bloodbath of “well-fed dead”.20  In the case of such an event, it warns us 
that the “well-fed dead” will not be served by describing their plight primarily as a 
humanitarian one. Their situation may well present components relevant to a 
                                                           
19 The broader context of these projects is discussed in Chapter 5. IFRC, The Code of 
Conduct: Principles of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement 
and NGOs in Disaster Response Programmes. Available at 
http://www.ifrc.org/PUBLICAT/conduct/code.asp; accessed on 21 June 2010. The Sphere 
Project, Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response (Geneva: The 
Sphere Project, 2004). Available at 
http://www.sphereproject.org/component/option,com_docman/task,cat_view/gid,17/Ite
mid,203/lang,english/; accessed on 21 June 2010. 
20 The New York Times, "Editorial: The Well-Fed Dead in Bosnia", The New York Times (15 
July 1992). Available at http://www.nytimes.com/1992/07/15/opinion/the-well-fed-dead-
in-bosnia.html; accessed on 31 July 2010. 
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response by professional humanitarians, but that does not mean that it is 
adequately described by the humanitarian actions that may occur. Importantly, this 
may ignore or diminish their status as victims of crimes. In brief, the value-added of 
humanitarianism as an idea is best achieved by a humble and limited usage of the 
term. 
 This sense of the danger of “humanitarian” acquiring an overly euphemistic 
sheen is increasingly a concern. Recently, David Keen rejected the title “complex 
humanitarian emergencies” for his book on the subject of complex emergencies 
because “the word ‘humanitarian’ carries certain dangers. One is the implication 
that the solution lies with humanitarian relief (rather than with tackling underlying 
human rights abuses, for example)”.21 Fiona Terry expresses anxiety about the 
other part of the label. “Using terms like ‘complex emergency’ and reiterating how 
much more complicated, dangerous, and ubiquitous disasters are today than they 
were in the past also help to excuse by transferring blame to the nature of crises 
themselves.”22 As she and Joelle Tanguy put it: "Most ‘humanitarian crises’ are 
fundamentally political crises with humanitarian consequences. All the ambiguities 
of intervention lie in this essential link."23 Here we see a logical desire to use 
“humanitarian” in a rigorous manner, attaching it to emergencies only in so far as 
these are framed in a manner consistent with the possibilities at hand, but without 
losing sight of how the situation came about. In his Nobel lecture, James Orbinski 
expands on this theme in a passage worth quoting at length: 
 
And ours is an ethic of refusal. It will not allow any moral political failure or 
injustice to be sanitized or cleansed of its meaning. The 1992 crimes against 
humanity in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The 1994 genocide in Rwanda. The 1997 
massacres in Zaire. The 1999 actual attacks on civilians in Chechnya. These 
cannot be masked by terms like “Complex Humanitarian Emergency”, or 
“Internal Security Crisis”. Or by any other such euphemism – as though they 
are some random, politically undetermined event. Language is determinant. 
                                                           
21 The quote continues: “Another is that the word may prejudge the motives of interveners 
as altruistic (when they may be much more complicated).” The status of altruism is 
discussed in the next chapter. Keen, Complex Emergencies, 1. 
22 Terry, Condemned to Repeat? , 226. 
23 Tanguy and Terry, "Humanitarian Responsibility and Committed Action: Response To 
"Principles, Politics, and Humanitarian Action"": 33. 
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It frames the problem and defines response, rights and therefore 
responsibilities. It defines whether a medical or humanitarian response is 
adequate. And it defines whether a political response is inadequate. No one 
calls a rape a complex gynecologic [sic] emergency. A rape is a rape, just as a 
genocide is a genocide. And both are a crime. For MSF, this is the 
humanitarian act: to seek to relieve suffering, to seek to restore autonomy, 
to witness to the truth of injustice, and to insist on political responsibility.24 
 
The overall thrust of Orbinski’s quote is that humanitarianism should not be 
deployed politically to turn a political problem of crime and injustice, such as a rape, 
into a technical problem, such as a “complex gynaecological emergency”. The point 
is eloquently put, with the latter formulation alone exposing much of the absurdity 
of the way the rhetoric of humanitarian emergency can be deployed. Yet while the 
argument underscores the limitations of humanitarian responses, it simultaneously 
asserts the authority of a humanitarian voice grounded in its technical engagement 
with human suffering. The paradox that Orbinski dodges is that as a doctor, in terms 
of the practical measures he can take, a rape is actually a “complex gynaecological 
emergency”, when it comes to the practical relief of its consequences. Orbinksi is 
able to name a rape because of his knowledge of the medical consequences of rape 
as a “complex gynaecological emergency”. Humanitarian action is thus clearly 
conceived as both treating symptoms and naming causes. Indeed, the naming of a 
rape, or a genocide, becomes a quintessentially humanitarian act precisely through 
the rejection of the humanitarian act being pinned down exclusively in terms of the 
treatment of “complex gynaecological emergencies”. 
 It turns out, then, that for Orbinski humanitarianism has to deal with socially 
and politically embedded suffering if it is not to fall into the same empty language 
as those it sets itself against.  Though Orbinski differentiates between the 
humanitarian and the political, restoring autonomy, bearing witness, and insisting 
on political responsibility are all in some sense political acts. This reveals the key 
tension many humanitarians feel. They want to be able to make unanswerable 
assertions about suffering, to find a space outside politics where that suffering 
cannot be relativised, diminished or questioned. Yet, finding their capacities to be 
                                                           
24 Orbinski, "Nobel Lecture". 
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inadequate in the face of suffering, they simultaneously want to shape politics in 
order to combat the causes of that suffering more effectively. Clearly, shaping 
politics is a political act, but so too is naming a genocide, and finding ways to win 
the argument against those who will inevitably deny it.25 Janice Stein confirms this. 
“Bearing witness is, at its essence, a deeply political act that shapes the reality of 
those who tell the story.”26 Furthermore, restoring autonomy carries with it the 
burden of defending the conception of autonomy at stake. Defining humanitarian 
framings of suffering against politics, as an apolitical act, thus appears untenable. 
 While Orbinski’s view is just about compatible with Ogata’s “no 
humanitarian solutions to humanitarian problems”, he is effectively implicating 
humanitarianism in the political negotiation of potential solutions. Of course, 
another option would simply be to retreat back to the vocabulary of “complex 
gynaecological emergency” and build a set of operating principles (which might well 
include not pointing fingers and rocking the boat) that fit the technical problem of 
relieving the suffering caused by such emergencies everywhere, in order to 
maximise the chances of relieving the most suffering in the long term. But this 
position is also profoundly troubling, as it seems to leave humanitarianism with 
nothing to fall back on to justify the value of saving lives except those operating 
principles. 
 Moreover, returning to the idea that humanitarianism has developed as a 
practice with a strong sense of the possible. Orbinski is opening a space to frame 
and engage with suffering where practical measures to relieve it may not be 
possible, or may be of negligible use, such as in the midst of a genocide. In such a 
context, he wishes to assert the possibility of a humanitarian act of speaking out, 
fitting his concept of “an ethic of refusal”, which is also really, when played out in 
practice, a politics of refusal, a negotiation of the boundaries of the acceptable 
across different social and political contexts. In this he sees the continuing 
possibility of humanitarianism, if not through practical acts of humanitarian relief, 
then through a different kind of humanitarian action: testimony and calling for 
                                                           
25 See for example Mahmood Mamdani, "The Politics of Naming: Genocide, Civil War, 
Insurgency", London Review of Books 29, no. 5 (2007). 
26 Stein, "Humanitarianism as Political Fusion": 741. 
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political responsibility. In such contexts, it is human solidarity that demands a 
project of defining the unacceptable. Humanitarianism then becomes the discussion 
about the ways in which we might characterise the limits of what can be tolerated 
as acceptable, and about the political responsibility associated with that. 
 This prompts two observations. First, this critique of the conventional 
understanding of humanitarian emergency makes the concept almost entirely 
unsustainable. In emphasising the importance of identifying the human agency and 
political responsibility behind human suffering, we would have to identify suffering 
entirely devoid of human causes to plausibly characterise it as a humanitarian 
emergency in the classical, apolitical sense. As Sen and others have shown, there is 
rarely much natural about the human consequences of even apparently natural 
disasters.27 If we were to apply Orbinski’s logic to even such a diffuse problem as 
climate change, which promises to deliver a myriad of “humanitarian problems”, 
the key humanitarian act would be, not just to deal with those problems as they 
arise, but rather to insist on the political responsibility for mitigating and alleviating 
the effects of climate change. This is really a case for abandoning the idea of 
“humanitarian emergency” altogether. 
 However, going against this somewhat, the practical utility of the vocabulary 
of humanitarian emergency, summarised earlier, may still retain much that is 
useful. Symptoms still demand treatment, and the more technical sense of 
humanitarian emergency, with its technical account of suffering and its operating 
principles, may allow access and a fast engagement with the problem, even if it is 
ultimately an unsatisfactory basis for fully describing or solving it. This remains an 
important qualification, especially since processes of justice with which Orbinski 
clearly wishes to engage may well not take place on a timescale compatible with 
saving lives.28 
                                                           
27 Amartya Sen, Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1983). See also Oxfam, Rethinking Disasters: Why Death and 
Destruction Is Not Nature's Fault but Human Failure (New Delhi: Oxfam International, 
2008). Available at 
http://www.oxfam.org.uk/resources/policy/conflict_disasters/oxfam_india_rethinking_disa
sters.html; accessed on 13 August 2010. 
28 The role of justice in humanitarianism is discussed in Chapter 5. 
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 The second observation, which will be crucial for what follows, is that 
Orbinski and Brauman together summarise a strong case for jettisoning the 
concepts of “humanitarian emergency” and “humanitarian crisis” as adequately 
describing the most horrific instances of human suffering. Yet in making this case, 
the reason such moments in the history of humanity, such moments as Srebrenica 
or Auschwitz, make for such powerful examples is that there is widespread 
agreement that they represent unacceptable and unjustifiable human suffering. 
Indeed, in his recent memoir, An Imperfect Offering, Orbinski links his own 
humanitarian awakening to a childhood encounter with a Holocaust survivor.29 They 
define the parameters of an ethic or politics of refusal. They represent, then, the 
very framings of suffering that have inspired humanitarians from Thomas Clarkson 
and Henry Dunant onwards, and clearly lie at the core of professional 
humanitarians’ self-understanding. 
 As such, it begins to make more conceptual sense to consider Auschwitz as a 
“humanitarian crisis”, in the sense of a “crisis of humanity”. Indeed, it is a core 
concern of this thesis to argue that the idea of “humanitarian crisis” becomes more 
coherent if understood in terms of “crises of humanity”, namely those moments 
when the central notion of a common humanity, which all humanitarians believe in 
and defend, comes under threat. This is not to say that there need be a single, 
definitive account of what common humanity is or entails. It is merely to note that 
humanitarians necessarily articulate and defend a notion of common humanity, 
which can then be understood as under threat in particular circumstances. The kind 
of suffering at stake then is perhaps best characterised not by its precise bodily or 
psychological manifestations, but instead by the notion of its unacceptability and 
unjustifiability. In fact, surely concern about “humanitarian crises”, understood 
technically, and the sense that human solidarity demands a response, comes from 
that simultaneous, or even prior, discussion about what is unacceptable. The 
unacceptable could well then be defined by such “crises of humanity”. 
 
                                                           
29 Orbinski, An Imperfect Offering, 21-25. 
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II Cruelty and Innocence 
 
The theme of unacceptable suffering has been taken up by Rieff, who argues that 
humanitarianism “defines itself largely in negative terms”, and cites Brauman as 
stating simply that “humanitarianism asks the question, What is a human being? 
and answers, ‘One who is not made to suffer’”.30 The work of philosophers such as 
Jonathan Glover underscores the daunting implications of this after a century of 
unprecedented innovation in the means of causing suffering.31 The question of how 
to conceptualise our markers of the unacceptable in this respect is one that has 
received recurring attention within political philosophy. In the rest of the chapter, I 
will examine several strands that speak to professional humanitarians’ attempts to 
define what humanitarianism constitutes itself against. Since the conception of 
humanitarianism being elaborated is not one defined in terms of a singular ethic or 
practice, the emphasis is on concepts that seem to have a certain amount of 
transhistorical resonance, even as they change and are redefined over time, in 
response to the innovations mentioned above. 
 Our starting point will be cruelty. As an introduction to this discussion, it is 
worth citing a passage from Orbinski’s memoir, in which he describes his encounter 
with one particular woman whom he treats amidst the chaos of a hospital 
overwhelmed with new arrivals: 
 
She was slightly older than middle aged. She had been raped. Semen mixed 
with blood clung to her thighs. She had been attacked with machetes, her 
entire body systematically mutilated. Her ears had been cut off. Her face had 
been so carefully disfigured that a pattern was obvious in the slashes. Both 
Achilles tendons had been cut. Both breasts had been sliced off. Her 
attackers didn’t want to kill her; they wanted her to bleed to death. They 
knew just how much to cut to make her bleed slowly … I felt a wave of 
nausea as I looked again at the pattern someone had cut in her face. I turned 
from her and vomited for the first and only time during the genocide …32 
                                                           
30 Rieff, A Bed for the Night, 93. 
31 Jonathan Glover, Humanity: A Moral History of the Twentieth Century (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2000). 
32 Orbinski, An Imperfect Offering, 227. Orbinksi also drew on this encounter in his Nobel 
speech. Orbinski, "Nobel Lecture". 
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There is something so distinctive about the deliberate and careful infliction of 
suffering described by Orbinski, and indeed in the extraordinary physical reaction of 
nausea in an experienced humanitarian medical worker, that the reaction against 
cruelty must surely be seen as central to any understanding of humanitarian 
concern. Who could dare deny that such cruelty is unacceptable? 
 All too clearly, cruelty is a concept that cannot be described once and for all, 
for the only limit on cruelty seems to be the human imagination. As such, cruelty 
makes sense more as a type of human behaviour than as a particular list of possible 
acts. Moreover, it speaks to the recurrent horror in the literature on 
humanitarianism at the ways humans can think up to make each other suffer. The 
humane disposition of the humanitarian is nourished largely by the suffering 
deliberately meted out by other humans. Within that, the element of deliberation, 
of deliberate, intentional harm seems to hold particular importance in the 
humanitarian imaginary. 
 We can identify two strands to the reaction to cruelty relevant to a 
discussion of humanitarianism and its conceptualisations of humanity and 
humaneness. The first is the conceptualisation, across or within societies, of a 
previously accepted mode of behaviour as cruel. A famous example is Voltaire’s 
engagement with the Calas affair, part of the process that led to the abandonment 
of judicial torture in pre-Revolutionary France. Though Voltaire was initially 
exercised by the religious bigotry at the heart of the case rather than the practice of 
torture itself, his argument shifted to emphasise the cruelty of the practice.33 
 The second strand is the “discovery of cruelty”, when wider groups discover 
or experience previously undreamt of ways that particular individuals or groups 
have found of being cruel to each other. This can feed into the first strand. For 
                                                           
33 Lynn Hunt, Inventing Human Rights: A History (London: W. W. Norton & Company, 2007), 
70-76. The case apparently prompted Voltaire’s first use of the term “human right”. Hunt 
also poses an interesting question: “If natural compassion makes everyone detest the 
cruelty of judicial torture, as Voltaire said later, then why was this not obvious before the 
1760s, even to him? Evidently some kind of blinder had operated to inhibit the operation of 
empathy before then.” Hunt, Inventing Human Rights, 81. The operation of empathy is 
examined in the next chapter. 
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instance, the discovery of particular practices within slavery, such as the Middle 
Passage, by the public at large served to delegitimise the wider practice as a whole, 
and contributed to the reconceptualisation of slavery itself as cruelty.34 
 The reaction to cruelty has greatly influenced the development of modern 
humanitarianism.  Of course, it has characterised efforts to “humanise” war, and we 
might recall Abraham Lincoln’s injunction that “military necessity does not admit of 
cruelty”.35 Jean Pictet in his seminal commentary on the fundamental principles of 
the Red Cross, comes surprisingly close to acknowledging a hierarchy of suffering in 
terms of its human causes, noting that “The most odious form of suffering is that 
which man inflicts deliberately”. For him, the reaction to cruelty nourishes the 
principle of humanity. He goes on to cite Montaigne: “I bitterly hate cruelty as the 
worst of all vices”.36 As an aside, it is interesting to note that Montaigne, who was 
intensely suspicious of what we might term trans-cultural generalisations, seems to 
have felt that this concept functioned at an appropriate level of generality. 
 This tradition has two particularly important manifestations in 
contemporary political philosophy. Judith Shklar, very much placing herself in the 
tradition of Montaigne, argues that cruelty has been neglected by philosophy, yet 
has profound implications. Catherine Lu notes the potential of Shklar’s starting 
point, which articulates itself not in terms of utopian human perfectibility and 
necessary moral progress but rather in that which we should avoid.37 For Shklar: 
“[putting] cruelty first is, however, a matter very different from mere humaneness. 
To hate cruelty more than any other evil involves a radical rejection of both 
religious and political conventions.”38 
 This radicalism inspires the liberalism of Richard Rorty. Rorty takes as the 
leitmotif of his liberalism the idea that cruelty is the worst thing we do. It is a 
particularly humanitarian understanding of liberalism, set out in his writings on the 
                                                           
34 The process behind this is discussed in the next chapter. 
35 Cited in Philippe Sands, Torture Team: Uncovering War Crimes in the Land of the Free, 
Updated ed. (London: Penguin, 2009), 3. 
36 Pictet, The Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross, unpaginated text. 
37 Catherine Lu, "The One and Many Faces of Cosmopolitanism", Journal of Political 
Philosophy 8, no. 2 (2000): 254. 
38 Judith N. Shklar, Ordinary Vices (London: Belknap Press, 1984), 8. Italics in original. 
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possibilities of human solidarity and on human rights.39 Although he explicitly 
rejects pinning any definitive account to any kind of concept of intrinsic human 
nature, Rorty sees the changing dance across time and space between our cruel 
infliction of suffering and our aversion to pain as a key site for our understandings 
of what might constitute social progress.40 
 Rorty does not explicitly engage with humanitarianism as such, but his 
account of liberalism as the view that cruelty is the worst thing we do, and his 
description of a “human rights culture”, arguably speak to our discussion of 
humanitarianism rather more clearly than to conventional debates on liberalism or 
human rights as such.41 Rorty’s focus on the concept of a solidarity fuelled by a 
hatred of cruelty fits the character of the social interactions at stake here, and is 
particularly valuable for reviving the often neglected idea of “solidarity”. Indeed we 
might want to modify the Shklar/Rorty formulation to identify humanitarians as 
those who put cruelty first. Christopher Coker explicitly characterises Rorty’s work 
as a “humanitarian project” based “on a rejection of metaphysics”.42 
 A key issue, however, is this rejection of metaphysics, and the presumption 
of Rorty’s work to be ungroundable. Norman Geras, another important writer on 
our reactions to suffering, has cast doubt on Rorty’s success in avoiding an implicit 
account of human nature.43 Perhaps Geras is right that we can never fully become 
liberal ironists. But it is not clear how important this qualification really is. If we see 
                                                           
39 Most importantly in Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony and Solidarity (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1989). Richard Rorty, "Human Rights, Rationality and 
Sentimentality", in Truth and Progress: Philosophical Papers Volume 3 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998).  
40 Though they are engaged in very different projects, there is an interesting parallel here 
with Andrew Linklater’s recent work on a transhistorical category of “harm”. Andrew 
Linklater, "The Harm Principle and Global Ethics", Global Society 20, no. 3 (2006). 
41 Richard Ashby Wilson and Richard D. Brown correctly identify that, in writing about 
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Rorty’s move as primarily methodological for our purposes, it becomes rather 
productive. Seeing key markers of humanitarianism, such as a hatred of cruelty, as 
ironic in the Rortean sense that their content can never be linked to a definitive, 
groundable account, allows us to view humanitarianism as a discussion in which 
different understandings of what is cruel can be negotiated. It is important to note 
that many of the participants, and many of their views will most likely be 
profoundly unironic. But as our understanding of humanitarianism is composed by a 
changing set of such views, the category makes sense as an ironic construct, if we 
prefer not to await final adjudication on which of those unironically-held beliefs of 
what is cruel is transcendentally true. All the more so if we suspect that such 
adjudication may be both impossible and undesirable. As a more general comment 
on Rorty’s work, Bernard Williams suggested that: “once one goes far enough in 
recognizing contingency, the problem to which irony is supposed to provide the 
answer does not arise at all”.44 The recognition of contingency can be seen, in 
Williams’ view, as a liberation from an illusory, “scientistic” search for political and 
ethical absolutes, devoid of any contingent historical perspective.45 
 
If we can get rid of that illusion, we shall see that there is no inherent 
conflict among three activities: first, the first-order activities of acting and 
arguing within the framework of our ideas; second, the philosophical activity 
of reflecting on those ideas at a more general level and trying to make 
better sense of them; and third, the historical activity of understanding 
where they came from. The activities are in various ways continuous with 
one another. This helps to define both intelligence in political action 
(because of the connection of the first with the second and the third), and 
also realism in political philosophy (because of the connection of the second 
with the first and the third.) If there is a difficulty in combining the third of 
these activities with the first two, it is the difficulty of thinking about two 
things at once, not a problem in consistently taking both of them seriously.46 
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Building on this, we can recognise the potential of discussions about 
humanitarianism, and about core concepts within them, such as cruelty, to thrive 
on the recognition of contingency if they are fully to play their part in the “human 
conversation”, to borrow Williams’ happy phrase.47 
 It should be noted here that cruelty does not exhaust the possibilities of 
framings that might spur humanitarian concern. The focus on cruelty may have its 
own distorting effect, leading us to neglect scenarios in which, if cruelty is present 
at all, it is much more diffuse. Cruelty does not necessarily lead to humanitarian 
responses. On the contrary, it may simply lead to disgust for the perpetrators, 
leading us to see them as “animals”. Cruelty is not a sine qua non of humanitarian 
action, nor a guarantor of it. But the focus on conceptualising suffering in terms of 
what should not be may have an extra advantage, and here we might consider the 
reaction of the woman described earlier by James Orbinski: 
 
The woman was one among many, among hundreds. She knew there were 
so many more. Again she reached to touch my forearm. She didn’t hold it 
this time. She nodded, looking at me. “Allez, allez . . . Ummera, ummera-
sha,” she said in a slow whisper. “Go, go. Courage, courage, my friend.” It 
was the clearest voice I have ever heard.48 
 
This quote illustrates an important and neglected point in the discussion of 
humanitarianism. A conventional approach to normative theorising on the question 
of common humanity is to look for and describe a core of human dignity that should 
be protected from harm.  But in this passage, what strikes us is the extreme courage 
and dignity shown by the woman in the face of extreme cruelty and unimaginable 
suffering. If she had not demonstrated that inner strength, the cruelty of that attack 
would surely be unacceptable to the humanitarian to exactly the same degree. To 
base an understanding of humanitarianism on the issue of preservation or loss of 
dignified behaviour by the victim appears abhorrent. Yet arguably it is implicit in 
many discussions of humanitarianism. Seeing the cue for humanitarianism, and for 
humanitarian impulses, in the negative articulation suggested in this section, 
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appears to open up the possibility of not judging the victim. If a common humanity 
is to be valued, it seems more coherent to conceptualise humanitarian concern in 
terms of attacks upon that common humanity, rather than as suggestions that the 
attack might have been successful. 
 However, in explicitly or implicitly reacting against cruelty, professional 
humanitarians have encountered another dilemma which, somewhat against their 
wishes, puts them in the position of judging the victim. This is the implicit 
requirement that victims suffer innocently. Stephen Hopgood argues that even 
Amnesty traditionally based its approach “around the archetype of the suffering 
innocent, the POC or Prisoner of Conscience”.49 For Rieff: “To accept people’s 
humanity and respect their dignity as individuals should not entail spinning fairy 
tales about their innate innocence.” Rieff goes on to remark acidly that “the one 
thing tyrants and aid workers have in common is their liking for being posed next to 
children”.50 Tony Vaux argues that: 
 
In effect, aid agencies have preserved the concept of the ‘deserving poor’. 
The idea is that people deserve our help because they are innocent victims. 
But this is not always true. And if it is not, are we supposed to withhold 
aid?51 
 
The quasi-religious notion of innocence poses a serious problem for 
humanitarianism, especially when juxtaposed with a hatred of cruelty as a framing 
through which to conceptualise suffering. The previous section argued that a 
technical, medicalised description of suffering limits the extent to which 
professional humanitarians, for instance, can access and describe the wider 
justification for their practice. But in stepping back, in naming rapes, genocides and 
cruelty, they necessarily bring notions of guilt and innocence into the discussion. 
These are notions that the technicalised version of humanitarianism was precisely 
designed to dodge through concepts of neutrality and impartiality. 
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 In the refugee camps in Zaire and Tanzania to which Hutus, including many 
génocidaires, fled in the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide, this dilemma, and this 
tension between ways of understanding suffering was bought home.52 These camps 
represented, in the traditional sense of the term, a very clear humanitarian 
emergency, with cholera epidemics, food and water shortages, etc. As such the 
human suffering at stake spoke to the humanitarian version of the Hippocratic oath, 
to relieve suffering, defined in terms of basic needs, impartially wherever it may 
occur. 
 But for some agencies, including MSF-France, the hypocrisy of the situation 
became unsustainable, as they realised that they were nourishing the instigators of 
one of the cruellest crises of humanity of the twentieth century. Moreover, these 
perpetrators saw the camps as bases in which to regroup. In this instance, then, for 
the agencies that withdrew from the camps, their understanding of 
humanitarianism in terms of refusal and rejection of cruelty, as powerful as that can 
be in yielding overarching justifications for humanitarianism as a whole, forced 
them to walk away from actual human suffering and implicitly judge some of the 
victims of that suffering. Fiona Terry notes that the experience of the post-Rwandan 
genocide refugee camps in Tanzania “pushed all of us in MSF to reflect deeply upon 
what humanitarian action represents, and at what point it loses its sense and 
becomes a technical function in the service of evil”.53 The implication is that 
defining humanitarianism in terms of its technical ability to save lives can lead to 
deeply perverse outcomes, in which humanitarians can become similar to doctors 
who keep torture victims alive to be tortured again.54 This is central to what she 
sees as the paradox of humanitarian action: “it can contradict its fundamental 
purpose by prolonging the suffering it intends to alleviate”.55 
 This is not a new dilemma, for professional humanitarians have long had to 
patch up villains of every description as part of their calling. However, it is relatively 
new to humanitarianism’s search for definition. There is a strong case against an 
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understanding of suffering as totally detached from its human causes. But the focus 
on the human agency behind human suffering necessarily implies a judgement 
about guilt and innocence. This is not an argument against treating the suffering of 
the guilty, for humanitarianism would risk forfeiting its grounding in the idea of a 
common humanity if it were to do so, but rather it suggests that humanitarianism 
finds it difficult, in hating cruelty, not to create dichotomies of guilt and innocence. 
 For Shklar, however, to do so is to misunderstand how radical an emphasis 
on cruelty can be. For her, putting cruelty first makes judging or even blaming 
victims superfluous: 
 
It is, however, not only undignified to idealize political victims; it is also very 
dangerous. One of our political actualities is that the victims of political 
torture and injustice are often no better than their tormentors. They are 
only waiting to change places with the latter. Of course, if one puts cruelty 
first this makes no difference. It does not matter whether the victim of 
torture is a decent man or a villain. No one deserves to be subjected to the 
appalling instruments of cruelty.56 
 
This suggests a way out for humanitarians, though the question becomes more 
complicated when they are put in a position of telling stories about the victims to 
spur humanitarian concern, as will be examined in the next chapter. 
 Arguably, though, humanitarians are going further than simply rejecting 
cruelty, they are also, in justifying themselves in terms of humanity, negotiating the 
ways in which common humanity contrasts with inhumanity. 
 
III Dehumanisation and Inhumanity 
 
In The Warrior’s Honor, Michael Ignatieff writes that "[there] are human and 
inhuman warriors, just and unjust wars, forms of killing that dishonor us all. The Red 
Cross has become the keeper of these distinctions; they are the sentinels between 
the human and the inhuman."57 As often, Ignatieff phrases the matter nicely here. 
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But he tells us little about dynamic character of the distinction between human and 
inhuman, or of the processes which shape each of the concepts. Within discussions 
about humanitarianism, many of the Red Cross movement’s more controversial, 
neutralist positions, for instance on the Biafra crisis, have been rehabilitated in 
recent years. Yet one particular instance of failure is persistently mentioned, 
namely the failure of the Red Cross to engage in a satisfactory way with the 
extraordinary human suffering of the Nazi Holocaust. Concerning this episode, Rony 
Bauman argues that the Red Cross was “guilty of not having taken into account the 
fact that the very notion of humanity already had been abolished”.58 
 The idea of inhumanity, containing both the acknowledgement of humanity 
and its negation, goes further than cruelty in capturing something vital about the 
suffering that, for humanitarians, no human should experience. One clear 
manifestation of inhumanity in the literal sense of a deliberate negation of the unity 
of humanity, is persecution through the process of dehumanisation. Otto, a rescuer 
of Jews during the Holocaust, reflected to Kristen Monroe on a discussion he had 
with a Nazi guard who had told him, in relation to the killing of Jews: "You know, 
they were not human anymore." Otto went on to note: 
 
That was the key: dehumanization. You first call your victim names and take 
away his dignity. You restrict his nourishment, and he loses his physical 
beauty and sometimes some of his moral values. You take away soap and 
water and then say the Jew stinks. Then you take their human dignity 
further away by putting them in situations where they even will do such 
things which are criminal. Then you take food away. When they lose their 
beauty and health and so on, they are not human anymore. When he's 
reduced to a skin-coloured skeleton, you have taken away his humanity. It is 
much easier to kill non-humans than humans.59 
 
This process of dehumanisation, so characteristic of the Nazi Holocaust has, of 
course, been described by many others, most eloquently perhaps by Primo Levi.60 
At the risk of not doing justice to an important debate on the commensurability of 
                                                           
58 Brauman, "From Philanthropy to Humanitarianism": 403-404. 
59 Kristen Renwick Monroe, The Hand of Compassion: Portraits of Moral Choice During the 
Holocaust (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 88. Italics in original. 
60 Primo Levi, If This Is a Man (with The Truce) (London: Everyman's Library, 2000). 
 79 
 
the Holocaust with other crimes against humanity, we find this process of 
dehumanisation repeated in Cambodia, Bosnia, Rwanda and countless other 
theatres of atrocity. Its purpose is to dissolve the existence of a common humanity 
by attempting to “animalise” certain humans. This mode of inhumanity tries to push 
certain humans across the human/non-human divide. It contrasts human animals 
with non-human animals, yet reserves a particularly virulent hatred for the 
dehumanized victim that is rarely exhibited towards other animals. It is thus a 
somewhat paradoxical illusion, for the very process relies on a prior identification of 
common humanity. It is these humans in particular who are non-human. And this 
rhetorical displacement can only be inflicted upon humans, by humans. 
 The idea of a sentimental education put forward in Rorty’s writing, of 
teaching humanity through the telling of “sad and sentimental stories”, here 
presents its dark side: the social psychological process it describes arguably also fits 
the process of dehumanisation, which has its own stories to tell. Thomas Laqueur 
makes exactly this point: 
 
Consider, for example, the words “they are not human, they are animals,” 
perhaps the most common formula for why one does not need to, indeed 
should not, extend the moral franchise to another person or group. It is 
supported not by an argument for a switch of species being – Rorty is right 
that such arguments are largely irrelevant – but by a “sad and sentimental 
tale,” that is meant to make the hearer treat someone as radically other.61 
 
 Once that initial step has been taken, it is easier to take it further, to make claims 
such as “these people who you may have known as neighbours are not like you. In 
fact they are animals. Worse than that, they are vermin who should be eliminated. 
If not, they will harm you and your family.” We have countless examples of this 
dehumanising sentimental education at work, from the anti-Semitic rhetoric of Nazi 
Germany to the hate-speak of Radio-Télévision Libre des Mille Collines during the 
Rwandan Genocide. Dehumanisation explicitly challenges the integrity of a category 
of common humanity, even if it paradoxically may draw on assumed commonalities 
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to function. It also contains its own account of human nature, of what we might be 
willing to do to each other by way of cruelty. It is worth remembering that 
Inhumanity is necessarily a human category. 
 The suffering engendered from an explicit attempt to cast a human out of 
the category of human is almost axiomatically inhuman in terms of a humanitarian 
concern with the integrity of the category of human. Other attacks, however, may 
be less obvious, and pose their own risks for the putative humanitarian. Rorty 
identifies three modes of dehumanisation. The first is the distinction between 
human and animal described above. But this distinction plays out not only between 
perpetrator and victim, but also between observer and perpetrator. Rorty’s second 
type of dehumanisation is the infantilisation of the other, allowing that they might 
be human, but are childlike, not capable of making mature choices. This theme adds 
another gloss to the question of humanitarianism’s uneasy accommodation with 
the question of innocence. His third type is simply limiting the ways one can count 
as human, by taking “human” as synonym, for instance, of “man”.62 Here Rorty links 
to the feminist work of scholars such as Catherine MacKinnon who challenge all, 
including humanitarians with the question of “are women human?”63 
 This schema is probably not exhaustive. But it raises another complicating 
factor for understanding humanitarianism as a simple reaction against 
dehumanising cruelty. The history of humanitarianism shows that it has often, in 
constituting itself against one of these forms of dehumanisation, simultaneously 
engaged in dehumanising processes of different kinds. For instance, one of the key 
chapters in the history of humanitarianism is, of course, the abolition of the slave 
trade, the reaction against the trade, and ultimately slavery itself, as a cruel practice 
that treated humans like animals.64 But it is impossible to detach the humanitarian 
discussions about the evils of slavery from inter-related discussions about the 
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benefits of colonialism. Craig Calhoun notes that more generally, "Colonialism itself 
was often understood (with no cynicism) as humanitarianism."65 This kind of 
attitude was deeply embedded in liberal humanitarian thought, and figures like J.S. 
Mill, while arguing against one set of dehumanising practices, simultaneously 
advocated others, such as treating colonial subjects as children to be educated. 
Neta Crawford notes that contemporary “advocates of humanitarian intervention 
pose justifications that recall the civilizing mission of colonialism”.66 More recently, 
Jeremy Moses argues that Bush and Blair drew on humanitarian discourse to 
effectively establish “an inside and outside of a global ‘human’ identity”.67 
 What is going on here? In the previous section, I argued that putative 
humanitarians come to the discussion with a variety of different ideas of what 
cruelty, dehumanisation and inhumanity might entail. These ideas are confronted 
with new ways of being cruel and inhuman. The argument I have put forward so far 
is that the concept of humanity at stake for humanitarianism is negotiated through 
this negative process. But this leaves an incomplete picture, for it neglects the way 
putative humanitarians come to the discussion with a paradigmatic humanity in 
mind. This prior conception of humanity is also being negotiated, both in terms of 
widening its catchment area and of rescuing those threatened with expulsion. For 
example, some Christian abolitionists were primarily concerned with saving their 
own souls, but they also wanted to create “proper” humans, i.e. Christians, out of 
the slaves. 
 Rhetorically those engaging in dehumanising discourses often claim to be 
doing so precisely in the name of a defence, a purification of the category of 
humanity.68 Indeed, for Rorty the category of human is precisely problematic 
because we always envisage humanity as “like us”. For him, we are more likely to 
engage in acts of solidarity if we expand that “like us”, rather than grounding an 
idea of the “human”. He sees the possibility of a human rights culture to react 
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against cruelty in the expansion of existing particularist, indeed parochial, 
identifications.69 
 
Consider, first, those Danes and those Italians. Did they say, about their 
Jewish neighbors, that they deserved to be saved because they were fellow 
human beings? Perhaps sometimes they did, but surely they would usually, 
if queried, have used more parochial terms to explain why they were taking 
risks to protect a given Jew – for example, that this particular Jew was a 
fellow Milanese, or a fellow Jutlander, or a fellow member of the same 
union or profession, or a fellow bocce player, or a fellow parent of small 
children. Then consider those Belgians: Surely there were some people 
whom they would have taken risks to protect in similar circumstances, 
people whom they did identify with, under some description or other. But 
Jews rarely fell under those descriptions.70 
 
Here Rorty is telling an empirical story, which does not quite exhaust the 
possibilities of solidarity according to the empirical evidence, as Geras, using 
examples of rescue by the “Righteous Among the Nations”, has demonstrated.71 In 
fact, many Rescuers of Jews seem to have had a much less parochial, more 
expansive sense of what “like us” might entail, in many cases so expansive as 
precisely to see humanity as the crucial shared identity. Indeed, Kristen Monroe’s 
important work on Rescuers, which draws on psychological literature on the 
categorisation of others, notes the particular psychological salience among many 
rescuers of a category of “human”.72 The path from concern to action, and the 
emotive mechanisms that underlie it, will be examined further in the next chapter. 
For now, the important point is that we should take on board Rorty’s insights into 
how the categories of “human” and “inhuman” can function in terms of narratives 
of dehumanisation and, for want of a better term, rehumanisation. Humanity is the 
key category within and against which humanitarians conceptualise suffering. We 
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can agree with Brauman that humanitarians are those who believe that humans are 
not made to suffer, but we need to recognise the contingencies inherent in every 
term of that phrase. 
 Therefore, we should envisage humanitarianism as a discussion within which 
the category of “human” is not only defended, but more importantly negotiated 
and understood. This negotiation takes place through human suffering that we 
consider cruel and inhuman. But we also bring to bear on the discussion prior 
conceptions of humanity that may contain their own cruelties and sources of 
inhumanity. Framings of suffering become the arguments put forward in a “politics 
of humanity”, a politics through which we negotiate and defend our sense of the 
“human” and its place in our political landscape, even if, as Amir Pasic and Thomas 
G. Weiss remind us, humanity “is not a category for which we have prepared our 
political concepts”.73 Putative humanitarians are engaged in a high stakes game 
against those who wish to narrow the category of the human, but can also fall prey 
to valid charges of narrowing or ring-fencing that category themselves. More 
troubling, in negotiating the meaning of “humanity”, humanitarians are, in effect, 
negotiating the humanity of others. In doing so, they can slip into a deeply 
possessive relationship. For instance, Alex de Waal refers to the danger of “the 
humanitarians’ moral ownership of other people’s suffering” engendering “the 
legitimacy of their intrusion into other societies”.74 
 Related to this is a danger inherent in this necessary politics of humanity: 
the production of hierarchies of suffering, based on its causes. This is the flipside of 
the danger of articulating perfect crimes with only victims, as warned against by 
Brauman. Taking things to the other extreme, we can come to devote ourselves 
exclusively to identifying dragons to slay, and miss the more diffuse forms of 
suffering, that though unjust (see Chapter 5) may not present the drama of 
obviously cruel action, or a clear agent to whom to attribute guilt and blame. We 
may come to idealise our own moral agency (as good) as well as the moral agency 
of the perpetrator (as evil). In the absence of a “bad guy” to hunt down, or an easily 
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understandable causal pattern, such as characterises complex emergencies or 
apparently intractable civil conflicts, we neglect suffering such as the grinding 
everyday poverty in which a huge percentage of the world’s population lives. This 
can be deeply counterproductive in the case of slow-onset disasters, and complex 
phenomena such as climate change.75 This points humanitarians back to more 
dispassionate, technical assessments. The challenge, then becomes neither to reify 
the causes or consequences of suffering, as both risk doing injustice to those 
humanitarians aspire to help. As will be seen, this is an extremely difficult and 
complex challenge. Either way, humanitarians are locked in to the play of what 
Craig Calhoun terms “the emergency imaginary”, and the struggle to define what is 
normal and abnormal both in terms of human suffering and of political order, and 
what merits and legitimises intervention.76 Nicholas Onuf traces the history of this 
struggle back to the early nineteenth century, and notes the tendency for suffering 
to become secondary to one’s own programmatic concerns.77 
 I put forward this starting context for debates about humanitarianism as a 
necessary alternative to twin tendencies to reduce them entirely to either 
philosophical or practice-based discussions, because, as this chapter has shown, 
neither framing suffering as a practical matter of saving lives nor as a philosophical 
hatred of cruelty can ever fully resolve the issues at stake. The suggestion here is 
that the distinctiveness of humanitarianism is not to be found in a definitive 
account of human suffering, but rather on how it operationalises that suffering as a 
politics of humanity.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has begun to fill out the category of humanitarianism in one important 
respect, charting how suffering enters the discussion. Framings such as emergency 
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or crisis have serious practical benefits, but leave unanswered a wider set of 
questions about why they are justified, and the limits of acceptable suffering. We 
may have to step back to identify our changing, but nevertheless visceral, 
understandings of what is unacceptable in terms of cruelty and inhumanity. 
Through that process, we fill out our understanding of what is human. 
Humanitarianism in that sense represents the discussion about how to enlarge that 
category. But to engage in that is to engage in a “politics of humanity”, negotiating 
the content and political salience of the category of “human”, as well as the 
response to attacks on the integrity of the human (which may even come from 
within). The following chapters will thus chart how this politics emerges and is 
negotiated. 
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3. Mobilising the Humanitarian Impulse 
 
Any conception of humanitarianism is, at least in part, constituted by visceral 
reactions to the suffering of others. Mediated or unmediated, these reactions 
sometimes lead to a willingness to act. This section explores the enabling context 
for such visceral reactions to develop into such a willingness, building on the 
insights of the previous chapter, which highlighted how those convinced of the 
importance of humanitarianism can be portrayed as engaged in an ethical and 
political struggle to define and protect the category of common humanity, in a 
highly contingent process frequently driven by those whose imaginations allow 
them to plumb new depths of cruelty. The content of common humanity was seen 
to be necessarily political, contingent and contestable. To engage in 
humanitarianism is to engage in a politics of humanity. 
 But some of the clarity of the previous chapter came from its grounding in 
the experiences of professional humanitarians with robust credentials, notably 
leading figures in Médecins Sans Frontières. It would be a mistake to understand 
the “politics of humanity” simply in terms of these figures, virtual ideal-types of 
humanitarian conviction, if not necessarily perfect guides to action. Though their 
understanding of common humanity may ultimately be contestable, their reactions 
are powerfully visceral, while also reflecting robust lived experiences of other 
people’s extreme suffering, leading to situations where a humanitarian encounter 
of one sort or another is already, if not entirely pre-determined, then at least 
extremely likely. Their ability to experience and reflect upon this situation depends 
on wider and more diffuse networks of support, on processes that mobilise 
humanitarian concern and the will to act. Cornelio Sommaruga, ex-President of the 
ICRC, once called for a permanent state of “humanitarian mobilization”.
1
 
 But strongly prescriptive accounts that merely set out strong moral 
obligations to act in response to human suffering, whether professional 
humanitarian talk of a “humanitarian imperative” or cosmopolitan duties of global 
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justice, often ignore the conditions that make such action possible or likely, at both 
individual and collective level. Where such rules play a part, it is at the very least 
because they are deeply embedded in individuals’ or communities’ identities and 
sense of self, rather than because they are possessed of an irresistible power of 
persuasion. Otto, the Rescuer we encountered in the previous chapter, noted that 
“[the] hand of compassion was faster than the calculus of reason”.2 
 The previous chapter introduced Richard Rorty’s influential work on the 
mechanics of such persuasion, through a process of sentimental education. His 
question is essentially the classic pragmatist one: what works? His own answer is 
that it depends on portraying others as “like us” through the telling of “sad and 
sentimental stories”. While for Rorty, that “like us” is unlikely to function at the 
level of humanity as a whole, empirical work done on the Rescuers (admittedly a 
possibly exceptional group of people) suggested that the identity of common 
humanity was remarkably salient for them. But Rorty’s move is still a useful one.  
Political theorists often focus on discussions about right motives, at the expense of 
an account of what actually motivates us to act – or, in the absence of a definitive 
account – what seems to motivate us to act. The question of how important “right” 
motives are will be addressed in the next chapter. For now, what concerns us is 
essentially an empirical question. What mechanisms are effective in stimulating 
humanitarian concern, and transforming that concern into action, or at least a 
willingness to act? 
 As it stands, the picture we can paint is only as clear as our understanding of 
the human mind, which is to say, still relatively obscure (although fairly rapid 
progress is afoot). But some plausible directions lie elsewhere, in the discussions 
about empathy, sympathy, compassion and pity that have been ongoing for 
centuries. Adam Smith’s version of practical reasoning certainly took these issues 
seriously. More recently, neuroscientists have revived the study of the emotions as 
a central plank of reasoning and consciousness.3 One of the many dilemmas facing 
professional humanitarians is that of how to negotiate this patchwork of emotions, 
                                                           
2 Monroe, The Hand of Compassion, 91. 
3 Hunt, Inventing Human Rights, 110. 
 88 
 
importantly for themselves and for leading policymakers, but also on a much wider 
scale, among the individuals and communities whose small expressions of concern, 
donations of time or money and applications of political pressure, form the enabling 
context for any kind of humanitarian action. If they want to stimulate humanitarian 
concern and action, what emotions do they need to engage? This question is 
complicated by the fact that not all of these pull in the same direction: the appeal to 
pity is somewhat different to the appeal to empathy, and we cannot assume that 
the preferred appeal will necessarily be the most effective. 
 In an influential article, Neta Crawford suggested that “research on emotion 
may lead to a fundamental reconceptualization of agents and agency in world 
politics”.4 In understanding the “politics of humanity”, it is important to see how 
humanitarian agency is linked to emotional underpinnings, not least because, as 
Michael Walzer warns us, to neglect the passions that nourish politics is to risk 
setting out an implausible and impoverished account of politics.5 This chapter will 
explore these issues, assessing in turn debates on the role of sympathy and 
empathy within humanitarianism, the lessons of bystanders, issues around the 
mediation and communication of human suffering and the perils of the 
“spectatorship of suffering”, and the issue of selectivity and impartiality. 
 
I The Humanitarian Impulse as Emotional Capacity 
 
The conventional shorthand used to express the way in which suffering triggers 
humanitarian concern is the idea of a “humanitarian impulse”.6 The phrase is rarely 
unpacked, but often employed, a recognition perhaps that reason alone may not 
account for humanitarianism, but the barest recognition in work that frequently 
                                                           
4 Neta C. Crawford, "The Passion of World Politics: Propositions on Emotion and Emotional 
Relationships", International Security 24, no. 4 (2000): 156. 
5 Michael Walzer, Politics and Passion: Toward a More Egalitarian Liberalism (London: Yale 
University Press, 2004). 
6 The earliest relevant instance of the phrase I have been able to find is in Francis S.L. Lyons, 
Internationalism in Europe, 1815-1914 (Leyden: Sythoff, 1963), 263. Alex de Waal refers to 
an “impulse for humanity and human rights”. Alex de Waal, "The Humanitarians' Tragedy: 
Escapable and Inescapable Cruelties", Disasters 34, no. s2 (2010): 131. 
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attempts to escape the contingencies of emotion. The phrase endures because it 
captures several important themes that lie at the heart of our topic, and which 
were both brought home in the previous chapter: the sense of urgency and the 
unpredictable, unreliable contingency that accompany “crises of humanity”. It 
would be unwise to make this (a necessarily parochial) semantic point, but a few 
dictionary definitions of “impulse” give a good sense of the dynamics at play here: 
“Incitement or stimulus to action arising from a state of mind or feeling; an instance 
of this… Sudden or involuntary inclination to act, without premeditation; an 
instance of this… Force or influence exerted on the mind by an external stimulus; an 
instance of this; (a) suggestion, incitement, instigation.”7 
 What these themes preclude, however, is the existence of a definitive 
singular humanitarian impulse that has a stable, transhistorical content and 
resonance. Indeed, the idea of impulse might seem a rather strange way to capture 
an enduring human capacity that might form the bedrock of a widening and 
deepening of humanitarian concern. But there seems to be something persistent 
about it. For instance, Roberto Belloni maintains that “a humanitarian impulse has 
always existed in all major world religions in the form of compassion or solidarity 
towards those who are in need”.8 Like the rejection of inhumanity explored in the 
previous chapter, the idea of a humanitarian impulse seems a useful way to capture 
a shifting but recognisable trope of human behaviour. Moreover it leads us to 
question what lies behind and enables such an impulse, and the manner in which 
another’s suffering is received and transformed into concern rather than 
indifference, and then perhaps ultimately into a willingness to act. This thesis uses 
the idea of humanitarian impulse in the singular, as useful shorthand, but it needs 
to be emphasised that it assumes a plural, malleable character, rejecting the notion 
of a definitive, authentic and retrievable experience. This section examines how the 
humanitarian impulse sits on a spectrum of emotional responses that range from 
empathy to pity. 
                                                           
7 Lesley Brown, ed., The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1993), 1329. 
8 Belloni, "The Trouble with Humanitarianism": 452. 
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 So how is humanitarian concern experienced? What emotional capacities 
underpin the possibility of humanitarian impulses? The previous chapter noted the 
psychological salience among those most willing to engage in humanitarian action 
of perceived bonds of common humanity. But the question remains of the 
experiential underpinning of such a bond. Recent normative work in international 
political theory has increasingly recognized the importance of establishing such 
plausible empirical bases to carry forward the negotiation and expansion of our 
spheres of moral concern. For instance, Andrew Linklater recognises that “[it] is 
preferable to rest the case for cosmopolitanism on socio-psychological 
commitments to empathy and sympathy, which are among the universal pre-
requisites of social life”.9 I will argue later in this work that it is a mistake to place 
humanitarian commitments entirely within the cosmopolitan camp, as 
cosmopolitanism is not a necessary component of a humanitarian commitment. But 
the majority of cosmopolitan theorists writing in international political theory 
certainly present humanitarian commitments as an integral part of their outlook, 
and there is a great deal of overlap for our purposes in terms of the work being 
done on the character of our fluctuating and plural solidarities. It is certainly 
significant that cosmopolitans such as Linklater accept that the ways in which 
humans actually experience and form social relationships need to be at the heart of 
normative theorizing, and that it is not sufficient to merely dazzle with a series of 
logically aligned propositions that any “reasonable” person should accept. 
 This is all the more vital when it comes to the grisly subject matter of 
humanitarianism, which all too often makes a mockery of prior notions of 
reasonableness. Surely few would argue that, when people have shown themselves 
willing, at the extreme, to risk their lives for others, reason and deliberation are not 
at the core of their actual motivations. Indeed, there is now empirical work to back 
that up.10 That is not to say that such processes are not important elements in the 
humanitarian conversation. But it is not clear at all that rational argument and 
                                                           
9 Andrew Linklater, "Distant Suffering and Cosmopolitan Obligations", International Politics 
44, no. 1 (2007): 221. 
10 It is for instance a consistent characteristic of the Rescuer testimonies collected in 
Monroe, The Hand of Compassion. 
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reason trump all else in leading to humanitarian action. Rorty in particular cautions 
that the flawed “idea that reason is ‘stronger’ than sentiment, that only an 
insistence on the unconditionality of moral obligation has the power to change 
human beings for the better, is very persistent”.11 Indeed, much writing on 
humanitarianism focuses on the area of unconditional duty, yet references to the 
“humanitarian impulse” are at least partial acknowledgements that reason alone is 
often insufficient to motivate us to act. If we are to follow Rorty’s warning, to 
understand how people heed calls to action, we need to examine the affective 
content of our humanitarian impulses. That is, we should turn to the bonds of 
sympathy, empathy, compassion and pity that constitute the social texture of 
humanitarianism. 
 There has been a revival of interest in these bonds in recent years, which 
draws largely on two key figures of the Scottish Enlightenment: David Hume and 
Adam Smith. For instance, to develop his own concept of a “sentimental 
education”, Rorty draws (via Annette Baier) on Hume’s understanding of sympathy. 
Smith’s The Theory of Moral Sentiments, and the account of sympathy it contains, 
has become increasingly important in the work of Amartya Sen on our responses to 
injustice (see Chapter 5), and lies at the heart of Luc Boltanski’s important work on 
the mediation of suffering, which will be returned to later in this chapter.12 But 
perhaps most interesting at this point in the argument is the work done by Nancy 
Sherman on the “moral attitudes that undergird a commitment to humanitarian 
intervention” and on the moral psychology that underpins the humanitarian 
impulse.13 She draws on both Hume and, especially, Smith to emphasise the central 
place within humanitarianism of empathy. Empathy is currently the focus of much 
                                                           
11 Rorty, "Human Rights, Rationality and Sentimentality", 181. 
12 Luc Boltanski, Distant Suffering: Morality, Media and Politics, trans. Graham Burchell 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). Sen, The Idea of Justice. 
13 Nancy Sherman, "Empathy, Respect, and Humanitarian Intervention", Ethics & 
International Affairs 12 (1998): 103. Sherman uses the phrase “humanitarian impulse”. 
Sherman, "Empathy, Respect, and Humanitarian Intervention": 119. Sherman makes a 
similar argument, with a different emphasis in Nancy Sherman, "Empathy and Imagination", 
Midwest Studies In Philosophy 22, no. 1 (1998). See also Suski, "Children, Suffering and the 
Humanitarian Appeal", 210. 
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study across the social and natural sciences.14 As Lynn Hunt notes, empathy is a 
concept broadly equivalent to the Enlightenment understanding of sympathy, a 
term that has in modern usage crept closer to our understanding of pity.15 
 Sherman demonstrates that, though we may describe our humanitarian 
commitments in terms of, say, a Kantian notion of respect, “[if] respect for human 
dignity is a part of the humanitarian posture, then it must be thickened with, and 
made operational through, empathy”.16 Sherman is prepared to pin down the 
agenda of humanitarianism, rather than allowing fully for the negotiations and 
contestations that necessarily constitute the idea of human dignity, and can even 
emerge from the sentimental experience of humanitarianism. But her account of 
the mechanisms of empathy nevertheless convincingly shows how developments in 
psychological research bear out Adam Smith’s version of sympathy. Smith famously 
emphasised the importance of our ability to “trade places in fancy”.17  
 
By the imagination we place ourselves in his situation, we conceive 
ourselves enduring all the same torments, we enter as it were into his body, 
and become in some measure the same person with him, and thence form 
some idea of his sensations … His agonies, when they are thus brought home 
to ourselves, when we have adopted and made them our own, begin at last 
to affect us, and then tremble and shudder at the thought of what he feels.18 
 
His account comes close to the modern understanding of empathy as the cognitive 
ability to imagine oneself into another’s situation. This ability performs a vital role in 
absorbing and making sense of others’ suffering. As Sherman puts it: 
 
Empathy and protoempathy are ways we transcend the self and achieve a 
kind of social intelligence or understanding. If, as research suggests, 
empathetic capacities are also important contributors to altruistic behavior, 
                                                           
14 For a recent overview see Jeremy Rifkin, The Empathic Civilization: The Race to Global 
Consciousness in a World in Crisis (New York: Penguin, 2009). 
15 Hunt, Inventing Human Rights, 64-65. 
16 Sherman, "Empathy, Respect, and Humanitarian Intervention": 109. 
17 Cited in Ibid.: 110. 
18 Cited in Laqueur, "Mourning, Pity, and the Work of Narrative in the Making Of 
"Humanity"", 48. 
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then we would expect to find them buttressing a theory of political 
humanitarianism.19 
 
If humanity comes into focus in large part through encounters with human 
suffering, then an empathetic encounter with suffering is the most plausible basis 
for, on the one hand, understanding suffering, and on the other, conceptualising 
common humanity as something genuinely shared: your experience of being human 
is potentially mine, and mine potentially yours, however unlikely this may be in 
practice. This raises the issue of how much weight that last question of likelihood 
carries. That is, does it place a limit on the possibility of an empathetic reaction 
characterising the humanitarian impulse?  
 The problem of practical likelihood relates to the question of pity, which can 
also, if more problematically, underlie and enable humanitarian impulses. I might 
recognise the suffering of another as appalling and feel deeply sorry for them, but 
not really envisage or imagine that suffering as my own. Luc Boltanski argues that 
humanitarianism is in large part characterised by what he calls a “politics of pity”. 
“The politics of pity regards the unfortunate together en masse, even if … it is 
necessary to single out particular misfortunes from the mass in order to inspire 
pity.”20 Pity leads to a somewhat different kind of humanitarian impulse, in which 
we feel sorry for the other but do not really recognize ourselves in their suffering. 
Boltanski draws on Arendt to argue that this has been a characteristic of a certain 
kind of humanitarian impulse at least since the French Revolution. For Arendt: 
 
Pity, because it is not stricken in the flesh and keeps its sentimental 
distance, can succeed where compassion always will fail; it can reach out to 
the multitude and therefore, like solidarity, enter the market-place. But pity, 
in contrast to solidarity, does not look upon both fortune and misfortune, 
the strong and the weak, with an equal eye; without the presence of 
misfortune, pity could not exist, and it therefore has just as much vested 
interest in the existence of the weak. Moreover, by virtue of being a 
sentiment, pity can be enjoyed for its own sake, and this will almost 
                                                           
19 Sherman, "Empathy, Respect, and Humanitarian Intervention": 104. 
20 Boltanski, Distant Suffering, 4. Italics in original. 
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automatically lead to a glorification of its cause, which is the suffering of 
others.21  
 
Through this kind of humanitarian concern, we come to define ourselves as those 
who do not suffer, in contrast to the objects of that concern, who do. A 
humanitarian impulse defined by pity necessarily sets in train a very different kind 
of relationship, one clearly less egalitarian and solidaristic than a response born 
from empathy. Boltanski expresses a preference for a “politics of justice”. Yet pity 
cannot be excluded entirely from a plausible account of potential humanitarian 
reactions, as it can still operate within a context of defending a notion of common 
humanity. This relates to the humanitarian perspectives explored in the previous 
chapter, which clearly expand the category of common humanity, but in doing so 
impose hierarchies based on narratives of infantilisation or sexism, for instance. We 
will see in subsequent chapters that feeling sorry for someone without identifying 
with their suffering plays a major part in some of the excesses of humanitarian 
action. If the identification and experience of shared humanity lies at the heart of 
humanitarianism, then clearly an empathetic reaction to suffering is more 
consistent with a coherent humanitarianism than a reaction of pity. 
 Yet a non-negotiable requirement of full empathy equally seems unfeasibly 
daunting, and goes against the grain of humanitarianism as a largely practical 
endeavour, as much characterised by action as by the concern that fuels it. It is not 
clear that it is necessarily problematic if pity can raise the funds to send into the 
field a professional humanitarian, perhaps one fuelled by a strongly empathetic 
connection to the suffering he or she will encounter there. It is worth noting that in 
his discussion of the principle of humanity, Jean Pictet chooses to emphasise the 
role of pity, which “is one of the driving forces of charity. It is a spontaneous 
movement, an instantaneous affective reaction to the suffering of others”.22 
Perhaps, then, the affective basis that is seen as sufficient for humanitarian action is 
linked to the desired scope of humanitarian action. For an act of charity, pity might 
be sufficient, while for a more sustained act, such as an act of justice, empathy 
                                                           
21 Hannah Arendt, On Revolution (London: Penguin, 1990), 88-89. 
22 Pictet, The Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross, unpaginated text. 
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would seem a better starting point, enabling as it can devices like Smith’s impartial 
spectator. 
  A spectrum of affective responses leading from pity to empathy seems 
highly plausible as the basis of our humanitarian impulses. In one of his lesser 
known articles, Charles Taylor provides us with an interesting account of sympathy, 
understood in a broad sense that encompasses the relevant range of this 
spectrum.23 For Taylor, we really are dealing with a primitive, immediate and 
unthinking impulse here, and he draws on an account of a Rescuer during the 
Holocaust to illustrate this. He argues that sympathy, being moved by the suffering 
of others, is powerfully constitutive of what it is to be human, and the possibility of 
sympathetic responses is explanatorily basic in how we come to understand our 
humanity. 
 This is not to say, however, that this provides us with a reliable, foundational 
building block. The capacity to experience the humanitarian impulse is in turn 
enabled or hindered by other factors. Sherman argues that though empathy may be 
something that most of us develop in childhood and beyond to some extent, it 
needs to be cultivated if it is to help us respond to threats to human dignity with 
which we cannot easily identify.24 
 
Scenes of the helpless and so obviously innocent, of starving and orphaned 
children, may transcend parochial borders; we may understand the dramatic 
script without much explicit rehearsal. The simulation, or act of empathetic 
imagination, may be fairly automatic, fairly procedural. We may experience 
a sense of “there but for fortune,” a response that underscores our shared 
humanity. 
 In other cases, threats to human dignity may be harder to simulate. 
We may have to find mediating steps that bridge an alien world and our own 
so that identificatory mechanisms can be established. So, some have argued, 
the threat of rape many women live in fear of, or the prospect of female 
genital mutilation, may require a sensitivity to women’s vulnerabilities that 
many men may not easily come by without education and consciousness-
raising.25 
 
                                                           
23 Charles Taylor, "Sympathy", Journal of Ethics 3, no. 1 (1999). 
24 See also Hunt, Inventing Human Rights, 39. 
25 Sherman, "Empathy, Respect, and Humanitarian Intervention": 113. 
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The challenge here is similar to that acknowledged in Martha Nussbaum’s 
influential plea for a cosmopolitan education to make the lives of distant strangers 
less pallid in comparison to the colourful consolations of patriotism.26 How to 
cultivate a capacity for empathy that can potentially link us to any human and their 
suffering? For Kwame Anthony Appiah, the answer lies in building out from an 
identity that is already shared, such as the Christian identity that links American 
Christians to Christians in Southern Sudan, or writers worldwide through PEN 
International: “engagement with strangers is always going to be engagement with 
particular strangers; and the warmth that comes from shared identity will often be 
available”.27 This is not dissimilar to Rorty’s sense that we empathise and 
sympathise with people “like us”. What is not so clear, as I argued in the previous 
chapter, is that our sense of shared identity is necessarily particularistic, in the 
sense that many rescuers of Jews in the Second World War felt that the relevant 
shared identity was humanity (though perhaps a particular conception of 
humanity). If there is to some extent a dynamic of expanding our borders of 
empathy according to a pattern of concentric circles, we must acknowledge that for 
some, albeit perhaps a small minority of so-called “moral exemplars”, the particular 
identity at stake might be one of, if not universal resonance, at least universal  
scope. 
 Andrew Linklater complicates the question further, asking “whether the 
extension of human solidarity depends not only on emotional identification and 
compassion but also on feelings of guilt or shame when harm is caused or when 
little is done to alleviate misery. The conjecture is that shame and guilt along with 
compassion must become ‘cosmopolitan emotions’”.28 Judith Lichtenberg draws on 
recent work in experimental psychology to suggest that shame (more so than guilt), 
can be particularly effective in motivating people to act out of a concern that their 
                                                           
26 Martha C. Nussbaum, "Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism", in For Love of Country?, ed. 
Joshua Cohen (Boston: Beacon Press, 2002). 
27 Kwame Anthony Appiah, Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers (New York: W. 
W. Norton & Company, 2006), 98. 
28 Linklater, "Distant Suffering and Cosmopolitan Obligations": 27. 
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self-image will be compromised if they do not.29 This is arguably to do with the fact 
that, as Stan Cohen argues, shame, unlike guilt, is a “social emotion”, appealing “to 
a sense of community and moral interdependence rather than personal 
responsibility”.30 But, Lichtenberg argues that this sense of shame is easily 
internalised, and can therefore even function when the actor in question is 
unobserved.31 For Lichtenberg, shame is one of the crucial elements in her 
argument, in relation to aid, that “if we want people to give more, we must raise 
the general level of giving in a society”.32 Martha Nussbaum, though in general 
concerned with the negative effects of shaming, also notes the potential of certain 
kinds of shame to spur people towards valuable activity.33 
 This opens out the discussion of empathy to something much more public, a 
“cultural practice” as Lynn Hunt has it, and clearly relevant to the issue of how to 
spark and deepen humanitarian concern.34 Though at the core of empathy and pity 
are cognitive processes experienced on a personal basis, Nancy Sherman reminds us 
that “our private imaginations are fed by public images and narratives”.35 The 
activation of pity and empathy depend on struggles over knowledge and ignorance 
of suffering and how to communicate these. 
 
II Knowing and Ignoring Suffering 
 
Reflecting on the phenomenon of German adhesion to Nazism, Primo Levi 
perceptively highlighted the “way the typical German citizen won and defended his 
                                                           
29 Judith Lichtenberg, "Absence and the Unfond Heart: Why People Are Less Giving Than 
They Might Be", in The Ethics of Assistance: Morality and the Distant Needy, ed. Deen K. 
Chatterjee (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 90-91. 
30 Stanley Cohen, States of Denial: Knowing About Atrocities and Suffering (Cambridge: 
Polity, 2001), 216. 
31 Lichtenberg, "Absence and the Unfond Heart", 90-91. 
32 Ibid., 88. 
33 Martha C. Nussbaum, Hiding from Humanity: Disgust, Shame, and the Law (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2004), 347. 
34 Hunt, Inventing Human Rights, 29. 
35 Sherman, "Empathy, Respect, and Humanitarian Intervention": 114. 
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ignorance”.36 At the heart of the battle to engage the human capacity for empathy 
is a public and private negotiation of the knowledge and ignorance of others’ 
suffering.37 In her thoughtful study Regarding the Pain of Others, Susan Sontag 
reminds us that: “[to] designate a hell is not, of course, to tell us anything about 
how to extract people from that hell, how to moderate hell’s flames”. She 
continues: 
 
Still, it seems a good in itself to acknowledge, to have enlarged, one’s sense 
of how much suffering caused by human wickedness there is in the world we 
share with others. Someone who is perennially surprised that depravity 
exists, who continues to feel disillusioned (even incredulous) when 
confronted with evidence of what humans are capable of inflicting in the 
way of gruesome, hands-on cruelties upon other humans, has not reached 
moral or psychological adulthood. 
 No one after a certain age has the right to this kind of innocence, of 
superficiality, to this degree of ignorance, or amnesia.38 
 
Anyone who has spent any time reading about the human ravages of the twentieth 
century will be familiar with, and sympathetic to, the indignation expressed by 
Sontag. “One reads the newspaper these days shaking”, as Michael Walzer puts it.39 
But implicit in much of the literature on humanitarianism is the notion that to 
spread the full word about just how badly humans can treat each other, and 
thereby to lift the veils of denial, is the first step towards a more humane world. 
There seems to be a requirement that we should all somehow take the full measure 
of human suffering as a necessary, if not sufficient, precondition for engaging in 
suitable action. 
 This is of course not the whole story, as a central plank of the humanitarian 
traditions that emphasise the importance of bearing witness, for instance 
Quakerism or the secular humanitarianism of MSF, is the idea that truth and 
                                                           
36 Cited in Boltanski, Distant Suffering, ix. 
37 For an outstanding account see Cohen, States of Denial. 
38 Susan Sontag, Regarding the Pain of Others (London: Hamish Hamilton, 2003), 102. 
39 Michael Walzer, "The Politics of Rescue", Social Research 62, no. 1 (1995): 65. 
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knowledge have value not only instrumentally but also intrinsically.40 Interestingly, 
David Rieff, close to the MSF understanding of humanitarianism, tells us that an 
“inchoate idea about witness, in the Quaker sense of the term, was what set me on 
my journeys to all those ground zeros.”41 
 But if action remains at the heart of the humanitarian purpose, knowledge 
of human suffering and crises of humanity cannot ever be an unalloyed good. It 
necessarily requires filtration and mediation. Stan Cohen suggests that a surfeit of 
empathy can be overwhelming and paralysing.42 Michael Ignatieff is blunter: “There 
are strict limits to human empathy.”43 To quote Primo Levi again: “if we had to and 
were able to suffer the sufferings of everyone, we could not live. Perhaps the 
dreadful gift of pity for the many is granted only to saints.”44 Judith Lichtenberg 
agrees: 
 
people have only so much psychological room to feel others’ pain. It’s not at 
all clear that we would want to make people more sensitive in this way if we 
could. The suffering most people encounter among those in their inner circle 
- through death, disease, and innumerable varieties of evil, stupidity, and ill-
fortune - is quite enough.45 
 
The risks involved in a surfeit of others’ suffering are backed up by studies of 
professional humanitarianism. John Norris’ recent portrait of aid workers, The 
Disaster Gypsies acknowledges that many of them are “disaster junkies”, but overall 
the picture of the corrosive effect of wandering lives largely defined by others’ 
                                                           
40 See for example the website Quaker Witness in Africa. Available at 
http://quakerafrica.blogspot.com/; accessed on 13 August 2010. 
41 Rieff, A Bed for the Night, 17. 
42 Cohen, States of Denial, 72. 
43 Michael Ignatieff, "The Stories We Tell: Television and Humanitarian Aid", in Hard 
Choices: Moral Dilemmas in Humanitarian Intervention, ed. Jonathan Moore (Oxford: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 1998), 287. 
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suffering is bleak: a tale of people “burned out and listless as they hunched over at 
hotel bars”.46 The key point here is that for concern for suffering to remain 
nourished, the possibility of not suffering has to remain imaginable. This is arguably 
another of humanitarianism’s paradoxes. In attempting to identify, alleviate, and 
hopefully eradicate the most extreme forms of human suffering, it risks describing 
common humanity wholly in relation to human suffering, because of the core 
dynamic of defining itself against suffering. 
 Clearly a high degree of ignorance or naivety about suffering is unlikely to be 
conducive to plausible action to alleviate that suffering. But is there not an initial 
danger too in potentially ranking all human activity according to how focused it is 
upon extreme forms of human suffering, and of experiencing our humanity entirely 
through the pain of others and our response to it? This might seem an exaggeration, 
but in fact such tendencies dangerously contribute to the myth of the humanitarian 
as perfect, pure altruist, a figure just as unlikely as the famed rational, utility-
maximising economic man.  Tony Vaux’s own memoir is characterised by a quasi-
religious yearning as he discusses “’minimizing’ the self and increasing awareness of 
the ‘other’”.47 The title of his book, The Selfish Altruist, is alive to the paradoxical 
nature of humanitarian concern, but its pages still contain phrases like “human bias 
affects the purity of our altruism”, which implies a measuring of oneself against a 
transcendental ideal.48 We will examine in Chapter 5 Amartya Sen’s caution that 
transcendental ideals of justice do not necessarily provide the best guide to 
action.49 Arguably his point has a wider resonance that is useful to consider here: 
should humanitarians really measure themselves against saints? And does such a 
move not contain its own selfishness and narcissism? A requirement of pure 
altruism is ultimately entirely paralysing to any proposed humanitarian project, for 
it abstracts away from the lived experience of human life that necessarily provides 
the resources of empathy. It is also inegalitarian, if your experience of human 
                                                           
46 John Norris, The Disaster Gypsies: Humanitarian Workers in the World’s Deadliest 
Conflicts (Westport: Praeger Security International, 2007), 99-100. 
47 Vaux, The Selfish Altruist, 7. 
48 Ibid., 60. 
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suffering bears no relationship to my understanding of my own humanity, it is 
ultimately a denial of the possibility of a common humanity. 
 Moreover, with respect to the kind of ethical requirements put forward by 
cosmopolitans like Peter Singer, there are many possible reasons for rejecting the 
kind of consequentialism that would put every human activity, whether opera-going 
or famine relief, into the same felicific calculus.50 But surely one is that opera-going 
embodies some of the possibilities of a common humanity not only defined in terms 
of torture, murder, starvation, misery and survival.51 Such a vision of common 
humanity and its requirements may well be both impractical and undesirable, for 
without consolations and pleasures. It neglects the important fact that such 
consolations and pleasures can be crucial to nourishing our sense of humanity and 
thereby creating the resources to care for each other. 
 The second reason why knowledge of suffering needs to be handled with 
care is the well-documented danger of prompting affective reactions quite different 
to humanitarian concern. A close relation of pity, through the distinction it makes 
between those who suffer and those who do not, is Schadenfreude. Schadenfreude 
is not something on which contemporary international political theory likes to 
dwell. The idea that some may take, if not pleasure, then at least comfort in the 
suffering of another is nevertheless an important consideration here. Even Vaux, a 
dedicated and experienced aid worker, sees the possibility of a mild version of this 
in himself: “I was like the person who watches TV and reassures himself with images 
of starving people, before reaching for a pizza from the fridge”.52 
 Entangled with the spectrum of affective reactions leading from pity to 
empathy is one that ranges from indifference to Schadenfreude to sadism, and that 
runs through many nuances, from shameful denial to voyeuristic pleasure. Sontag 
documents some of these excesses in her work.53 In fact, as Karen Halttunen 
demonstrates, humanitarianism has been frequently associated with what she 
                                                           
50 See Peter Singer, "Famine, Affluence, and Morality", Philosophy & Public Affairs 1, no. 3 
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52 Vaux, The Selfish Altruist, 94. 
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terms a “pornography of pain” since its inception.54 The eagerness of crowds to 
attend punishments and executions is a long-standing phenomenon.55 The line 
between that which shocks and that which excites is often a fine one, or simply 
depends on the character of the viewer. Vaux cautions that “that the motive of pity 
so easily interacts with the motive for cruelty, and the desire to help so easily 
becomes the desire for power”.56 As we will see, this places any agent who might 
wish to stimulate empathy in something of a conundrum, as they can never control 
the terms on which the suffering they convey will be received. 
 But what of Levi’s ignorance “won and defended”? The role of the bystander 
is arguably the most troubling to those who would probe the affective content of 
humanitarian impulses. How can they be so vividly absent? The bystander has been 
the subject of much scrutiny since the Holocaust, and there are a plethora of 
plausible explanations for why such a stance is not only possible, but often likely. 
David Rieff writes that: “[the] moral test of being an onlooker at other people’s 
tragedies is one that few of us are likely to pass reliably.”57 Norman Geras’ elegant 
book The Contract of Mutual Indifference is a stark study of how bystander attitudes 
might come to be generalised.58 His account takes the form of an implicit contract. 
He argues that it is all too easy for us to constitute our social relationships on a basis 
of not helping each other, of not extending solidarity. If we do not assist others in 
emergencies, we cannot expect them to feel duty-bound to come to our 
assistance.59 He shows the troubling ease with which we can become bystanders, 
wrapped in a cocoon of denial. 
                                                           
54 Karen Halttunen, "Humanitarianism and the Pornography of Pain in Anglo-American 
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59 Ibid., 28. 
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 Stan Cohen focuses on the many modes and layers of denial that 
characterise our engagement with the suffering around us in everyday life, and that 
can be amplified in the case of distant suffering.60 He unpacks the complex workings 
of denial in great detail, from the individual psychological to the collective social 
level. While social shame was suggested as a motivating factor above, there can 
exist powerful social mechanisms to counteract that and enhance denial, including 
collective modes and acts of normalisation, self-defence, collusion and rhetorical 
adjustment.  
 During the campaign to abolish the Atlantic slave trade, overcoming the 
mechanisms of denial was often a lengthy process, both at personal and collective 
level. It took John Newton, an ex-trader turned Evangelical preacher, almost thirty 
four years to make the psychological journey and publish his Thoughts Upon the 
African Slave Trade in which he set out the trade’s cruelties.61 
 Furthermore, as, Cohen points out, knowledge of suffering is likely to lose 
some of its urgency when it has to be mediated.62 Mediation increases perhaps the 
biggest barrier to enabling humanitarian impulses, which is simply abstraction. For 
Judith Lichtenberg, “[other] people’s suffering is almost always abstract.”63 We 
recall Adam Smith’s reminder that a man who lost his little finger could not sleep a 
wink, whereas, “provided he never saw them, he will snore with the most profound 
security over the ruin of a hundred millions of his brethren, and the destruction of 
that immense multitude seems plainly an object less interesting to him, than this 
paltry misfortune of his own”.64 
 This abstraction can have a double effect not only of limiting our 
engagement with the suffering of distant strangers, but also of serving as an excuse 
not to really engage with any human suffering. A love of humanity does not always 
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necessarily translate into concern for actually–existing humans. We can use a 
limited engagement with humanitarian concerns as an alibi to avoid concrete 
human suffering. Thomas Laqueur reminds us that: 
 
The very term “humanitarianism” has long been suspect precisely because 
sentiments for humanity generally did not translate easily into care for 
humanity at hand: Dickens’ Mrs. Jellyby in Bleak House, who worried about 
children in Africa but neglected her own, is the paradigmatic fictional case. It 
is, and was, far easier to be moved than to be moved to action far easier to 
see clearly at a distance than near by.65 
 
One might add that, had Mrs. Jellyby spent more time looking after her children, 
she would not necessarily have been acting in a less “humanitarian” way. Rather, 
her humanitarianism would have been more coherent had it been able to relate her 
concern for distant strangers to a practical, positive vision and experience of caring 
humanity. 
 Arguably then, there are three potential humanitarian mistakes here: caring 
for distant strangers to the complete exclusion of suffering neighbours, caring for 
suffering neighbours to the complete exclusion of distant strangers, and coming to 
view humanity as an essentially suffering entity. The challenge for professional 
humanitarians is how to overcome these obstacles, to make the suffering they 
engage with concrete and create an enabling context for their and other actors’ 
political action. 
 
III Stirring the Humanitarian Impulse 
 
How to mobilise and appeal to humanitarian impulses of empathy or pity in such a 
way as to prompt action, let alone “appropriate” action, has always been a 
controversial and difficult subject. There have always been tensions within 
humanitarianism between sensationalism and sobriety, between appeals to “baser” 
instincts, such as not losing face and keeping up with the Joneses, and to “nobler” 
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visions of justice. Appealing to the humanitarian impulse usually now involves 
complex processes of mediation. As Lilie Chouliaraki points out, “mediation does 
not simply act on a pre-existing public, but constitutes this public as a body of action 
in the process of narrating and portraying distant suffering”.66 In doing so it can fall 
prey to the dangers of merely creating participants in a “spectatorship of suffering”. 
I will discuss the issues that arise in the context of two important and interrelated 
modes of appeal to action: images of suffering and personal narratives. 
 Many of the parameters of the humanitarian appeal were set during the 
pioneering phase of humanitarian campaigning. Arguably, they have not changed 
that much over the ensuing two centuries. Where today we may wear plastic 
bracelets to indicate support for campaigns against global poverty, abolitionists 
could indicate their allegiances with one of Josiah Wedgwood’s famous seals 
featuring a chained, kneeling African and the legend “Am I Not a Man and a 
Brother?” The image spread, in an early example of “viral” marketing, to adorn 
books, leaflets, snuffboxes and cufflinks.67 The image directly challenged the viewer 
to identify the slave as a fellow human, forcing an explicit rather than implicit 
exclusion from that category should he or she reject the appeal. 
 Even more iconic was Thomas Clarkson’s diagram of a slave ship, the 
Brookes, a revolutionary image first published in that revolutionary year, 1789. It 
showed cross-sections of each level of a typical slave ship, with 482 slaves in the 
unimaginably cramped positions, body to body in tight rows, in which they would 
have made the journey across the Atlantic. This image, though sensational, was also 
sober, for Clarkson and his colleagues were careful not to exaggerate in its 
composition. For example, the number of slaves carried was at the bottom end of 
the range the ship was actually recorded as having carried.68 For Thomas Laqueur, 
the key to such an image is that it renews our vision, it demands that we “see the 
middle passage for what it was: something other than an exercise in the mere 
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transport of goods”.69 Such images were central to the re-imagining and redefining 
of people’s conceptualisation of slaves as human beings (though not necessarily as 
equals), and generated a significant and persistent aesthetic trend denouncing the 
evils of the slave trade. Indeed, half a century later, Turner famously chose the 
subject of a slave ship, with slavers throwing the dead and dying overboard as a 
vengeful typhoon approaches, for his Royal Academy Exhibition picture of 1840.70 
The theme had clearly acquired a powerful resonance in British public life. Turner 
himself was prompted to paint the picture by the publication in 1839 of a number 
of high-profile books on the horrors of slavery, including the second edition of 
Thomas Clarkson’s History of the Rise, Progress, and Accomplishment of the 
Abolition of the Slave Trade, and a book on The African Slave Trade by Thomas F. 
Buxton, serialised in The Times.71 
 Today, though, we live in a much more crowded and complex media culture. 
In the early 1990s, there was much talk of the “CNN effect” bringing the world’s 
suffering even more vividly into our living rooms, in real time, and creating a global 
public, who would spur their political leaders to action. But this proved somewhat 
premature, with the “bodybag effect” showing that the “CNN effect”, to the extent 
that it functioned at all, was a double edged sword. In the case of military 
humanitarian interventions, calls to “do something” could rapidly become calls to 
pull troops out.72 Rapidly, talk turned to predictions of “compassion fatigue”.73 
 A more nuanced debate on the role of visual imagery has since emerged, but 
it reveals a dauntingly complex environment for any professional humanitarian 
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aiming to mobilise humanitarian action and overcome indifference to suffering, 
above and beyond the problems discussed in the previous section. Furthermore, it 
raises questions about how to spread humanitarian identity without sacrificing its 
integrity. These arise both in terms of how humanitarians formulate and 
promulgate their message, and the media environment in which it is transmitted. 
  Though deterministic readings of technology, like the “CNN effect” or 
“compassion fatigue” theses, are no doubt rather overblown, there is little doubt 
that the characteristics of the media play an important part here. Clearly, 
contemporary media is often seduced by sensationalist readings of events, and 
events need to be sensational to make the news. Kevin Rozario cautions us not to 
create a dichotomy between a good humanitarianism and a bad media, arguing that 
the identity of modern humanitarianism is in many ways itself the product of a 
sensationalistic mass culture.74 Michael Ignatieff considers that the lure of a good 
clear story line, with a clear demarcation between good and evil, innocence and 
guilt, is hard to resist, as are the distortions of over-sentimentalisation.75 This 
creates a dangerous terrain for professional humanitarians to navigate, especially if 
they are attempting to present their own “sentimental education”. 
 For Ignatieff, who focuses on the role of television in particular, another 
distortion is to reproduce the problem of the technical understanding of 
humanitarian crises, examined in the previous chapter, in which the humanitarian 
consequences are presented with great pathos, at the expense of political 
understanding, such as happened during the Ethiopian famine in 1984, with Michael 
Buerk’s famous “biblical” report, in which the famine victims seemed to be prey to a 
timeless tragedy.76 In an examination of visual culture more generally, David 
Campbell argues that the visual representation of key sites like Darfur do not simply 
mirror what is going on, but rather “both manifests and enables power relations 
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through which spatial distances between self/other, civilized/barbaric, North/South, 
developed/underdeveloped are produced and maintained”.77 
 A third key characteristic noted by Ignatieff is the constant use of 
synecdoche, taking the part for the whole, and the focus on particular individuals to 
tell the story. He concedes that synecdoche “has the virtues of making the 
abstractions of exile, expulsion, starvation, and other forms of suffering into an 
experience sufficiently concrete and real to make empathy possible”.78 But he then 
points out that: 
 
The identification that synecdoche creates is intense but shallow. We feel 
for a particular victim, without understanding why or how he or she has 
come to be a victim; and empathy without understanding is bound to fritter 
away when the next plausible victim makes his or her appearance on our 
screen or when we learn something that apparently contradicts the image of 
a simple innocence that the structure of synecdoche invited us to expect.79 
 
Here we rejoin the problem explored in the previous chapter, of the innocence of 
the victims in question. Though putting cruelty first, for instance, may enable 
professional humanitarians to overcome the need to believe in the innocence of 
victims, it is not so easy when appealing to the humanitarian impulse of others. The 
issue of synecdoche also links into important debates about the ethics of 
representation within professional humanitarianism. They are concerned about the 
extent to which humanitarian appeals nourish the voyeuristic tendencies of some, 
as evoked above. They also wonder whether images of suffering, designed to 
promote the defence of common humanity and human dignity, should prioritise a 
respectful portrayal of the people involved, and if so, what that might entail. The 
Red Cross Code of Conduct states that: “In our information, publicity and 
advertising activities, we shall recognise disaster victims as dignified humans, not 
hopeless objects”.80 Arguably, this is where different strands of the humanitarian 
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conversation collide. Is it really possible to engage people’s concern with, say, the 
suffering of women in Congo, and not promote to some extent a negative vision of 
“the African”?81 
 Laura Suski argues that “[the] emotional pull of humanitarian appeals is 
always dependent upon the worthiness of those suffering, and constructions of the 
morality of sufferers shift in different historical and social contexts.”82 Her work 
alights in particular on the place of children, and their suffering, at the heart of the 
humanitarian appeal. Arguably, the child heightens all the dilemmas inherent in our 
understanding of common humanity, and responses to the wounding of that 
common humanity, and its representation and mediation. There is no doubt about 
the power of images of children. Christopher Coker concurs: "[it] is above all the 
scenes on television of the plight of children that prompt western audiences to 
demand that their governments intervene in the civil wars which plague the planet. 
Children have become a litmus test by which we judge not only the inhumanity of 
others, but our own ability to feel the pain of our fellow human beings.”83 
 Kate Manzo has analysed how it is difficult entirely to reconcile NGOs uses of 
imagery fully with the various expressions of good intent present in the different 
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codes of conduct such as the Sphere Projects Humanitarian Charter and Minimum 
Standards in Disaster Response.84 She concludes that  
 
the iconography of childhood also works for NGOs in the same way that 
missionary iconography worked in the colonial age. It reinforces an 
impression of both institutional efficacy and the power to act in loco 
parentis by tapping into cultural associations of childhood with dependence, 
innocence, and the need for protection and care.85 
 
On this account, images of children serve to infantilise whole populations and can 
contribute to a dehumanising humanitarianism. Child sponsorship programmes 
blend two powerful narratives: childhood innocence and personal testimony.86 
Despite these problems, Wilson and Brown “note that individual victims' narratives 
seem to be a necessary component in the mobilization of empathy, and in the 
formation of global political constituencies to end the suffering of others."87 
Arguably, the power of individual narratives maintains its force within the world of 
professional humanitarianism itself. In his study of Amnesty International, Stephen 
Hopgood refers to one staffer who had been able to accustom himself to the daily 
encounter with horrific images of violence, but who still felt powerfully disturbed by 
personal testimonies, because they highlighted that at stake was a “real person”.88 
 Though by no means a silver bullet, giving space to fuller accounts of 
people’s lives, in appealing on their behalf, might go some way towards avoiding 
the dehumanising potential of humanitarian appeals. The first point is preserving 
and presenting people’s names. Denis Kennedy notes how frequently this is 
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omitted, even in discussions about the problems of representation.89 Thomas 
Laqueur points out that historically, “[naming] is part of the story of how the 
normative claim that everyone has a life to live came to command cultural 
resonance.”90 Caroline Moorehead’s Human Cargo is another example of work that 
gives the refugees whose lives it draws on their due.91 
 Indeed, in the eighteenth century, sustained engagement in novels with 
particular characters was important in enabling a human rights culture to develop, 
according to Lynn Hunt: “Human rights could only flourish when people learned to 
think of others as their equals, as like them in some fundamental fashion. They 
learned this equality, at least in part, by experiencing identification with ordinary 
characters who seemed dramatically present and familiar, even if ultimately 
fictional.”92 
 This does not overcome the recurring problem of how to convey richer 
accounts in a fragmented and complex media environment, though Denis Kennedy 
places some hope in the internet’s ability to support more creative ways of doing 
this.93 At least, it promises the possibility of voices being heard through means 
other than the kind of journalism wryly referred to in the title of Edward Behr’s 
memoir Anyone Here Been Raped and Speaks English?94 
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 But we still face the problem of moving from emotional reaction to political 
action, or rather of creating politicised emotions. Suski suggests that “[an] emotion 
can be labelled political when it incites an active response to suffering.”95 For Luc 
Boltanski: 
 
the consolidation of the humanitarian movement depends, at least in part, 
on its ability to clarify and make explicit the connection, which is often 
realised in practice by its members, between distant causes and the 
traditions, sensibilities and even interests of those who organise support for 
these causes.96 
 
The example of British abolitionism reminds us of some useful considerations of 
how images of slavery, such as those mentioned at the beginning of this section, 
can be drawn on to create a broader political will to act. Chaim Kaufmann and 
Robert Pape show that over a sixty year period from 1807 to 1867, the British state 
undertook what was “the most expensive international moral effort in modern 
world history” at a cost of 1.8 percent per annum of national income and 5,000 
British lives, figures that dwarf the current British international development aid 
budget, say, or indeed the number of US soldiers whose deaths prompted the 
United States to withdraw from Somalia after “Black Hawk Down”.97  
 Kaufmann and Pape acknowledge that the abolitionists were driven to some 
extent by a basic moral universalism. “Once Britons recognized Africans as fellow 
human beings, their dignity could not be completely denied.”98 But they make the 
case for that recognition of basic dignity and the reaction to it being nested in much 
thicker, particular moral identities, which were nevertheless broadened through 
abolitionist campaigning to include a wider sense of common humanity. 
 
[The] reasons why so many British abolitionists were willing to accept very 
high costs to correct injustices thousands of miles away were not based on 
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their acceptance of obligations to a universal moral community, but rather 
on their parochial identities as Protestant Dissenters, members of the 
middle class, and their national identity as Englishmen. They saw slavery, 
together with the overlapping complex of the planters, the aristocracy that 
controlled British political life, and the hierarchy of the established Church 
as a single body of corruption, immorality, and arbitrary power that 
threatened the souls of all Englishmen and had to be defeated in order to 
redeem the nation. Anti-slavery overseas was one component of a program 
for redemption at home.99 
 
This returns us to the necessary contingencies of the humanitarian impulse, where 
the object of concern receives recognition by virtue of her/his status as human, but 
the manifestation of the humanitarian imperative takes place within a complex and 
contingent setting of thicker solidarities and politics. For Kaufmann and Pape: 
“although universalist logic was sufficient to persuade Englishmen to regard slavery 
as immoral, this did not translate into a willingness to take action.”100 
 The political campaign that followed, which enabled an unprecedented 
commitment of blood and treasure, illustrates some of the advantages of a 
sustained engagement with the state and therefore with politics. The key period in 
this campaign was that between the foundation, in 1787, of the London Committee 
for the Abolition of the Slave Trade, and the 1807 Act of Parliament. What 
Kaufmann and Pape bring out is the importance of the domestic political context in 
committing the British state to abolishing the slave trade, especially the important 
place the abolitionists occupied within the coalition dynamics of the time. At 
various times throughout the first half of the nineteenth century, the appeal of or to 
abolitionism was decisive in determining electoral success for both Tories and 
Whigs.101 
 The suggestion here, which will be returned to in Chapter 6 at more length, 
is that for humanitarians, in attempting to create greater solidarity deriving from 
recognitions of a common humanity, politics, whether at the level of the mediating 
environment they speak through, or in the conventional sense of constituency 
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building and election fighting, is not a problem to be solved, but a constitutive 
context of the possibility of humanitarianism itself. 
 Of course, given the complexities discussed above, reliably stirring 
humanitarian political action remains a highly contingent process. Discussing the 
possible reactions of Euripides’ contemporaries to his play The Trojan Women, 
Martha Nussbaum neatly sets out the unreliability of the causal chain from 
aesthetic to affective to human to political realms: 
 
Did compassion really enable those Greeks to comprehend the real 
humanity of others, or did it stop short, allowing them to reaffirm the 
essential Greekness of everything that's human? Of course compassion 
required making the Trojans somehow familiar, so that Greeks could see 
their own vulnerability in them, and feel terror and pity, as for their own 
relations. But it's easy for the familiarization to go too far: they are just us, 
and we the ones who suffer humanly. Not those other ones, over there in 
Melos.102 
 
IV Selectivity and Impartiality 
 
Before the following chapters’ focus on the characteristics of humanitarian action, it 
is worth pausing briefly to consider the humanitarian action that does not happen. 
A major objection to relying on the kind of process outlined above is the issue of 
selectivity, inconsistency and partiality, when it comes to the mobilisation of 
empathy and the carrying out of humanitarian action. Indeed, empathy is all very 
well, but we need to ask ourselves whose pain is being felt. This links back to the 
centrality of notions of impartiality to professional humanitarians’ self-perception. 
Here I will mainly be addressing the extent to which it is possible to generate 
solidarity impartially. But it should also be noted that working out what impartiality 
means often implies an account of fairness or justice, as will be unpacked in Chapter 
5. 
 On this view, empathy hides a multitude of sins. Critics of humanitarianism 
who emphasise the selectivity of humanitarian action either consider the issue to 
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undermine the whole enterprise, or see a deep need for rule-corrected solidarity. 
The issue of selectivity is also a major concern throughout the world of professional 
humanitarianism, feeding on the multiple layers of imperfection and complexity 
that characterise it, not least those explored in the previous section. Indeed, at 
every level of humanitarian engagement, charges of selectivity are a preferred way 
of attacking its coherence. 
 Ian Smillie and Larry Minear argue that at the heart of the lively debate over 
the moral necessity of humanitarian action lies “the unevenness of the response to 
emergencies, with human need going largely unaddressed in some crises while 
being inundated with attention and resources in others”. They go on to say that the 
“humanitarian imperative is difficult to take seriously when its application is so 
tattered”.103 Jan Egeland, the former head of OCHA, notes in his recent memoir that 
the successful fund-raising response to the 2004 tsunami “represents an astonishing 
$7,100 for every affected person, as opposed to only three dollars per head actually 
spent on someone affected by floods in Bangladesh in 2004.”104 Less extreme, but 
still noteworthy, is the varying level of funding different crises receive, as set out in 
real-time by OCHA in their comprehensive online funding summaries.105 These 
disparities underscore the extent to which the professional humanitarian sector is 
at the mercy of the wider social context in which humanitarian concerns are 
expressed and support for action formulated. The fact that even in highly controlled 
and institutionalised contexts, professional humanitarianism is not at full liberty to 
determine its own priorities according to the principles it sets itself. Instead, it has 
to negotiate the more fickle and contingent play of empathetic responses. 
 Some professional humanitarian actors resist this. Famously, in the 
aftermath of the 2004 Tsunami, MSF quickly shut down its appeal as it had more 
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money than it could usefully spend.106 For Brauman, since “[mass] solidarity is not 
based on reasoning alone” (as I outlined above) the role of aid organisations is 
especially important in bringing lucidity into decision making.107 They become, then 
a kind of solidarity filter. Terry links this to the importance of independence in 
humanitarian action, of course at the heart of both the ICRC and the MSF 
approaches. She recognises though that in practice the independence that would 
allow for true impartiality is much less practical for many other actors with different 
funding structures. For example, she notes that “UNHCR is particularly affected by 
funding discrepancies between those refugee emergencies that are perceived to 
hold important stakes for major donor governments and those that are not”.108 But 
arguably even those agencies cannot indefinitely remove themselves from partialist 
tendencies, as beyond the short term solidarity has to be mobilised anew. 
 The debate centres on the extent to which action that makes a moral claim 
is undermined by selective application. The argument I will make here is that this 
debate is essentially misconceived in the case of humanitarianism, because of the 
dynamic outlined in this and the previous chapter. 
 The charge is that selectivity is a major, possibly defining feature of 
contemporary humanitarianism, and that it undermines even the initial plausibility 
of action. Arguably this focus reflects a belief that, rather than cruelty being the 
worst thing we do, hypocrisy is. Indeed, Shklar, while recognising the dangers of 
hypocrisy, considers that “To put hypocrisy first entangles us finally in too much 
moral cruelty, exposes us too easily to misanthropy, and unbalances our politics.”109 
With regard to the, admittedly problematic, practice of military humanitarian 
intervention, Chris Brown defends a certain degree of inconsistency in decision-
making, against the likes of Noam Chomsky, for whom hypocrisy clearly is the worst 
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thing we do (especially the hypocrisy of liberals).110 For Brown, it is important to 
recognise that not all situations lend themselves to the establishment of rules, and 
that meaningful moral agency requires that we acknowledge the importance of 
practical judgement, especially when faced with situations of extreme 
complexity.111 He argues that the greatest humanitarian failures, such as the 
absence of any kind of meaningful intervention to stop the 1994 Rwandan 
genocide, are above all failures of judgement and of political will.  
 Of course, humanitarianism encompasses discussions about the first resort, 
about what rules and processes should be put in place to avoid situations of 
extreme human suffering, but if those discussions, or those processes fail, 
humanitarianism also implies a response of last resort. The very failure of the 
former implies to a great extent the contingency of the latter, and the importance 
of practical judgement on the one hand, and the formation of political will, as 
pointed to in the previous section, on the other.112 
 A related discussion is the requirement of altruism on behalf of 
humanitarian actors, whether individuals, organisations or states. Again, for Brown, 
this is to miss the point that a moral universe in which actions are either wholly 
altruistic or wholly selfish represents Manichean wishful thinking, rather than a 
plausible picture of the moral life.113 To return to the second section of this chapter, 
it hampers us with unbearably heavy saintly requirement. In line with the third 
section, it also disregards the important ways in which we can come to see our 
identities and interests in a more expansive way and how, to mobilise the 
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humanitarian impulse effectively, meaningful links to the self-perception of 
individuals and groups need to be created (and that is not an impartial process). 
 Yet altruism still features heavily in the aspirations of professional 
humanitarians, who worry that emotional engagement and an impartial assessment 
of others’ needs sit in tension. This points to a profound paradox at the heart of 
professional humanitarians’ understanding of the principle of humanity: to honour 
it seems to require that it be exercised impartially, yet it is nourished by the partial 
play of empathy and emotional engagement with particular instances of suffering. 
Tony Vaux acknowledges the point: 
 
At the heart of humanity are not only conflicts of selfishness and altruism, 
but the paradox of being emotional enough to feel concern while not being 
so emotional that we limit that concern unfairly. We need both attachment 
and detachment. And it is particularly tempting to feel ‘concern for the 
person in need’ rather more strongly in the case of those whom we like, and 
to attack those whom we do not like even if their ideas and objectives are 
similar to our own.114 
 
His account reminds us of the position of a doctor, who constantly needs to 
combine professional detachment with the nourishing power of a commitment to 
healing people. And if we take the example of professional medicine, we see that an 
apparently impartial concept like “greatest need” is actually very hard to define in 
abstract, and has to be negotiated, often controversially, as we see in Britain with 
every controversy over guidelines issued by the National Institute for Health and 
Clinical Excellence (NICE), through a political discussion, in which not everyone can 
necessarily find satisfaction.115 This brings us to the concept of triage, which is 
evoked in different guises in the humanitarian context.116 The problem of selectivity 
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will almost always rear its head again in practical contexts. The dilemma was 
already recognised by Dunant: 
 
Then you find yourself asking: "Why go to the right, when there are all these 
men on the left who will die without a word of kindness or comfort, without 
so much as a glass of water to quench their burning thirst?”117 
 
The way that the principle of impartiality has evolved is to establish that the 
quenching of thirst should not be hampered by the colour of one’s skin, say, or 
one’s religion. However, deciding which kind of suffering represents the greatest 
need, inevitably reintroduces a hierarchy of suffering, in the absence of an 
unlimited supply of material and moral resources. It is not clear that different kinds 
of suffering are commensurable. Indeed, it may do a disservice to the principle of 
humanity to try to argue that they are. 
 Tony Vaux argues that "[we] need a rule of impartiality precisely because we 
are not impartial."118 But it is not at all clear that a world richer in humanitarianism 
would necessarily ever, in practice, be a more truly impartial world. Indeed, it is 
very unclear on what basis the calculation of “more” or “less” would be established. 
Richard Rorty notes: "[free] universities, a free press, incorruptible judges, and 
unbribable police officers do not come cheap”.119 These measures arguably 
represent past humanitarian gains, and it would clearly be absurd on humanitarian 
grounds to neglect them. It would not make the world a “more humanitarian” place 
to abolish the human rights protections from which, for instance, Europeans 
benefit. Yet equally clearly, if we were to decide “greatest need” impartially, the 
resources poured into this would not be justifiable. Indeed, Rorty is profoundly 
sceptical that that our ambition to widen the ambit of solidarity to all humankind 
can ever be achieved, for all the gains he undoubtedly thinks can be achieved 
through the spread of a human rights culture through a sentimental education. 
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Once again the trope of triage comes up as a way to suggest that our solidarity is 
related to our sense of the possible.120 
 Perhaps impartiality is, in the end, a transcendental ideal that, while serving 
as a useful corrective to excesses of partiality, does not provide us with a full 
account of how to make decisions. Moreover, as we will see in the next chapter, the 
contexts in which the humanitarian impulse is called upon is frequently one within 
which tragic choices are a likely feature of any decision to act, or a conscious 
decision not to act.121 
 Furthermore, and on a more positive note, humanitarianism could only be 
truly impartially conceived and enacted if it were the only important and valuable 
kind of solidarity. As we will see in the rest of the thesis, if the point even needs to 
be argued, this is not the case. But more importantly, humanitarianism is never a 
solidarity floating free, but rather is always related to and enabled by other forms of 
solidarity. For instance, feminism is clearly a solidarity that has done much to 
establish the importance of considering women as fully human. A feminist solidarity 
and a humanitarian one need not necessarily always pull in the same direction. Yet 
the bringing about, through all kinds of action, of a more humanitarian world, can 
never just be about being kind impartially, it also requires dedicated feminists to 
devote their lives to establishing fully the status of being a woman, and a sensitivity 
to the particular vulnerabilities experienced by women, as a meaningful and robust 
voice in the discussion over our common humanity. It may well be that the most 
effective way of enriching the category of common humanity is through the 
exercise of that kind of partiality. The task of humanitarianism is in large part, 
whatever one’s approach to it, about expanding the reach and content of human 
solidarity.122 It seems deeply perverse in doing so to neglect existing possibilities of 
solidarity, which by definition are likely to be partial or particular in nature. To be 
suspicious about the fickle and contingent workings of our humanitarian impulses 
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seems appropriate. But they remain at the heart of the possibility of humanitarian 
action (broadly understood). The problem that we cannot empathise with everyone 
will not go away, and does not make processes of empathetic interaction any less 
important for envisaging a world in which more humanitarian action takes place. 
 The size of the category of humanity is an important consideration, but so is 
the quality of our human relationships. The danger is of being equally indifferent to 
all - equal opportunities egotists. The contrasting danger is to reify altruism as the 
quintessence of humanity. This leads to a dichotomised morality, in which a lack of 
understanding of the complexity of ourselves as humans is likely to hinder a 
complex understanding of the threads of any common human  
 
Conclusion 
 
"The politics of empathy are fickle”, writes Adam Hochschild123 It is this recognition 
that prompts humanitarians to seek a more stable politics, such as a politics of 
rights or justice, as we will see in Chapter 5. Yet the selective play of empathy, in 
enabling the sense of a shared human identity and therefore the possibility of 
human solidarity, cannot simply be dismissed because of its contingent character. 
This chapter has made clear that there is no neutral affective terrain that can 
process humanitarian concern in a non-contingent manner. It has suggested that 
the line between successful and abusive ways of mobilising humanitarian empathy 
is rather thin. The next chapter will examine what happens when there is a will to 
act. But by way of coda to this chapter, and lest the exposition of the contingencies 
of empathy are seen as themselves representing a kind of inhumanity, we might 
recall W.H. Auden’s lines from the poem “Musée des Beaux Arts”: 
 
About suffering they were never wrong, 
The Old Masters: how well they understood 
Its human position; how it takes place 
While someone else is eating or opening a window or just walking dully 
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along; 
How, when the aged are reverently, passionately waiting 
For the miraculous birth, there always must be 
Children who did not specially want it to happen, skating 
On a pond at the edge of the wood: 
They never forgot 
That even the dreadful martyrdom must run its course 
Anyhow in a corner, some untidy spot 
Where the dogs go on with their doggy life and the torturer's horse 
Scratches its innocent behind on a tree.124 
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4. Humanitarian Action as Rescue 
 
 Whoever saves one life, it is as if he saved the entire world.1 
 
 We had to burn the village in order to save it.2 
 
If humanitarianism brings into focus the desire to defend a common humanity, it is, 
as the first, Talmudic saying indicates, intimately bound to acts of rescue, of saving 
lives. Indeed, a single act of rescue can take on immense symbolic importance in the 
defence of the idea at least of a common humanity. For, as saving “the entire 
world” or permanently deferring the death of a single individual are impossibilities, 
the rescue of certain individuals remains at least a tangible possibility, and 
consequently defines the texture of humanitarian action. Moreover, while it should 
be clear from previous chapters that it would be erroneous to attempt to define 
humanitarianism once and for all in terms of a specific set of permissible actions, 
some notion of saving human lives necessarily remains central to the kind of action 
at stake, when we set out and negotiate what humanitarian concern entails. 
 This is driven home by the pervasiveness of the language of rescue across 
the diverse contexts in which humanitarianism is discussed, one of the few 
constants across the multiplicity of understandings of what humanitarianism is and 
means. Obvious examples from the realm of practice include two long-standing 
humanitarian organisations: the International Rescue Committee and Save the 
Children. The most significant International Relations monograph on humanitarian 
intervention is entitled Saving Strangers, while in Political Theory Michael Walzer’s 
most important intervention on the subject is an article on “The Politics of Rescue”.3 
In fact, much of contemporary normative theorising relies on an implicit act of 
rescue. Peter Singer’s famous drowning child has now been rescued on numerous 
occasions, only to be thrown back to its doom again by battalions of eager political 
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philosophers, the “Shallow Pond theorists” in Kwame Anthony Appiah’s amusing 
phrase.4 
 Perhaps another common thread is that for many of these writers and 
organisations, what rescue means is fairly straightforward. It is usually some variant 
of pulling the child out of the pond, and popping them back onto dry land. Yet it is 
interesting to note that the language of rescue is used more cautiously within the 
literature of humanitarianism in crisis.5 In part, this reflects the recognition that 
saving a human body is not self-evidently exactly the same thing as saving a human 
being, as we do not understand our humanity solely in relation to our bodies. It also 
reflects awareness of the lives that have not been saved, and a suspicion that, for all 
their good intentions, the most meaningful thing that humanitarian practitioners 
are rescuing is their sense of self. David Rieff notes the tendency many of us share 
to cling on to humanitarianism as a “saving idea”.6 He is wary of the self-serving 
delusions of the American soldier cited above, similar to the famous order of the 
Abbot of Cîteaux, Arnald-Almric during the Albigensian Crusade. “Kill them all; God 
will look after His own”.7 
 Certainly, the notion of rescue, as applied to humanitarian action, is replete 
with tensions and paradoxes. But for all that, it remains a vital concept in describing 
the contours of humanitarianism. In part, this is because the paradoxes of rescue 
are also the paradoxes of humanitarianism, as I will attempt to demonstrate 
throughout this chapter. But it is also because, as Chapter 2 suggested, 
humanitarianism largely comes into being as a reaction to (and a conversation 
about) inhumanity. In the discussion of what constitutes inhumanity, examples such 
as the Holocaust, or the practice of slavery, loom large, and carry much symbolic 
weight. Chapter 3 showed just how problematic the path from the articulation of 
concern to the willingness to act can be, with many bystanders falling by the 
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wayside. But in the face of even the most crushing acts of inhumanity, some people, 
sometimes, do act. It is important to bring those actions into our understanding of 
humanitarianism if we are to generate a sense of what humanitarian action can be, 
beyond an impoverished list of operating principles and procedures. In this sense, 
some acts of rescue, such as those undertaken by the “Righteous among the 
Nations”, come as close as is possible to summarising the possibilities and 
characteristics of humanitarian action. Yet in much contemporary writing on 
humanitarianism, figures such as the Righteous simply do not appear. Perhaps they 
do not fit textbook definitions of humanitarian action, but bringing in such figures to 
the discussion of humanitarianism can greatly enrich our understanding of the 
importance of rescue, but also of its limitations. Rescue cannot exhaust our 
understanding of the acts required by humanitarianism, but it deserves a sustained 
focus as an indispensable starting point. 
 The chapter proceeds in four, closely inter-related parts. I begin by 
discussing different meanings of rescue as they apply to the rescued, which prompt 
us to examine the conceptions of rescue held by their potential rescuers. In the 
relationship that emerges between the two, I assess the interplay between motives, 
intentions and outcomes, which leads on to the question of harm, legitimate means 
and the use of violence in the service of acts of rescue. The moment of rescue 
emerges as one of radical inequality and presumption. The implicit recognition of 
this often leads us to formulate projects of rescue-in-advance. But the question 
remains of whether the need for ad hoc, reactive rescue, with all its contingencies, 
can ever be obviated. 
 
I The Objects of Rescue: The Rescued 
 
In certain circumstances, the meaning of rescue, and its place within our 
understanding of humanitarianism, can appear to be rather clear. In a warzone, a 
doctor can stem the flow of blood that would otherwise have been fatal to a 
soldier. At a feeding station, a child can be brought back from the brink of 
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starvation. Many compromises may have been necessary to get to that point. Wider 
injustices may well have led to the threat to life, or indeed to the fact that rescue is 
an option for some but not others. But for those particular people, on that 
particular day, the meaning of rescue can be clear and visceral: live or die. Though 
Chapter 2 argued that a conception of humanitarian crisis as merely a certain 
quantity of bodies on the brink of death can never sufficiently describe what is at 
stake in the conduct of humanitarian politics, it was conceded that the sense of 
humanitarian crisis as a threat to bodily survival remains an important practical 
basis for conceptualising humanitarian action. It follows that we should take 
seriously the idea that the heart of humanitarian action lies simply in the saving of 
human bodies. 
 This characterisation of the object of humanitarian rescue presents serious 
advantages. We know roughly how many calories a human body needs to survive 
another day, how much blood a body can lose before it expires, what medicine 
might cure or manage a fatal disease. This leads to conceptions of life-saving as that 
which, very simply, keeps human bodies alive, to be assessed and responded 
through scientific and technical expertise. Hence the highly specialist discussions 
published, for example, in the journal Disasters, and the authority of the voices of 
technical humanitarian organisations, for instance those with particular medical 
expertise.8 A view is taken about what bodies need to stay alive, and then a 
discussion is had about how best to enable that. The skills of doctors, nutritionists 
etc. can then be brought to bear on the problem. As we saw in Chapter 3, the path 
to matching up a person in need with a person in a position to help them is by no 
means a simple one. But prior to this problem is a bigger risk to conceptualising 
humanitarian action solely in terms of bodily life-saving. 
 The issue here is the way that the terms of rescue can come to determine an 
individual’s humanity, and impose upon her a definition of her own identity so 
narrow that it becomes a straightjacket. If, to save a human being (or perhaps even 
a wider project of common humanity), it becomes sufficient to save a human body, 
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can that not carry the danger of reducing the humanity of the rescued to a set of 
biological properties, to a kind of “bare life”, to borrow Agamben’s phrase?9 At 
times, one gets the impression that for Agamben and his followers, this leads to the 
extreme position that a refugee camp cannot in any meaningful way be 
distinguished from a concentration camp.10 They are both “sites of hierarchical 
power”, to borrow Geras’s phrase, and such sites are, for those of a biopolitical 
bent, the key loci of modernity and of modern social life.11 Against this, we might 
recall Primo Levi’s admonition against this brand of undiscriminating conflation: 
“There’s no gas chamber at Fiat”.12 That is, all sites of hierarchical power do not 
necessarily imply a slippery slope towards extreme abuse. A more nuanced analysis 
is in order. 
 Nevertheless, two important themes for this chapter emerge from this 
point. The first is that it should remind us that the moment of rescue is necessarily 
one of radical inequality between rescuer and rescued.13 At best this can strain the 
ability of each to identify with the other.14 At worst this can indeed lead to us 
rescuing for the other a very different idea of common humanity from that which 
we claim for ourselves. But in many respects, the play of this power disparity is 
much more nuanced. I shall return to this dimension of the problem in subsequent 
sections. The second theme is that human bodies can never be sufficient 
descriptions of human beings, at least within the context of humanitarianism, 
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wherein common humanity necessarily asserts itself as weightier than merely 
common biology. 
 This is the crux of the matter when it comes to understanding what 
humanitarianism is rescuing, or saving, the sense that a human being is not just a 
human body and that, in consequence, we can never arrive at a satisfactory account 
of humanitarian action if we work only from the perspective of bodily need. It may 
seem that the rescue of human bodies is a necessary but not sufficient condition for 
the rescue of a human being. But even that need not necessarily be the case. 
Certainly the claims of a humanitarian perspective that consistently ignored present 
bodily suffering would most likely soon ring hollow. But acts of memorialisation of 
dead individuals or lost communities can quite plausibly be understood as 
humanitarian acts.15 This can function both by addressing injustices committed by 
those who would erase people from history, but also by constructing a narrative 
that aims to prevent future injustices. For example, the enormous body of literature 
on the Holocaust does this in several ways: it aims to recover some of the detail and 
complexity of the human lives that were annihilated, but also to remind us of those 
acts of courage in the face of inhumanity that led to acts of rescue, or of attempted 
rescue. For some, as for the Goya of The Disasters of War, horror cannot fit into any 
message of hope. It simply is.16 But the wishful, indignant call of “never again” is, 
among other things, an instance of humanitarianism using the process of 
memorialisation of those rescued and unrescued to obviate the need for future 
rescue.17 While it may seem that this idea of memorialisation as rescue is a story 
about prevention, about rescue-in-advance, there is very much a sense that it is also 
a last-ditch act of rescue which aims to save something of the humanity of those 
who were not rescued in the bodily sense. 
 Dwelling on the intangible meanings of rescue of course takes us close to 
religious discourses of salvation, which clash somewhat with the idea that 
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humanitarianism always involves a strong conception of the practical and the 
possible. This dimension will be examined in the next section. But this intangible 
sense of rescue also speaks to a more practical notion of témoignage, which 
situates testimony squarely in the present, in relation to on-going injustices, and is 
central to much of the French humanitarian tradition, and especially important to 
MSF.18 For José Antonio Bastos: “[even] if it is impossible to help the refugees, we 
must keep trying, and find the truth of what is happening, and we must speak. 
Sometimes speaking is the only action that is possible. To not speak is to fail the 
possibility of humanity.”19 The implication is simply that, at times, if we cannot 
rescue the individual lives under threat, we can at least save a “possibility of 
humanity”. 
 Even in the case of a single individual, at a single moment in time, 
humanitarian action as rescue potentially has to negotiate conceptions of humanity 
across a wide range of contexts, which include humanity as a set of biological 
properties and humanity as ethical, political and legal identities. For some, these 
would include less tangible notions of a soul or of unity with a divine being. For 
others, they might include the ability to care, love, laugh and cry. 
 Humanity can be understood across all these parameters, understood to be 
violated across any of these parameters, and rescue of that humanity 
conceptualised across any of these parameters. The complexity of that which is to 
be rescued and preserved is inextricably interwoven with the complexity of how we 
articulate the distinctiveness, value and beauty of humanity. It is likely that 
attempts to pin it down once and for all will always fail, just as a lepidopterist’s 
display case must always fail to reveal the most vital characteristic of the butterfly: 
its mesmeric flight.  Among influential recent attempts to grapple with this 
complexity, we might think of Martha Nussbaum’s list of the central human 
capabilities, a thoughtful and rich questioning of what constitutes a human life, of 
what people should be able to do and be to live a life that might be considered fully 
human, including, for instance the ability to have an emotional and imaginative 
                                                           
18 On MSF and témoignage see D. Robert DeChaine, Global Humanitarianism: NGOs and the 
Crafting of Community (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2005), 82-90. 
19 Orbinski, An Imperfect Offering, 290. 
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life.20 But ultimately, as an answer, it proves unsatisfactory, precisely because it 
takes the form of a list, and such a document is always likely to be more plausible as 
a political programme to enable more humane lives than as a description of 
humanity itself. 
 A list cannot quite ever succeed in capturing the boundless and 
unpredictable creativity of a Mozart or a Shakespeare. Nussbaum comes closer than 
most, by trying to capture the potentialities of human life, and taking seriously the 
things, like love, that really give it meaning. She makes a good case for a human life 
conceived of according to the central capabilities as being much less nasty, brutish 
and short than any number of alternatives. But the intangible, by definition, still 
eludes such an exercise. We are unlikely to place such a list in our time capsules. 
Had Nussbaum composed her list, on the 9th of May 1927, for instance, it would 
arguably have to have been understood in a new light on the 10th, when Louis 
Armstrong recorded “Potato Head Blues”.21 Are such artefacts not equally, if not 
more powerful, groundings to take forward? 
 This complexity is added to by the fact that, when it comes to potential acts 
of rescue, there may be profound tensions in terms of which elements of a common 
humanity may be rescued. Some elements may be saved, others sacrificed.22 In 
contexts of forced migration, for instance, there are genuine and important 
questions about whether the humanitarian act is to try to save the most bodies or 
to try to save the context and way of life within which people conceptualised their 
                                                           
20 The list is evolving, but a good account can be found in Martha C. Nussbaum, Women and 
Human Development: The Capabilities Approach (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2000), 70-86. Her list consists of: life; bodily health; bodily integrity; senses, imagination, 
and thought; emotions; practical reason; affiliation; relationship with other species; play; 
control over one’s political and material environment. 
21 This recording features in another famous list of things that make human life worth living, 
as read by Woody Allen into his dictaphone in Manhattan (1979). 
22 For an interesting, and related, discussion of sacrifice and triage, see Redfield, "Sacrifice, 
Triage, and Global Humanitarianism". 
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own humanity. One may well involve sacrificing the other.23 Though it may not 
always be articulated as such, this dilemma can go all the way down into an 
individual’s experience of rescue. Caroline Moorehead’s sensitive study of refugees, 
Human Cargo, demonstrates that many refugees who are relocated and attain 
bodily security, who are thus rescued in quite a concrete way by institutionalised 
humanitarianism, nevertheless often experience a numbing, irreplaceable loss of all 
the other elements, beyond their own immediate bodily security, that add up to a 
human life beyond the mere passing of days.24 
 This tension is of course primarily experienced by the rescued. But it also 
characterises some of the sharpest dilemmas of humanitarian action by potential 
rescuers. Naturally, other considerations beyond the rescue of those in danger, such 
as political expediency, often condition the actions of potential humanitarian 
actors. But assuming their good faith (and at times that can be a heroic 
assumption), there can often be real dilemmas about whether, say, to effectively 
collaborate in an ethnic cleansing, and the destruction of ways of life, in order to 
save people in the short term. Variations of this kind of dilemma have been 
experienced widely within the “humanitarian international”, for instance in the 
creation of “safe areas” in Bosnia in the early 1990s, in the delivery of aid in Hutu-
run camps in Zaire in 1994-1996, or in the violation of the principle of non-
refoulement in disbanding those camps.25 Of course, in facing these dilemmas, 
humanitarian actors are necessarily imposing their own conceptualisations of 
rescue, and what it means to be rescued. 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
23 This links to the discussion of the relationship between humanitarianism and human 
rights in the next chapter. For an argument on how humanitarianism can aggravate the 
issues by dehistoricising and depoliticising refugees, see Liisa H. Malkki, "Speechless 
Emissaries: Refugees, Humanitarianism, and Dehistoricization", Cultural Anthropology 11, 
no. 3 (1996). 
24 Moorehead, Human Cargo. 
25 Power, Chasing the Flame. Terry, Condemned to Repeat? 
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II The Subjects of Rescue: The Rescuers 
 
It is clearly very hard to gain a clear picture of what saving a human being, beyond 
saving a human body, entails. Bodily survival is obviously vital, but is never likely to 
be sufficient to make sense of the negotiation of what a common humanity is and 
entails, which is at the heart of the way humanitarianism, in all its guises, functions. 
The dilemmas evoked above, wherein humanitarian actors have to choose between 
which kind of act of rescue will better honour their conception of a common 
humanity, also make clear the fact that, ultimately, it is their conception of that 
common humanity which will inform the decision taken. It is therefore their 
conception that will be saved or lost, along with the human lives at stake. 
 This relates back to the danger raised at the end of Chapter 2, that in 
articulating a conception of wounded common humanity in response to the 
suffering of another, the concerned agent risks defining the other’s humanity for 
her, albeit perhaps for the very “best” of motives. The stakes are raised when it 
comes to engaging in potential acts of rescue, for the moment of rescue is, almost 
by definition, one in which one agent hold’s the other’s life in her hands. How she 
understands and characterises the other’s humanity is in her hands as well. While 
she may want to deny this power, she must also will it. This is well illustrated by 
Roger Rosenblatt: 
  
If you really knew what drives me - and I imagine drives most of my 
colleagues when we go to places where people are suffering things that no 
people ought to suffer - it is the impulse to rescue. The impossible, illogical, 
entirely emotional, impractical, impolitic impulse to take those children in 
my arms - and adults in my arms - and save them. If you have ever watched 
a man or a woman or a child die from starvation, you know the 
powerlessness of mortality, and you so want to be a god at that moment 
and to be able to breathe life into a fellow creature.26 
 
                                                           
26 Again, we see the negative articulation, “suffering things that no people ought to suffer”, 
examined in Chapter 2. Roger Rosenblatt, "Introduction to Rescue: The Paradoxes of 
Virtue", Social Research 62, no. 1 (1995): 6. 
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This states very clearly something that is arguably a necessary correlate of the 
desire to engage in humanitarian action and save human lives: the desire to play 
God (and the relationship between God and his creation cannot be one of equals). 
 Though merely a figure of speech for Rosenblatt, the character of a quasi-
religious, or indeed avowedly religious mission is writ large across the history of 
humanitarianism. This speaks to perhaps the deepest paradox within modern 
humanitarianism. It was enabled by the opening up of a particular intellectual space 
by Humanist and then Enlightenment thinking, largely against the strictures of 
religious dogma. However, as humanitarianism emerged as a framing for practical 
action, much of the motivation of those who engaged in humanitarian action 
remained deeply religious, linked to powerful ethical codes such as Christian 
charity. 
 This was very clearly the case during the first modern international 
humanitarian campaign, the British-based campaign to abolish the Atlantic slave 
trade.27 The campaign was characterised by Enlightenment discourses of humanity 
and freedom, visceral reactions to revelations about the cruelty of the practices 
involved, and strong conceptions of religious mission. Perhaps for some 
abolitionists, what they aimed to save might have been simply the tortured bodies 
of the slaves, to be released from bondage to engage in, develop, or rediscover 
their own projects. But for others, the object of rescue was the freedom of the 
Enlightenment’s universal, perfectible man. Crucially, for many, the key objects of 
salvation were people’s souls. The slaves were to be freed not to become fully 
human on their own terms, but rather to become fully human in the only 
acceptable way, as Christians to be saved, if not in this life then in the next. Equally 
important to many abolitionists, and perhaps the dominant concern in fact, was the 
salvation of their own souls, the preservation of which became, in their eyes, 
incompatible with the owning of slaves.  
 A militant religious drive for salvation was a major factor in the development 
of institutionalised humanitarianism in the nineteenth century, whether we think of 
the floods of missionaries to “uncivilised” parts of the world, or, at the domestic 
                                                           
27 See for instance Hochschild, Bury the Chains. 
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level, the creation of organisations like the Salvation Army. The humanitarianism of 
Gladstone encompassed campaigns to save far-flung Christians, notably in Bulgaria, 
and nocturnal missions to “rescue” “fallen women”.28 In the same era, the 
campaigning journalist W.T. Stead linked his sensational reports on atrocities in 
Bulgaria to his own spiritual self-preservation and avoidance of damnation.29 A 
happily “fallen” nineteenth century humanitarian, Byron, mocked the naïve 
tendency of his contemporaries in the London Greek Committee to conceive their 
putative objects of rescue in a manner equally detached from the lived experience 
of the actual people at stake.30 “Philhellenes” obsessed with ancient Greece were 
no doubt dismayed to find an absence of philosophising Classical Greeks to save 
when they arrived on the shores of a contemporary Greece heavily under Ottoman 
influence. 
 To take another different conception of what is being saved, Andrew 
Carnegie’s “scientific philanthropy” embodied a vision of the human perfectible 
through the application of modern scientific knowledge.31 Perhaps what links the 
humanitarianism of Gladstone and Byron and Carnegie is the ease with which 
humanitarianism can become associated with utopian projects and the projection 
of an idealised humanity. The persistence of this tendency is powerfully critiqued by 
David Rieff, who sees contemporary humanitarianism as taking on the role of 
“saving idea”, “central to the Western imagination” because of its persistence as 
the last “moral fable” left standing.32 For Rieff, “humanitarianism is a hope for a 
disenchanted time. If it claims to redeem, it does so largely in the limited sense that 
in a world so disfigured by cruelty and want it intervenes to save a small proportion 
of those at risk of dying, and to give temporary shelter to a few of the many who so 
                                                           
28 On Gladstone’s nocturnal rescue missions, see Anne Isba, Gladstone and Women 
(London: Hambledon Continuum, 2006), 99-121. Roy Jenkins, Gladstone: A Biography (New 
York: Random House, 1997), 100-115. On the Bulgarian episode, see Finnemore, The 
Purpose of Intervention, 62-63. Jenkins, Gladstone, 399-414. Richard Shannon, Gladstone 
and the Bulgarian Agitation 1876 (Thomas Nelson and Sons: London, 1963). 
29 Laqueur, "Mourning, Pity, and the Work of Narrative in the Making Of "Humanity"", 35. 
30 Gary J. Bass, Freedom's Battle: The Origins of Humanitarian Intervention (New York: 
Knopf, 2008), 78. 
31 Calhoun, "The Imperative to Reduce Suffering", 79. 
32 Rieff, A Bed for the Night, 91-93. 
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desperately need it.”33 Rieff actually wants to defend the minimal, visceral act of 
providing “a bed for the night”, that is, a minimal, partial act of rescue. But he is 
sceptical about the way it also nourishes a “longing for salvation [which] is all but 
hardwired into Western culture”. When it comes to the bigger picture, it “is a saving 
idea that, in the end, cannot save but can only alleviate”.34 
 But Stephen Hopgood’s work suggests that this is unlikely to be satisfactory 
for many of those engaging in humanitarian action, for they crave a justificatory 
framework within which to define their moral authority, even when they are not 
concerned with saving souls, but merely bodies.35 Laura Hammond also notes the 
tendency of professional humanitarians to elevate their principles “to the level of 
the secular-sacred”.36 For religious strands of humanitarianism, the framework is 
clear, as is the redemptive power of acts of rescue. But returning to Rosenblatt’s 
quote, even the most avowed atheist, confronted with an expiring child, will either 
yearn for a God-like power to rekindle life, or a God-like, transcendental authority 
to say that this suffering is wrong. Even if the conception of the human invoked is 
not a religious one, it goes significantly beyond mere embodiment. While the 
chosen, practical act of rescue may well be limited to an act of bodily life-saving, 
with the attendant risks of negotiating with the other only on the basis of “bare 
life”, the context of that act of rescue can never be limited to the practical act, for it 
is always embedded in a struggle to articulate and preserve a thicker, more 
intangible sense of common humanity, albeit one that may be narcissistic and 
contain its own sources of violence and suffering. 
 But these excesses need not always be the case, for there is always “a 
possibility of humanity” connected to that visceral experience of a human life in 
danger, and therefore a possibility of rescue if the more intangible meanings of 
humanity at play for the rescuer is in synch with the requirements of the situation. 
                                                           
33 Ibid., 91-92. 
34 Ibid., 86. 
35 Hopgood, Keepers of the Flame. Hopgood, "Moral Authority, Modernity and the Politics 
of the Sacred". 
36 Laura Hammond, "The Power of Holding Humanitarianism Hostage and the Myth of 
Protective Principles", in Humanitarianism in Question: Politics, Power, Ethics, ed. Michael 
Barnett and Thomas G. Weiss (London: Cornell University Press, 2008), 189. 
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Moreover, how much does it matter if I think you’re saving my body, while you 
think you’re saving your soul? This leads to the question of how to weigh motives, 
intentions and consequences. But before delving deeper into that discussion, it is 
worth briefly recalling here the Rescuers of Jews during the Holocaust. 
 In Chapter 2 I referred to work that suggested that a category of common 
humanity was particularly psychologically salient for Rescuers, belying the 
possibility that, once I had identified the shifting meanings of humanitarianism, the 
category itself would implode. But in engaging in reactions of rescue, the visceral 
played a part, and also threatened the integrity of the Rescuers’ identity, sense of 
self and humanity. For Otto, “the primitive had certainly a strong part in my 
motives.” He also evoked a fellow rescuer, “a woman who said she was tired of 
hearing about her spirit, courage, and nobility. ‘I did it because of self-respect,’ she 
said, ‘a lot of self-respect.’” For Otto: “I like the word self-respect because it is what 
I said before. It is one of the egotistic components in my motivation. I respect more 
and feel good about it and this is a very good definition."37 
 This suggests that humanitarian rescue is always both about saving the other 
and saving one’s sense of self. It is both other-regarding and narcissistic, and the 
two elements are not really separable. This builds on the analysis presented in the 
previous chapter. The problem here, of course, is that the risks of failure are not 
necessarily equivalent. For the rescuer, the risk may be a loss of self-esteem, for the 
other, death, another facet of the inherent inequality of rescue. This pushes us to 
explore further how we might plausibly characterise rescue meaningfully, and to 
ask whether there is any stable basis to assess an act of rescue and say that it is 
consistent with an account of humanitarianism. 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
37 Monroe, The Hand of Compassion, 97. For a study of religious cultures and acts of rescue, 
see Pearl M. Oliner, Saving the Forsaken: Religious Culture and the Rescue of Jews in Nazi 
Europe (London: Yale University Press, 2004). 
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III Motives, Intentions and Consequences 
 
On what basis, if any, can we make qualitative assessments of acts of rescue, in a 
manner that can honour the meaning of rescue for both rescued and rescuer? Yad 
Vashem accords the title of “Righteous among the Nations” according to both the 
acts themselves and the motives behind them.38 The question of motive is of course 
a key touchstone in contemporary debates on humanitarianism. For many, the 
absence of a motive entirely consistent with the act of rescue calls into question the 
validity of that act, whatever the outcome. In fact, three distinct variables are worth 
considering here: motives, intentions and consequences. For Terry Nardin, an 
“agent’s intention is what he chooses to do; his motive is the dispositions and 
desires that explain his choice”.39 Motive relates to our reason for action, intention 
to how we plan to act. Nardin also notes that motive and intention are often used 
interchangeably, a problem we will encounter below. When it comes to the carrying 
out of the act itself, another element comes into play: the means of rescue, which 
have the potential, for some, to invalidate any or all of those three potential 
criteria, if deployed inappropriately. This question will be examined in the next 
section. For now, we will concentrate on the interplay between motives, intentions 
and consequences, arguing that, for different reasons, all are important, but that 
they function at different levels of the humanitarian endeavour. 
 In a provocative recent essay Stephen Hopgood makes a compelling 
argument that, if the core justification of the practice of humanitarianism is to save 
                                                           
38 Monroe, The Hand of Compassion, 287. One of the criteria is that the act not be 
motivated by desire for money, which presents interesting links to professional 
humanitarians’ mistrust of money, explored below. 
39 Terry Nardin, "Introduction", in Humanitarian Intervention, NOMOS XLVII, ed. Terry 
Nardin and Melissa S. Williams (New York: New York University Press, 2006), 10. A debate 
between Fernando Tesón and Terry Nardin in the aftermath of the invasion of Iraq usefully 
fleshes out these issues. Terry Nardin, "Humanitarian Imperialism", Ethics and International 
Affairs 19, no. 2 (2005). Fernando R. Tesón, "Ending Tyranny in Iraq", Ethics and 
International Affairs 19, no. 2 (2005). Fernando R. Tesón, "Of Tyrants and Empires", Ethics 
and International Affairs 19, no. 2 (2005). For a summary of debates on motives and 
intentions in the context of humanitarian intervention, see Lang, "Humanitarian 
Intervention", 138-141. For a recent treatment of these issues, see James Pattison, 
Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect: Who Should Intervene? 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 153-180. 
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lives, a consequentialist logic ultimately imposes itself upon the process of deciding 
how those lives should be saved.40 If it can be done best by a profit-seeking 
company, then why not? After all, is humanitarianism not always motivated by a 
variety of different justifications?41 The piece provokes partly because in raising the 
question of money and profit, it touches upon an issue with which many 
professional humanitarians are profoundly uncomfortable. As pointed out in the 
introduction, the Red Cross principle of voluntariness is rarely mentioned in 
analytical work, because it is generally not seen to carry as much weight as ideas 
such as impartiality or neutrality. But arguably it still goes deep into professional 
humanitarians’ sense of self, and suggests that for many, doing the right thing for 
the right reasons remains crucial (even if they are prey to much doubt about what 
the right thing might be). 
 Moreover, for Hopgood, this kind of question fits into his broader analysis of 
how humanitarianism always oscillates between the sacred and the profane. To 
focus on effectiveness and what works is to risk forfeiting a grounding sense of 
transcendental moral authority, which links back to the argument evoked earlier 
that there is always an intangible element at stake in an act of rescue. Yet the 
“keepers of the flame”, in becoming stern gatekeepers of their practice, risk having 
little, or no impact in the real world, and is that not a greater danger?42 Fine 
motives, or plausible declared intentions alone can never be enough if they do not 
lead to meaningful outcomes. James Orbinski also sees it as important that: “[the] 
moral intention of the humanitarian act must be confronted with its actual 
                                                           
40 Hopgood, "Saying "No" To Wal-Mart?" A recent defence of military humanitarian 
intervention from a consequentialist perspective is Eric A. Heinze, Waging Humanitarian 
War: The Ethics, Law, and Politics of Humanitarian Intervention (Albany: State University of 
New York Press, 2009). For a critique, see Henry Radice, "Review of Waging Humanitarian 
War: The Ethics, Law, and Politics of Humanitarian Intervention. By Eric A. Heinze", 
International Affairs 85, no. 5 (2009). 
41 He also emphasised this in his presentation at a recent workshop. Stephen Hopgood, 
"Killing with Kindness: The Moral Authority of Humanitarian Violence" ("War and the Future 
of Humanitarianism" BISA Workshop, Royal Holloway, University of London, 19 June 2009). 
42 Hopgood highlighted humanitarian organisations’ reluctance to commission impact 
studies at a recent talk he gave at the LSE to the staff and research students of the 
International Relations Department (18 November 2009). See also Hopgood, Keepers of the 
Flame. 
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result”.43 The challenge of Hopgood’s argument is to ask whether there is any 
better route to defining humanitarianism than a necessarily vague, but visceral, 
notion of the “existential act” of saving a life.44 His conclusions come close to David 
Rieff’s: humanitarianism should scale down its ambition and stick to saving some 
lives and providing some beds for the night. 
 This intervention goes to the heart of contextualising the notion of rescue 
within humanitarianism, and consequently of defining the contours of humanitarian 
action. On its own terms, Hopgood’s argument is difficult to rebut. One possibility, 
from within the realm of practice, is suggested by Rony Brauman. We might accept 
the consequentialist logic of varying sources of life-saving relief, such as armies or 
corporations. But that does not necessarily mean we have to label the action 
“humanitarian” and to locate it within the sphere of humanitarianism. It can be 
valuable on moral grounds other than those described as humanitarian.45 
Brauman’s point makes a lot of sense in terms of trying to pin down operational 
principles to run a consistent humanitarian practice. There may well be value to a 
brand identity for humanitarianism based on consistent principles. But ultimately, 
the distinction between humanitarian relief and relief provided by less consistent 
actors cannot fully hold beyond the level of practice, if we see humanitarianism as a 
wider context for the negotiation of a common humanity and attendant 
requirements of human solidarity. In this negotiation, surely what is crucial is not 
what professional dedicated humanitarians are willing to do, but precisely what 
those who are not might be. Humanitarianism is as much about expanding the 
latter category as the former. Humanitarianism teases out the minimal, as well as 
rigorous maximalist understandings of our common humanity and what is required 
to preserve or save it. For instance, part of the role of International Humanitarian 
                                                           
43 “Moral intention” is of course a somewhat ambiguous phrase, and is best read as relating 
to motive. Orbinski, "Nobel Lecture". 
44 In discussion with Hopgood at a number of workshops and conferences during the course 
of 2009, he emphasised that, though he cannot set out a rigorous philosophical definition 
of it, some kind of visceral, “existential act” of saving lives has to be at the heart of any 
notion of humanitarian action. 
45 Rony Brauman, "Masterclass: A Review of the Last Two Decades of Humanitarian 
Assistance" ("Who are the Humanitarians Now?" Seminar, Humanitarian and Conflict 
Response Institute, University of Manchester, 24 November 2009). 
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Law is to define what one should accord one’s enemies out of common humanity. 
Brauman and Hopgood both share a consequentialist vision of life-saving action, 
they merely differ on the significance and placement of the boundaries of 
“humanitarian” action within that. 
 A consequentialist approach to saving lives can coexist perfectly well with a 
concern to take intentions seriously, as long as the intentions correspond to the 
articulation of outcomes, and are not simply collapsed with a deontological account 
of a “correct” humanitarian motive. In the context of humanitarianism, it is 
especially important to make a clear distinction between motive and intention, for 
the way humanitarianism has been described so far in this work is as a context in 
which different motives can coalesce into a shared intention to act in pursuit of a 
certain kind of outcome. The common phrase “good intention” is problematic 
because it often means “correctly-motivated intention”. The idea of a single 
legitimate humanitarian motive for rescue is a category error, which reduces 
“humanitarian” to a synonym of “altruistic”. We can have mixed motives, wildly 
divergent reasons for engaging in an act of rescue, but share the determination and 
declared intention to engage in an act of rescue.46 One might be interested in the 
preservation of an immortal soul, the other in a sense of consistency with a political 
ideology in which the care for others is important, the third feel the need to 
expunge a previous act of cruelty. It makes more sense to discuss the role of 
motives within humanitarianism, rather than humanitarian motives as such. It is the 
political negotiation of different motives that leads to intentions. 
 At a different level of analysis, motives present the biggest qualification to a 
purely consequentialist account of acts of rescue within humanitarianism. Within 
humanitarian practice, a consequentialist logic is ultimately irresistible if the goal of 
the practice is to maximise life-saving action. But the previous two sections, in 
discussing the complexities of articulating the meaning of saving a human life, 
suggest that, if the idea of saving lives, Hopgood’s “existential act”, is to be assigned 
                                                           
46 For example, the Make Poverty History campaign embodies a collective intention, 
nourished by all kinds of different motives. In fact, at the level of collective actors, it makes 
sense to identify intentions and consequences, but for motives we need to look to the 
individual level. 
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value, we have to turn back to the ways in which such value is generated. The goal 
of the practice, even if described only as the saving of human lives, is deeply 
complex in its possible meanings. Moreover, the goal of saving human lives exists in 
a wider social context, one in which the goal is articulated and defined as valuable. 
The goal is such a fragile one, its betrayals so frequent, that it becomes vitally 
important to understand how it can come to be valuable and spur people to act on 
it. That is, we have to turn back to the reasons why people save other people, and 
take motives seriously in a more general sense, that is, the kind of study of 
motivations set out in the previous chapter. So it is not a question of finding some 
pure humanitarian motive, but rather of drawing together the threads of why a 
sense of solidarity can emerge sufficient to call for and generate acts of rescue, that 
is, to coalesce into concrete intentions.  
 This leads us back to the Rescuers of Jews. If a sense of common humanity 
makes it important and desirable that Jews be rescued, the rescue of Jews can 
plausibly become a humanitarian campaign within which not every individual act 
has to be linked back to a pure “humanitarian motive”. To do so would be 
unnecessarily demanding, untestable and a misunderstanding of the breadth and 
complexity of humanitarianism as a category. Yet, to understand the development 
of the view that it is desirable that Jews be rescued under the auspices of a 
common humanity, it also seems valuable and important to look at the particular 
reasons given by those who did exactly that. 
 Furthermore, when those reasons are examined, they reveal that a search 
for some kind of purity would be fruitless. For Otto: “I also examined myself 
whether it wasn't part of showing off, and it was”.47 When asked, “did you see your 
activities with the Resistance as being primarily political or primarily as a result of 
your humanitarian instincts?”, he responded “Both. Both. Both."48 For Knud, 
“humanitarian” motivations were inextricably mixed with a strong desire to resist 
German aggression at all costs, and the desire to protect Jews as fellow Danes.49 
What is interesting is precisely that the rescuers were very different, “ordinary” 
                                                           
47 Monroe, The Hand of Compassion, 91. 
48 Ibid., 95. 
49 Ibid., 180. 
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people (or at least people who saw themselves and their actions as ordinary) who 
engaged in exceptional activity according to a similar pattern. Very different lives 
and experiences fed into common ways of interpreting and acting on the situation 
they saw before them. Moreover, very different and complex sets of life choices led 
to a moment in which they felt they had no choice but to act. Their perceptions of 
what was at stake were very similar: they all felt the salience of belonging to a 
common humanity, the resonance this had within their sense of identity, and that 
the integrity of their sense of self depended on the consistency of their actions with 
their self-understanding.50 So in understanding the rescue of Jews during the 
Holocaust, we can characterise rescue in a number of different ways, including the 
practical rescue of Jews (in which a consequentialist logic should be seen as 
important at an aggregate level, lest we return to the position that the only valid 
acts of rescue were ones done for impeccable reasons), the saving of the sense of 
self of those who felt compelled to rescue. Kristen Monroe also points to the acts of 
rescuers saving the very “possibility of humanity” evoked earlier: 
 
Resistance to genocide is not just an affirmation of universalism in which 
every human being is entitled to rights and equal treatment by virtue of 
being born human. It is more than simply seeing the humanity in the Jews, 
more than seeing the bonds that connect us. It is also a cherishing, a 
celebration of all the differences - individual and group - that allow for 
human flourishing, set firmly within the context of universal worth. This is 
what the rescuers protected for all of us when they resisted genocide, 
prejudice, and ethnic violence. Their very ordinariness, their very 
humanness, encourages us to look deep within our own souls and ask if we, 
too, do not possess this possibility.51 
 
Within the context of humanitarianism, then, rescue can plausibly entail a 
consequentialist logic once articulated, but we must look beyond that logic to 
understand the reasons behind its articulation. Humanitarian action can be 
invalidated both by a lack of tangible results, and by lack of justification for why 
those results might be valuable. It cannot, however be assessed at the level of 
                                                           
50 Ibid., 237. 
51 Ibid., 265-266. 
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intention, for that will yield the most impoverished account that explains neither 
inputs nor outcomes in the politics of humanity.52 Yet another important element 
has been missing from the discussion so far: the potential of humanitarian action to 
cause harm in a ways that potentially invalidate a plausible categorisation as rescue, 
either through the act itself, action leading to unintended harmful consequences, or 
through the use of violent means. 
 
IV The Problem of Causing Harm and the Means of Rescue 
 
The potential of humanitarian action to cause harm is now widely recognised. For 
example, Mary B. Anderson’s work has noted the negative side-effects that 
humanitarianism can have, such as the way aid can exacerbate conflict, or create 
dependency.53 In a famous argument, she called for humanitarianism to strive to 
“do no harm”.54 But is this remotely possible? The potential to cause harm in and 
through rescue was surely implicit in the first two sections, indeed in the previous 
chapters too. The moment of rescue is necessarily a radically contingent and 
undetermined one, wherein different conceptions of the human are negotiated, but 
negotiated in a context of fundamental power disparity. This context of inequality, 
though, is necessary to the possibility of rescue, just as it is in many areas of our 
social life, such as fire fighting or in an intensive care unit. We might well think that 
acts of rescue are valuable and tolerate, or even promote, such inequalities. But we 
must recognise the potential for harm inherent within them. The most obvious 
instance is where the potential rescued agent does not see themselves in need of 
rescue at all, and the act of rescue actually becomes the main, unwanted, driver of 
change in their life. 
 The possibility of missionary excesses is one that can never be completely 
overcome, for the moment of rescue is always one of life’s “presumptive 
                                                           
52 Yet this is the place where many look, often in the process conflating motive and 
intention through the concept of “good intention”. 
53 Anderson, "'You Save My Life Today, but for What Tomorrow?'". 
54 Anderson, Do No Harm. 
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occasions”, to borrow Michael Walzer’s phrase.55 Walzer uses the example, which 
we will return to at greater length in Chapter 6, of stopping someone committing 
suicide, even though they might have good reason to do so. We choose to 
emphasise the overriding value of life, even though we cannot fully know how much 
worth that value retains for the attempted suicide. The question of how much we 
need to know about the other, as a stranger or outsider, in order to save them is a 
vital one for humanitarianism.56 But perhaps humanitarianism can never know 
enough, because it is constantly negotiating the earthly and the intangible, and 
therefore humanitarian action must always be seen as a presumptive occasion to 
some extent, with the potential for immense rewards, but also immense harms. 
How we might summarise and situate our presumptive intuitions in the context of 
contemporary liberal thought will be returned to in Chapter 6. 
 But even in cases where a large part of the act of rescue is clearly agreed 
upon between rescuer and rescued, the act can still cause harm, for instance in 
limiting, or appearing to limit the rescued’s humanity and possibilities to that 
particular relationship of bodily rescue. This could be seen to be case in many 
entrenched refugee situations. The body is nourished and, in some cases free (for 
only a lucky few), but the humanity is left on life-support. The danger of this is 
particularly high in the kinds of contexts in which humanitarian acts of rescue are 
called for, precisely because they are contexts of radical and rapid change, in which 
a conception of restorative rescue, to a life similar to that which went before, may 
well be impossible.57 In that case, the rescuer faces choices about what new and 
different life they are enabling or imposing. Even assuming good faith here, these 
can be impossibly difficult choices, with the potential for causing harm at every 
step. 
                                                           
55 Michael Walzer, Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad (Notre Dame: 
Notre Dame University Press, 1994), 16. 
56 It is addressed for instance in the famous debate between Michael Walzer and his critics 
in Philosophy & Public Affairs. See in particular Luban, "The Romance of the Nation-State". 
Walzer, "The Moral Standing of States". 
57 Pasic and Weiss provide a good account of the difficulties of restorative rescue. Pasic and 
Weiss, "The Politics of Rescue". 
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 There is also the question of unintended side-effects. The provision of food 
aid is notoriously difficult precisely because of the distortions it can impose on local 
economies and livelihoods, and its ambiguous role in the political economy of 
conflict. Even more troubling, David Rieff notes that while UN officials can justifiably 
assert that their humanitarian endeavours have saved many lives across the world, 
“their presence has also cost lives by raising in people who might have succeeded in 
fleeing and saving themselves the false confidence that they would be protected.” 
Rieff refers to those Rwandans bereaved because of just “such a waste of hope.”58 
Similarly, Alex de Waal with respect to famine, argues that “[the] greatest harm 
done by the humanitarian international is to create delusion”. For him, this delusion 
takes on a triple character:  
 
Western governments and donating publics are deluded into believing the 
fairy tale that their aid can solve profound political problems, when it 
cannot. The humanitarians deceive themselves about their own importance. 
Most significantly, local people (“recipients” or “beneficiaries”) are deluded 
into believing that salvation can come from other than their own actions. 
Some tangible material benefits (many fewer than are commonly believed) 
are delivered, but at the cost of sustaining this tremendous, institutionalized 
delusion. Meanwhile, the real reasons why people survive and conquer 
famine are obscured.59 
 
Rieff’s view is very clearly that “it is impossible to really do no harm”.60 This links to 
Rieff’s sense that it is important to acknowledge that the context of 
humanitarianism is failure, and therefore thinking that we can step into hell and do 
no harm must always be entirely illusory.61 Conceivably, some situations that 
prompt humanitarian rescue may be very simple cases of help being called for and 
granted. But the scenarios in which humanitarianism currently functions are rarely 
that simple. Moreover, if the act of rescue can be understood in a way that is 
devoid of harm for rescued and rescuer alike, the question remains of what means 
                                                           
58 Rieff, A Bed for the Night, 13. 
59 de Waal, Famine Crimes, 221. 
60 Rieff, A Bed for the Night, 22. 
61 Ibid., 304. 
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are used in the service of rescue, whether these have the potential to cause harm, 
and whether that provides a definitive criterion for acts of humanitarian rescue. 
 Among means, the most controversial point must surely be the use or threat 
of violence.62 The problem of violent means has been debated throughout the 
history of humanitarianism. It is arguably the single most important issue in 
discussing whether military humanitarian intervention can ever lie within a 
coherent understanding of what humanitarianism is. The issue here is not whether 
the ICRC should have a standing army at its disposal. Rather, the key question is 
whether professional humanitarian organisations’ many understandable reasons for 
separating themselves from the use of violence are also adequate arguments for 
excluding the use of violence entirely from the wider discussion involved in 
humanitarianism’s politics of humanity. 
 David Rieff’s disenchantment with the notion of humanitarian violence is a 
particularly interesting case here, for he is equally without illusions as to the purity 
of the humanitarian endeavour and to the consequences of violence. Having 
acknowledged the impossibility for humanitarian action of doing no harm, his work, 
as it has evolved, also makes clear the sense that by allying itself to the use of force, 
humanitarianism risks undermining its ability to do any good. He criticises the 
obscuring of the reality of violence by defenders of humanitarian violence. “The 
image evoked [by figures like Bernard Kouchner] is one of a burly man breaking 
down a door in a burning building, rather than of an action that even in the best of 
circumstances is inseparable from the slaughter of innocents.”63 Rieff is not a 
pacifist, and believes that force may be sometimes morally required, but he wishes 
to separate that moral justification of the use of force from the practice of 
humanitarianism, which should lose its utopian streak and abandon a sense of itself 
as a saving idea. As Orbinski puts it: “Humanitarian action exists only to preserve 
                                                           
62 Here I mean violence in the visceral sense, not the forms of structural violence that could 
be read into the “harms” described above. Or indeed in the form examined in Riina Yrjola, 
"The Invisible Violence of Celebrity Humanitarianism: Soft Images and Hard Words in the 
Making and Unmaking of Africa", World Political Science Review 5, no. 1 (2009). 
63 Rieff, A Bed for the Night, 216. 
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life, not to eliminate it”.64 We might also recall that the Talmudic saying that 
prefaced this chapter is preceded by the idea that whoever destroys a life, destroys 
an entire world.65 
 It is not hard to agree with Rieff that “the slaughter of innocents” is wrong, 
and can never be a “humanitarian act” as such. But the problem is that surely Rieff’s 
intuition that force should be used to stop a genocide (wherever it may occur), and 
his implication that the slaughter of innocents is always wrong (wherever it may 
occur) stem from the same discussion, which is a humanitarian discussion about the 
universal value of human life and the need to defend a common humanity. Though, 
in practical terms, he ultimately comes down on the same side of the argument as 
Rieff, Hugo Slim argues that: 
 
The paradox of humanitarian violence should be allowed to raise its head 
and not simply be shouted down by humanitarian purists and critics of neo-
liberal hegemony, for it represents a serious moral problem. The fact that 
the best way to restrain extreme violence and to protect civilians might be 
to use violence itself is a moral paradox that needs careful attention, not 
simple slogans.66 
 
It may well not be appropriate to give the symbols of that value, organisations like 
the ICRC and MSF, guns. But that is not quite the same thing as saying that those 
with guns, who stop a genocide, however imperfectly, are not part of the same 
discussion. If humanitarianism becomes the vocabulary through which we describe 
and understand the worst excesses of cruelty and inhumanity, it cannot exclude a 
priori action that comes into being precisely as a response. Of course, we should 
always be sceptical of justifications for the use of force. But can we really exclude 
force once and for all from our understanding of how humanitarianism functions? Is 
                                                           
64 Orbinski, "Nobel Lecture". 
65 The Rescuer Otto also notes this. “On my medal, the Yad Vashem Medal, there is an 
inscription. It says, ‘Whoever saves one life, he has saved the entire humanity.’ And I think 
the inversion of that is also true. Whoever kills one innocent human being, it is as if he has 
killed the entire world." Monroe, The Hand of Compassion, 88. 
66 Hugo Slim, "Violence and Humanitarianism: Moral Paradox and the Protection of 
Civilians", Security Dialogue 32, no. 3 (2001): 337. 
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it not possible that violence may always be the worst way to honour our sense of 
humanity, but on very rare occasions the only way to save or preserve it? 
 A first point to make here is that humanitarian identity need not be co-
terminus with particular agents across all time and all actions engaged in by the 
relevant agent. Immaculate humanitarian identity is not necessary to engage in 
humanitarian action or rescue, and it may be inappropriate for some coherent acts 
of rescue carried out in the name of a common humanity. Arguably the tendency to 
think that it this is not the case reflects the desire to preserve the moral authority 
that humanitarian NGOs carry as a result of the more singular character of their 
agency and voice within international politics. The impulse to rescue looms large in 
our understanding of what humanitarianism is. But it necessarily coexists with the 
desire to pre-empt future occasions for suffering, to engage in rescue-in-advance 
through the elaboration of laws, institutions and practices. An obvious example 
here is the development of human rights, and this will be examined as a key 
example in the next chapter on institutionalised humanitarianism. Perhaps when it 
came to designing a more just system that obviated the need to rescue at all, 
someone who had spent their life publicly arguing against prejudice on the basis of 
race or religion would be able to make a more coherent input. Thus we may well 
require high priests of humanitarianism, to go back to Hopgood’s notion of the 
sacred and the profane. We should not ask these high priests necessarily to get 
their hands dirty, but merely tolerate within the politics of humanitarianism, the 
“politics of humanity”, some who accept that burden. 
 This potential burden is complicated in two ways. First, the agents involved 
in actual humanitarian action are more likely to be collective agents. How to 
understand that complication of responsibility within the context of 
humanitarianism will be addressed in Chapter 6. But my argument, while mitigating 
against a blanket exclusion of violence from humanitarian action, fails to account 
for an important dimension of the actual use of violence in humanitarian acts of 
rescue. We might reasonably argue that a reactive killing in defence of an innocent 
as an act of last resort does not represent a moral crime. But in more likely real-
world scenarios faced by collective agents, violence usually involves a strong 
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possibility of “collateral damage”. As Michael Doyle puts it: “the necessarily ‘dirty 
hands’ of violent means often become ‘dangerous hands’ in international 
interventions.”67 The presumption of the rescuer is scaled-up, and he is confronted 
with an irresolvable equation with rescued victims on one side and innocent victims 
of collateral damage on the other. So some of the violence involved will very likely 
represent an important moral crime on the very terms of the declared 
humanitarianism. In his seminal essay on dirty hands, Michael Walzer writes that in 
the case of a politician who carries out, or orders a moral crime to be carried out: 
 
he committed a moral crime and he accepted a moral burden. Now he is a 
guilty man. His willingness to acknowledge and bear (and perhaps to repent 
and do penance for) his guilt is evidence, and it is the only evidence he can 
offer us, both that he is not too good for politics and that he is good enough. 
Here is the moral politician: it is by his dirty hands that we know him. If he 
were a moral man and nothing else, his hands would not be dirty; if he were 
a politician and nothing else, he would pretend that they were clean.68 
 
His concept of the moral politician is particularly interesting in the context of our 
politics of humanity. It is this kind of actor which might be tentatively situated 
within humanitarianism (perhaps at the helm of a government or a military force) to 
engage in acts of rescue. The moral politician is different from the high priest within 
the “politics of humanity”, but they are both part of the same broad enterprise. 
There are obvious problems here, such as the danger of state leaders co-opting 
humanitarians as a “force multiplier”.69 But this section’s aim has been merely to 
suggest that while they should always be approached gingerly, there is at least the 
possibility that violent means entirely be excluded from humanitarianism, broadly 
understood, in some instances, to defend the idea of a common humanity and 
human life, as well as particular human bodies. 
                                                           
67 Michael W. Doyle, "A Few Words on Mill, Walzer, and Nonintervention", Ethics & 
International Affairs 23, no. 4 (2009): 354. 
68 Michael Walzer, "Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands", in Thinking Politically: 
Essays in Political Theory, ed. David Miller (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 
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69 de Torrente, "Humanitarian Action under Attack: Reflections on the Iraq War ": 9. 
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 Perhaps more than anything else, the problem of humanitarian violence 
reminds us of the possibility of tragedy, in the genuine sense of the term, inherent 
in the humanitarian enterprise: professional humanitarians are frequently in 
positions where all the options at their disposal involve doing wrong in a morally 
important way.70 De Waal has recently argued that the tragedy of humanitarians is 
precisely that ultimately they are unable completely to escape the possibility of 
acting cruelly.71 That is, they cannot entirely avoid causing precisely the kind of 
suffering that, as we saw in Chapter 2, lies at the heart of the manner in which 
humanitarianism comes into being in the first place. This makes a strong case for 
embracing the role of the “moral politician”, for as Rieff argues: “[the] virtue of the 
political is that the case for making the most tragic of all public decisions becomes 
controversial and a matter for public debate, rather than some kind of categorical 
moral imperative whose need to be undertaken is deemed to be self-evident.”72 
The challenge for professional humanitarians then, is how to face up to their moral 
and political responsibility in such situations, for as we will see in the next chapter, 
they are not easily avoided or pre-empted. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has argued that it is not possible to resolve the paradoxes of 
humanitarian action by reducing it to its core act of saving lives. Acts of 
humanitarian rescue always involve a complex negotiation of what is being saved, 
which flits between the self and the other, the tangible and the intangible. Yet once 
again, some definable contours can be identified: rescue is most coherent when 
outcomes in terms of actual human bodies saved simultaneously honour the 
integrity of the category of common humanity. Moreover, while the idea of doing 
no harm must necessarily be aspirational, harmful ends or means must be 
                                                           
70 For an argument about why international political theory should take tragedy seriously, 
see Brown, "Tragedy, 'Tragic Choices' and Contemporary International Political Theory".  
71 de Waal, "The Humanitarians' Tragedy". 
72 Cited in Smillie and Minear, The Charity of Nations, 1. 
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coherently understandable within the “politics of humanity” being sketched in this 
work. Rescue comes into focus as one of our moral life’s crucial “presumptive 
occasions”, without which the meaning of human solidarity would founder. The 
next chapter will examine the attempts of professional humanitarians to escape the 
many contingencies of rescue, and to rein in their capacity to cause harm. 
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5. The Pursuit of a Humanitarianism beyond Contingency: 
Accountability, Human Rights and Global Justice 
 
This chapter looks at three related attempts, three normative projects, to resolve 
some of the contingencies of humanitarian action explored in the previous chapters 
through different kinds of institutionalisation: internal accountability mechanisms, 
universal human rights and global social justice. These represent three different 
visions of how the “politics of humanity” should be pinned down. The chapter 
argues that looking at the institutionalisation of humanitarian impulses, and 
humanitarian action, inevitably returns us, via the nature of the action that is 
institutionalised, to the question of the purpose and scope of humanitarianism, of 
what it can, and should achieve, a problem that evades easy resolution. 
 Institutionalising humanitarian action has often simply been a matter of 
readiness, of creating a capacity to respond to crises that will inevitably emerge in 
order to temper, wherever possible, their inhumanity. The birth of professional 
humanitarianism was itself the result of a desire to be ready when the next act of 
rescue was needed, and readiness to rescue is itself a kind of rescue-in-advance, the 
attempt to make the capacity to rescue less contingent and coincidental. When 
Dunant composed his A Memory of Solferino, it was exactly for this purpose: so that 
the relief of the next army of battlefield wounded would not be entirely the result 
of spontaneity or coincidence. This approach is at the heart of the Dunantist 
tradition of humanitarianism and of the central question he puts to his readers: 
 
Would it not be possible, in time [sic] of peace and quiet, to form relief 
societies for the purpose of having care given to the wounded in wartime by 
zealous, devoted and thoroughly qualified volunteers?1 
 
Writing of Dunant’s efforts in the aftermath of the battle of Solferino, Ignatieff 
remarks that “[it] is doubtful Dunant saved a single life that weekend”.2 His 
                                                           
1 Dunant, A Memory of Solferino. 
2 Ignatieff, The Warrior's Honor, 110. 
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contribution to humanitarianism is not to be found in the particular acts of rescue 
that may or may not have taken place that weekend, but rather in his foundational 
role in creating an institution that would be there to save lives in the future. 
 But as the provision of life-saving action becomes more institutionalised, 
something that could potentially be relied upon, it inevitably comes to relate back 
to more preventive concerns, relating directly to the question posed by Mary 
Anderson and evoked in the previous chapter: “you save my life today, but for what 
tomorrow?”3 Or, we might add, “why was I not protected yesterday”. Issues of 
protection from harm, and protection after rescue, have also frequently been the 
subject of institutionalisation. This type of impetus towards institutionalisation is far 
more ambitious. It frequently draws on notions of human perfectibility, that 
contingency can be escaped in a more profound sense. It suggests that we can learn 
from and improve the world around us, and that much human suffering is 
“avoidable” and can, with effective action, be avoided. 
 Suffering not avoided raises the question of accountability for suffering that 
has occurred or will occur. In the previous chapter, it was suggested that even the 
smallest acts of memorialisation or testimony can, in a sense, rescue a conceptual, if 
not fully realisable in the obtaining circumstances, space for a “possibility of 
humanity”. The struggle to create mechanisms of accountability represents an 
amplification of this desire for recognition and justice, and in a sense demonstrates 
a circular pattern (which can take the form of tautology in some humanitarians’ 
account of what they are engaged in). The hope is that in creating accountability for 
suffering, future suffering will be pre-empted, abuses deterred. So though such 
projects may appear remedial, they are also deeply preventive: they aim to 
normalise “good” behaviour” that will not result in avoidable suffering.  
 Since its inception, professional humanitarianism has struggled over which 
of these purposes should take priority, and over the extent to which the 
contingencies of rescue can be overcome. But the partial successes 
humanitarianism has achieved in enshrining them all has paradoxically led to 
humanitarianism itself being the object of such humanitarian critiques. We saw in 
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the previous chapter how humanitarian action could cause harm and be deeply 
unaccountable at the level of specific acts of rescue. Institutionalisation has always 
amplified and complicated these problems. A fundamental question, such as 
whether humanitarianism embodies charity or justice, finds itself complicated when 
humanitarians find themselves committing injustices themselves. 
 The chapter first considers the pursuit of accountability within the sphere of 
professional humanitarianism. It then explores whether it can subordinate itself to 
the project of enshrining universal human rights. The deepest tensions are brought 
into focus through an examination of the question of humanitarian intervention. 
Finally, the chapter asks whether justice itself can provide a leitmotif for 
humanitarian action. 
  
I Accountability and “Humanitarian Rights” 
 
The narrowest sense in which humanitarians have tried to resolve the contingencies 
of rescue is through the creation of internal accountability mechanisms within the 
practice of professional humanitarianism. Humanitarians have devoted a lot of 
energy to holding others to account. But in recent years they have found 
themselves to be unaccountable in the carrying out of humanitarian action. 
Accountability thus presents a particularly interesting problem for actors like aid 
NGOs.4 Janice Gross Stein underlines the importance of accountability to the study 
of humanitarianism, noting that though her “subject is accountability, what is at 
                                                           
4 Leif Wenar, "Accountability in International Development Aid", Ethics & International 
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the context of the turn towards rights-based approaches, see Hugo Slim, "Dissolving the 
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stake is humanitarian ethics, humanitarian practice, and humanitarian identity as 
they evolve within a changing political dynamic”.5 Arguably, the crisis of 
humanitarianism is in large part a crisis of accountability. Indeed, I will argue that 
the search for accountability must always be one of the grand, yet unresolved, 
underlying purposes of humanitarianism. Exploring this question reveals the core 
problem about the source of accountability within humanitarianism: it is 
“humanity”. Yet humanity is not an agent it is easy to be accountable to or for. 
 The concern with accountability is intimately linked to the recognition of the 
harm that humanitarian action can cause, as set out in the previous chapter. The 
account given was in agreement with David Rieff’s conclusion that “it is impossible 
to really do no harm”.6 The institutionalisation of humanitarian action can 
exacerbate or prolong this in a number of ways. 
 Firstly, it was seen in the last chapter that power disparities in the 
mechanisms of rescue created a problem: on the one hand, to need to be rescued is 
to need someone with the power to rescue, on the other, that power conditions the 
content of acts of rescue. Secondly, it can cement inaction. Michael Barnett makes 
the point that the institutionalisation of humanitarianism has given humanitarian 
organisations the power to shape social reality. Their power and authority gives 
them a big role in shaping what we consider relevant emergencies and suffering 
worthy of consideration.7 It therefore impacts substantially on what become 
“forgotten crises”. Thirdly, institutionalisation can merely represent the 
institutionalisation of emergency, and states of “permanent emergency”.8 A prime 
example of this is the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine 
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Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), which is still, more than half a century later, 
officially dealing with an “emergency”.9 Fourthly, humanitarian action can just be 
incompetently, corruptly or counterproductively executed. All these represent 
abuses of power. At the heart of David Kennedy’s critique of humanitarianism is the 
charge that professional humanitarians have sought power without acknowledging, 
or accepting responsibility for it.10 Coupled with the moral authority that 
professional humanitarians jealously and understandably guard, this can be 
especially damaging. We are all well aware of the damage that can be wrought by 
an abuse of power or an act of betrayal by a trusted source of moral authority.11 It is 
also not coincidental that the rise in concern over unaccountability has taken place 
during the same period that humanitarian institutions have become more powerful 
and better funded. 
 There are a number of possible internal responses to the institutionalisation 
of humanitarianism’s capacity to cause harm. One is simply to throw up one’s hands 
and characterise the constant possibility of tragedy inherent in humanitarian action 
as inevitable, as definitive of its very nature, and of the human condition in general. 
Another is to redescribe anything harmful as not being “humanitarian”. The most 
prominent example of this is the tendency among some professional humanitarians 
to acknowledge the occasional need for military intervention in response to a crisis, 
but refuse to allow action they see as morally necessary to be included within the 
ambit of humanitarian action. Or one can place one’s faith in the ability of technical 
knowledge and solutions to solve every problem. Most radically, one could read 
harm as evidence that humanitarianism as a concept, and as a project, is really 
always about subjugating the “other”, and abandon the project. Previous chapters 
have already implicitly rejected these approaches as an overarching response. 
 The route professional humanitarians have largely, and plausibly, chosen is 
to attempt to institutionalise “accountability” as a defining characteristic of 
                                                           
9 Calhoun, "The Imperative to Reduce Suffering", 83. 
10 David Kennedy, The Dark Sides of Virtue: Reassessing International Humanitarianism 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004). 
11 The current crisis over widespread child abuse in the Catholic Church is an obvious 
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institutionalised humanitarian action. In many ways this is the most promising 
approach. Accountability has long been the pursuit of those areas of 
institutionalised humanitarianism, notably in its legal forms, whose aim is to hold 
others, those with “bad intentions”, to account for the harm they caused. Widening 
the net of accountability to include humanitarianism itself, for all its “good 
intentions”, could be seen as a mature acknowledgement of the flawed and 
complex nature of an essentially valuable endeavour. Arguably, it represents the 
real acknowledgement that humanitarianism has become a profession. As with 
other fields coming to terms with professionalisation, concepts such as “quality” 
and accountability become important buzzwords.12 Perhaps they also represent the 
acknowledgement that their principles and moral authority are no longer an 
automatic, transcendent source of legitimacy. Laura Hammond notes that there has 
often been a mismatch between the work professional humanitarians think a 
clearly-expressed commitment to principles of impartiality, neutrality and 
independence do, and aid recipients’ perceptions, which are rarely expressed in 
relation to these. Instead, they make judgements based on humanitarians’ 
responsiveness to local needs.13 It recognises the increasing evidence that even 
when they are not doing serious harm, humanitarians are frequently not doing 
much good, and that they need, as we saw in the previous chapter, to take 
outcomes, the consequences of their actions, seriously. It is also linked to the shift 
away from seeing victims as helpless and the shift in vocabulary from relief to 
“assistance”. 
 So what does accountability mean for humanitarians? In practice, it has 
resulted in a number of widely, though not universally, endorsed documents and 
networks: the Red Cross Code of Conduct;14 The Sphere Project,15 which resulted in 
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in higher education. 
13 Hammond, "The Power of Holding Humanitarianism Hostage and the Myth of Protective 
Principles", 193. 
14 IFRC, The Code of Conduct. 
15 The Sphere Project. Available at http://www.sphereproject.org/; accessed on 13 August 
2010. 
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a set of minimum standards and a “Humanitarian Charter”;16 a self-regulatory body, 
the Humanitarian Accountability Partnership;17 ALNAP, an Active Learning Network 
for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action.18 In conceptual terms, 
Koenraad Van Brabant, when co-director of the influential Humanitarian 
Accountability Project (the precursor to the Humanitarian Accountability 
Partnership), set out the core elements of an accountability system from a 
humanitarian perspective as follows. It requires: (1) an affected party; (2) an 
articulation of the rights of the individual or group; (2) duty-bearers responsible for 
respecting and fulfilling those rights; (3) standards for judgement of performance; 
(4) autonomous duty holders to monitor the duty-bearers; (5) praise for responsible 
performance and reprimand or redress for bad performance.19 Van Brabant went 
on to contextualise the pursuit of accountability, in the process neatly summarising 
why accountability should be a major consideration for an international political 
theory analysis of humanitarianism: 
 
Accountability is an act of justice, and relates to power. At the core of the 
contemporary debate about accountability are the questions of the social 
contract between citizens and the State, and inter-State relationships. This 
debate is not static: the terms in which ‘accountability’ is debated, and who 
                                                           
16 Sphere Project, Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response. A 
revised version is expected in early 2011. Sphere has garnered a mixed response within the 
humanitarian sector. See James Darcy, "Locating Responsibility: The Sphere Humanitarian 
Charter and Its Rationale", Disasters 28, no. 2 (2004). Charlotte Dufour et al., "Rights, 
Standards and Quality in a Complex Humanitarian Space: Is Sphere the Right Tool?" 
Disasters 28, no. 2 (2004). Jacqui Tong, "Questionable Accountability: MSF and Sphere in 
2003", Disasters 28, no. 2 (2004). Peter Walker and Susan Purdin, "Birthing Sphere", 
Disasters 28, no. 2 (2004). 
17 Humanitarian Accountability Partnership. Available at http://www.hapinternational.org/; 
accessed on 17 June 2010. 
18 ALNAP: Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian 
Action. Available at http://www.alnap.org/; accessed on 13 July 2010. Its most recent 
report is ALNAP, The State of the Humanitarian System: Assessing Performance and 
Progress (London: Overseas Development Institute, 2010). Available at 
http://www.alnap.org/pool/files/alnap-sohs-final.pdf; accessed on 17 June 2010. 
19 Koenraad Van Brabant, "Accountable Humanitarian Action: An Overview of Recent 
Trends", in Forum: War and Accountability, ed. ICRC (Geneva: ICRC, 2002). Available at 
http://icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/p0808/$File/ICRC_002_808_FORUM_WAR_A
ND_ACCOUNTABILITY.PDF; accessed on 17 June 2010. 
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participates in that debate, evolve historically and can themselves be the 
object of a political struggle.20 
 
Dorothea Hilhorst echoes this last point, that though these discussions do not often 
admit to it, they are highly political.21 Professional humanitarians have often been 
the subjects of the political struggle for accountability, and now the problem of 
harm leads them to place themselves as its objects as well, in a discussion that 
emphasises rights, justice, and the role of states, and will be unfolded in the course 
of this and the following chapter. 
 Van Brabant’s criteria are straightforward enough as a description of what 
accountability means. It may be possible to define accountability within very 
specific contexts (although real accountability for action remains elusive). But in the 
broader context of humanitarianism, it is incredibly hard to define who is 
accountable to whom, and how. Certainly, the practical accountability of 
humanitarian NGOs is far from fitting the five criteria outlined by Van Brabant. 
Janice Stein notes that: “[accountability] is by definition relational: one party is 
accountable to another. Standards are determined in negotiation with another, or 
imposed by one on another, rather than internally established.”22 She presents an 
even simpler way of capturing accountability, arguing that accountability can be 
summed up by the questions: “To whom am I accountable? For what? How is my 
performance monitored or measured? What are the consequences of a failure to 
meet expectations?”23 
 It might be assumed that if the problem is the capacity of humanitarian 
action to lead to harm and not be held to account, the relationship with those who 
either benefit from or are harmed by humanitarian action would be determinate. 
That is, that professional humanitarians would be accountable to recipients of aid 
for the consequences of humanitarian action. But it is not always as simple as that. 
In practice, it is often the relationship with donors, rather than recipients of aid, 
                                                           
20 Ibid. 
21 Dorothea Hilhorst, "Being Good at Doing Good? Quality and Accountability of 
Humanitarian NGOs", Disasters 26, no. 3 (2002): 197. 
22 Stein, "Humanitarian Organizations", 125. 
23 Ibid. 
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that determines how accountability is actualised.24 In other words, professional 
humanitarians become accountable to donors for the funds they receive. In many 
cases, they are the agents to state principals in the delivery of assistance.25 The 
pursuit of accountability has, to a large extent, merely formalised its dependence on 
contingent philanthropy, especially the philanthropy of states, rather than 
rendering the provision of rescue non-contingent, or its exercise accountable. Vaux 
confirms this: “[the] disadvantage of accountability is that it usually means 
accountability to those outside, not to the person in need”.26 This problem partly 
stems from the way that institutionalisation often creates distance between rescuer 
and rescued and fragments the former into a chain of different actors, precluding 
the possibility of unidirectional accountability. The picture can be even more 
complicated, as agreements or contracts with host governments can add a third 
potential stakeholder to the mix. 
 The Red Cross Code of Conduct, signed by most of the major humanitarian 
NGOs suggests that there need not be a problem: “We hold ourselves accountable 
to both those we seek to assist and those from whom we accept resources”.27 But 
this formulation presents two revealing problems. Firstly, there is no reason why 
accountability to both parties should always be possible. They can often pull in 
different directions. As I argued in Chapter 3, there is no necessary match between 
what donors want and the needs of recipients. On occasion, these might make 
utterly incommensurate demands on humanitarian organisations. 
 Secondly, who is holding humanitarians to account? The Code’s formulation, 
“We hold ourselves”, goes to the heart of the problem: to a large extent, 
humanitarian accountability is a voluntary exercise that may condition action in the 
desired direction but is difficult to punish in the breach.28 In a curious sense, the 
idea of a code of conduct takes professional humanitarians full circle. Having drawn 
                                                           
24 Wenar, "Accountability in International Development Aid": 16. 
25 Stein, "Humanitarian Organizations", 127. 
26 Vaux, The Selfish Altruist, 68. 
27 IFRC, The Code of Conduct. 
28 Though Wenar argues that such “horizontal” accountability mechanisms, if well-designed 
can lead to concrete improvements. Wenar, "Accountability in International Development 
Aid": 17-23. 
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on concepts and codes such as “warrior’s honour” to embed humanitarian 
limitations on the brutality of war, they have come to the realisation that their own 
capacity to do harm, a side-effect of their increasing power, leaves them in the 
position of needing to define a code to guide themselves, in a similar self-ascribed 
way. 
 Donors can hold them to account on their terms by withdrawing funding, 
host governments can by withdrawing permissions. But those who prompted a 
concern in the first place are often, by definition, not in a powerful enough position 
to challenge providers, let alone ensure compliance or punish failures to comply. 
There is a basic problem here that the likely relative positions of the likely actors 
simply do not match up to the positions they should occupy in a standard 
accountability structure, and it is hard to see how they ever truly could, as 
humanitarian problems tend to arise precisely in (and often as a consequence of) 
the kinds of situations in which accountability mechanisms of all kinds are 
profoundly failing, and the positions of the victims and agents of succour are highly 
unequal.29 
 That is not to say that humanitarian accountability is necessarily entirely 
unenforceable, or non-existent. There can be kinds of “surrogate” accountability.30 
Donors can, if they choose, call humanitarians to account in the name of the 
recipients, on the basis of the emerging set of principles of “good humanitarian 
donorship”, endorsed by most of the major donor governments and UN agencies in 
Stockholm in 2003.31 But the document they signed up to remains a statement of 
intent, rather than representing a rigorous policing mechanism of any kind.32 It 
                                                           
29 On the problems inequality poses for standard accountability mechanisms to work, see 
Jennifer Rubenstein, "Accountability in an Unequal World", Journal of Politics 69, no. 3 
(2007). 
30 Ibid. 
31 Good Humanitarian Donorship. Available at 
http://www.goodhumanitariandonorship.org/; accessed on 13 July 2010. 
32 GHD, "Principles and Good Practice of Humanitarian Donorship", Good Humanitarian 
Donorship (17 June 2003). Available at 
http://www.goodhumanitariandonorship.org/background.asp; accessed on 13 July 2010. 
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merely formalises “the charity of nations”, to borrow a phrase from Smillie and 
Minear.33 
 The other option is for host governments to hold organisations to account. 
Indeed, Matthew Winters demonstrates that aid is most effective in countries with 
robust accountability mechanisms of their own.34 But again, in practice, this is 
unlikely to happen in the most extreme cases, either because the host government 
is heavily dependent on resources in question, is failing, or because they simply do 
not act out of concern for their citizens and have caused the problem in the first 
place. 
 There has been a major attempt at improving, integrating and streamlining 
humanitarian action, epitomised by the “cluster approach”. This UN-led 
humanitarian reform initiative aims, in the context of complex inter-agency 
interventions, to ensure sufficient capacity, establish predictable leadership, build 
inter-agency partnerships, strengthen accountability, and improve coordination and 
prioritisation in the field.35 But high profile crises, such as the aftermath of the Haiti 
earthquake, are, despite these efforts, still characterised by a scramble of NGOs 
desperate to plant the flag. Some will no doubt carry out genuine life-saving action, 
but there is no real way to oversee this, or for those who lose out on the ground to 
call them to account. 
 So while the drive for accountability within humanitarianism may well have 
raised the quality of the delivery of relief (a similar story could be told in the case of 
development aid), the fundamental unaccountability of humanitarian action largely 
remains. Stein is deeply sceptical that these issues will be resolved, arguing that 
accountability in the humanitarian sector has become “constructed as outcome, 
framed conceptually as a principal-agent relationship, […] an exercise in 
                                                           
33 Smillie and Minear, The Charity of Nations. 
34 Matthew S. Winters, "Accountability, Participation and Foreign Aid Effectiveness", 
International Studies Review 12, no. 2 (2010). 
35 The on-going humanitarian reform programme is detailed at Humanitarian Reform. 
Available at http://www.humanitarianreform.org/; accessed on 16 August 2010. Resources 
relating to the cluster approach are in the process of migrating to OneResponse. Available 
at http://oneresponse.info/; accessed on 16 August 2010. 
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instrumental rationality that will prove to be a project that is largely 
unachievable”.36 
 The dilemmas that faced aid workers in the refugee camps of Zaire, say, over 
which kind of harm would be the least bad option, are still present in extreme 
situations, and still have to be resolved by professional humanitarians themselves, 
rather than them being constrained to action by an accountability mechanism 
working on behalf of the neediest. Professional humanitarians have to choose to 
whom, or to what, they hold themselves accountable. 
 At such moments, at an individual level, perhaps they feel themselves 
ultimately accountable to a religious or other moral code, but collectively, as 
humanitarians, they are returned to being accountable to their guiding principles, 
most importantly the principle of humanity, and the idea of acting “in the name of 
humanity”. In the last resort, they find themselves to be the only form of 
accountability the needy can call on. But that rescue of last resort itself represents a 
moment of radical unaccountability. In effect, this returns professional 
humanitarians to the paradox of acting in the name of an extremely powerful 
legitimising idea, supposed to be the ultimate source of accountability, but one that 
can result in the most profoundly unaccountable, contingent actions, of the kind 
examined in the previous chapter. Arguably, this is the position of many acts “in the 
name of humanity”. For example, for many, the Nuremberg judges may have 
represented a last possibility of holding to account, but the judges themselves were 
unaccountable to anything other than their concept of the requirements of 
defending the idea of common humanity. Arguably, then, the real challenge for 
humanitarians is to fully acknowledge this unaccountable moment in any claim 
made in the name of humanity, as humanity as such is never a capable collective 
agent. 
 Alternatively, we could shift the emphasis of what kind of accountability is 
being sought. Returning to Van Brabant’s definition of an accountability 
mechanism, we could characterise the critique presented above as a failure to really 
articulate a plausible category of “humanitarian right” and concomitant 
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responsibility (though in practice the tendency is to simply refer to the common 
vernacular of human rights). Though the intention is for aid recipients to become 
rights-holders, their rights are never stronger than the discretionary charity that 
underwrites, morally and financially, the structuring of humanitarian action. 
 Chris Brown writes that “[at] one level of generality, rights are ways to 
restrain the unfettered power of rulers”.37 But rulers have frequently played on the 
granting of rights to legitimise their power. Could the attempt to internal 
accountability be a way of legitimising a power that is actually inappropriate in the 
context of the problems humanitarianism seeks to resolve? Do “humanitarian 
rights” perhaps enshrine the rights of humanitarians, rather than create 
empowered rights holders? Is accountability a way of institutionalising 
humanitarianism in ongoing crises, disregarding with hubris the limited contribution 
they can make? For example, famously, Alex de Waal remarked that “relief is 
generally merely a footnote to the story of how people survive famine”.38 For de 
Waal, the problem is precisely the notion of humanitarian as ruler, as he sees the 
institutionalisation of humanitarian power, possibly legitimised through internal 
accountability mechanisms, as undermining potential local sources of accountability 
that in the longer term are more realistic and reliable ways of preventing famine. 
Already in 1994, de Waal, writing with Rakiya Omaar was deeply sceptical  of a 
humanitarian agenda driven by humanitarian relief: “At the end of the day, relief 
organizations will always make charitable works their priority, which means that 
human rights concerns will be fudged or jettisoned”.39 Winters argues that affairs 
can be improved through a greater emphasis on “participation”, another buzzword 
of the aid industry.40 But such efforts still largely seem to fall short of really 
empowering, or at least giving political voice to the recipients. 
                                                           
37 Brown, Sovereignty, Rights and Justice, 116. 
38de Waal, Famine Crimes, 1. Also cited in Terry, Condemned to Repeat? , 233. 
39 Their tentative answer was nevertheless to endorse a solidarity based on human rights, 
which links into the next section of the argument here. de Waal and Omaar, 
Humanitarianism Unbound? , 36. 
40 Though he acknowledges that it does not provide a panacea. Winters, "Accountability, 
Participation and Foreign Aid Effectiveness". 
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 Indeed, if the issue is really about empowering those at the mercy of 
contingency, there are other options potentially available to us in terms of 
removing victims from the contingencies of charity, by placing the “humanitarian 
international” within the auspices of more ambitious political projects, namely 
universal human rights and global social justice. Perhaps the failure of humanitarian 
accountability is due to a lack, rather than an excess of ambition? 
 
II Human Rights 
 
More substantial in its attempt to escape contingency, notably the contingency of 
action ultimately determined by charity, is the putative elision between 
humanitarianism, and one of the most significant crystallisations of the 
humanitarian impulse, the attempt to define and protect universal human rights 
through a comprehensive international regime. Hugo Slim sees the projects 
examined above, such as Sphere, as indicative of a shift towards a rights-based 
humanitarianism.41 But often, as we saw above, though the language of human 
rights may be used to describe the violations at stake, what is actually at issue is a 
kind of “humanitarian right”, the scope of which is defined by the practice of 
humanitarianism. The issue in this section is defining the practice more in terms of 
the international human rights regime, which is effectively the question that 
defined the debates on the so-called “new humanitarianism” at the turn of the 
century: rather than constant palliation, humanitarianism should look to 
institutionalise a much more preventative mode, and err on the side of a 
determined protection of human rights, rather than adopting a strictly neutral 
position. As Bronwyn Leebaw puts it: “[as] humanitarian organizations have 
struggled to address the limitations of impartial activism, many have looked to 
human rights as a basis for politicizing their work. The human rights movement is 
appealing because it offers a framework for critical transformation, yet also claims 
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to remain politically impartial.”42 For Fiona Fox, “new humanitarianism demands 
that all aid be judged on how it contributes to promoting human rights”.43 The 
biggest test of such an approach has come in the form of debates over the 
controversial practice of military humanitarian intervention, which will be examined 
in more depth in the next section. First, I will set out the potential conceptual value-
added that human rights offer to the disempowered recipients of aid discussed 
above. Then I will question two equally implausible practical approaches to the 
relationship between humanitarianism and human rights: a complete elision, and a 
firm distinction. Neither succeeds in avoiding the contingencies of humanitarian 
action, as is further illustrated by the case of military intervention. 
 Few would disagree with Charles Beitz that “the language of human rights 
has become the common idiom of social criticism in global politics”.44 Chris Brown 
agrees that “the language of rights has become the way in which humanitarian 
impulses are expressed in the modern international system”.45 Beitz sees this 
development as a watershed moment in the broader history of international 
humanitarian action. The relationship between humanitarianism and human rights 
is an extremely complex one, not least because both ideas defy (in similar ways), 
simple categorisation. In his recent study of human rights Beitz concludes that: 
 
the idea of a human right is not best understood as a fundamental moral 
idea in the way that some people conceive of ‘natural’ or ‘fundamental’ 
rights. Human rights operate at a middle level of practical reasoning, serving 
to consolidate and bring to bear several kinds of reason for action. Their 
normative content is to some extent open-ended and their application is 
frequently contested.46 
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On this account, then, human rights perform a similar function to the one so far 
described for humanitarianism as a whole in this thesis, negotiating, summarising 
and integrating disparate but related concerns. They provide a moral vernacular 
with which to negotiate claims. 47 The key potential value-added of human rights 
over other brands of humanitarianism is the central position of the rights-holder or 
rights-bearer in any human rights discussion.48 There is of course much 
disagreement over the best way to ground and articulate rights at a fundamental 
level, as Beitz indicates, but a shared aim is to give the rights-bearer a privileged 
position: using the language of human rights, they can legitimately, and loudly, 
voice a demand and identify a violation that, when human rights are working, 
should entail ethical, political and legal consequences. Now, as Beitz suggests, those 
may well be contested, but at least it should ensure a status for the object of the 
violation in the discussion beyond simply that of passive victim. If only at a 
discursive level, it should provide a modicum of empowerment in advance with 
regard to the content of the universal human right at stake. There is much debate 
over whether it is appropriate to conceptualise human rights as entitlements, but at 
the very least they should be recognised as entitlements to articulate and decry a 
violation or a right, and a failure of human rights responsibility should remedy prove 
elusive. The key point is that a right is precisely non-contingent, at least in theory. It 
creates a voice that should not be silenced. 
 This potential is now backed up by a substantial international human rights 
regime. The idea of universal human rights emerged and developed in international 
political life as a succession of humanitarian projects, as particular crystallisations of 
humanitarian concern, and as political responses to expanding notions of who 
counts as human. But perhaps the key moment in the emergence of human rights 
as a linchpin concept that should sustain an international political regime came in 
the immediate aftermath of the Second World War.49 Revelations about the full 
horrific extent of Nazi atrocities led to a typically humanitarian negative articulation 
in response to suffering: “never again”. The UN Charter contained some very 
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generalised human rights provisions. By 1948 two key documents emerged, the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of Genocide.50 These were followed by the International Covenants on 
Civil and Political Rights and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (both entered into 
force in 1976), the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (1969), the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of 
Discrimination against Women (1981), the Convention against Torture and other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1987) and the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child (1990).51 
 By the 1990s, it had thus become possible to articulate the vast majority of 
the suffering with which professional humanitarians were concerned in terms of the 
now complex and extensive language of human rights. Firstly, it had very clearly 
become the dominant vernacular to express international humanitarian concern. 
Secondly, instead of the perfect, perpetrator-less crime of a “humanitarian crisis”, 
human rights promised to provide a description of events in terms of specific 
failures of political responsibility, just as professional humanitarians were becoming 
disillusioned with constant palliation, and aware of the harm that even an 
apparently “do no harm” approach could entail, such as Tony Vaux experienced in 
Sudan where “providing a few sacks of food was virtually the same as providing a 
Kalashnikov rifle. They could be exchanged for each other within hours of 
delivery”.52 Most importantly, human rights represented the most ambitious 
attempt to create accountability for suffering in various forms. 
 For professional humanitarians, the dilemma became one of how to situate 
themselves in relation to the question of political responsibility with regard to 
human rights violations: as radically distinct, or, increasingly, as part of the 
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international human rights regime, with all the questions that raises about what 
responsibilities are being acquired. With the continued prominence of human 
“rights talk”, the terms of this dilemma became more and more ambiguous.53 While 
it is not possible to offer any kind of definitive resolution to the question here, I will 
set out the considerations on either side of this dilemma, before looking at the 
issues in a more applied way in the context of military humanitarian intervention. 
 For many humanitarians, it has become important to preserve a strong 
conceptual distinction between humanitarianism and human rights, along the lines 
of humanitarian action being about an apolitical, neutral, impartial provision of 
relief, and human rights being a politico-legal contract between individuals and 
their states or, at a stretch, various articulations of that nebulous entity, “the 
international community”. 
 To be clear from the outset, there are four clear limits to maintaining an 
impermeable practical or conceptual distinction between human rights and 
humanitarianism, all of which have already been discussed in this thesis. The first is 
simply the sheer power of human rights as a contemporary vocabulary to articulate 
the unacceptable, along the lines explored in Chapter 2. Though “human wrongs” 
may, as Ken Booth suggest, be even more powerful agreed framings, rights have 
worked themselves into the very fabric of the language in which humanitarian 
concern is expressed.54 Yet they retain much of the contingency of humanitarian 
concern as set out in earlier chapters. As Lynn Hunt puts it: 
 
Human rights are difficult to pin down because their definition, indeed their 
very existence, depends on emotions as much as on reason. The claim of 
self-evidence relies ultimately on an emotional appeal; it is convincing if it 
strikes a chord within each person. Moreover, we are most certain that a 
human right is at issue when we feel horrified by its violation.55 
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The second, related point is to recall the historical context. It is important to 
remember that accounts of universal human rights have largely come about as 
humanitarian projects. They represent instances where the contingent, 
discretionary character of a humanitarian ambition, such as eradicating slavery has, 
on paper at least, been overcome. Yet they remain, to the extent that they are 
sustained and advocated for by others, humanitarian projects. Even in that temple 
of human rights, Amnesty International, it seems that rights, stripped of their 
humanitarian hinterland, are inadequate to describe a sustained commitment to 
human rights. In his study of Amnesty, Stephen Hopgood notes that in referring to 
“the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), it did not do so as 
foundation but as corroboration”.56  
 The third, is that, as the first section made clear, even a limited account of 
humanitarian action comes up, by virtue of the discretionary nature of a 
humanitarianism not based on rights, against serious problems of unaccountability 
that undermine the force of its declared principles. 
 The fourth is that a clear distinction relies on an unsustainable humanitarian 
pretence of detachment from politics. This may represent a principled 
independence from particular political actors, such as states (as will be discussed in 
the next chapter), but it is not sustainable in the contemporary, highly organised 
and institutionalised engagement of professional humanitarianism with contexts in 
which human rights are at issue. This is especially true when emergencies are 
institutionalised.57 For example, UNRWA, technically a humanitarian rather than 
human rights actor, could never plausibly claim to have nothing to do with the 
human rights of several generations of Palestinians who have lived in its camps. As 
de Waal notes: 
 
In politics, humanitarian action is paradigmatically regarded as a state of 
exception — it takes place beyond politics. In this sense, humanitarianism is 
seen as a moment at which history is suspended and pure humanity is 
briefly in focus. This is a necessary fiction for the humanitarian enterprise, 
                                                           
56 Hopgood, Keepers of the Flame, 9. 
57 This also relates back to Van Brabant’s point in the previous section about the 
importance of the social contract inherent in such relationships. 
 171 
 
but as emergencies become prolonged, it is a pretence that becomes harder 
to uphold.58 
 
As such, human rights might appear to represent the best available version of 
humanitarian politics, one that humanitarians should embrace. However, there are 
good reasons why professional humanitarians should be wary of defining 
themselves by working backwards from accounts of universal human rights. Firstly, 
there are some good practical reasons for this caution, to do with enabling a degree 
of humanitarian space in difficult contexts: it may well be more expedient to agree 
that a child is starving, than to agree that the child’s human right not to starve has 
been violated by a particular agent, not least when that agent controls access to the 
child. This is where David Rieff’s “bed for the night” is at its most plausible: buy 
some time, keep the child alive while other, appropriate agents sort out the politics 
of the situation. Professional humanitarians should guard against the danger that in 
trying to do too much, they will end up doing nothing well. Rieff notes that “for all 
the talk of human rights, the imperative for most NGOs that want to remain 
operational is to cooperate with murderers and torturers. They have to do so to 
help the victims, and, quite rightly they hate it”.59 
 Furthermore, in grey areas of human rights practice, a clearer account of 
humanitarianism, not exclusively based on human rights, might be possible. The 
biggest example of this is of course war, in which humanitarian responsibilities are 
much more clearly codified in IHL than human rights responsibilities (though these 
are present, albeit to a lesser extent). A second example is International Refugee 
Law, which in a sense represents the institutionalised recognition of the past, 
current and future failures of International Human Rights Law: it comes into play 
when people lose their “right to have rights”, to borrow Arendt’s famous phrase.60 
 Another interesting tension is illustrated by the debate over slave 
redemption among abolitionists. Slave redemption is the practice of buying and 
then freeing a slave, and is still a point of contention in areas where slavery of 
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different kinds persists. A high profile example was given by the New York Times 
journalist Nicholas Kristof in 2004, who purchased and liberated two women 
enslaved in a Cambodian brothel. In relation to Sudan in the 1990s, Christian 
groups, including Christian Solidarity International, fundraised to free Christian 
Dinkas from the South enslaved in the Muslim North. But UNICEF and Human Rights 
Watch became heavily critical of the practice of slave redemption. Redemption was 
driving up the price of slaves, creating incentives for slavers to enslave more 
people.61 Margaret Kellow shows that these reproduce debates in nineteenth 
century American abolitionism.62 
 Moreover, it is perfectly possible to articulate serious humanitarian concerns 
and projects that are not best served by elision with human rights. For instance, at 
the heart of human rights practice is the possibility of recognising specific violations, 
either negative or positive. There needs to be a high degree of specificity about 
whose rights are the subject of violation, whether they be the rights of an individual 
or a group, and ideally, whose responsibility is at issue. An important contemporary 
example of the problem this poses, and the danger of effecting a complete elision, 
is the current attempt to formalise widespread humanitarian concern with climate 
change with a specific project of human rights. An increasingly popular way of 
thinking about the issue is to create some kind of accountability mechanism by 
assigning a “human right to a green future”.63 This seems like a vastly more abstract 
and obtuse way of conceptualising a problem that can be captured in broader 
humanitarian language, relatively simply: that is, that anthropogenic climate change 
represents, in the terms set out in Chapter 2, a serious humanitarian crisis in the 
sense of an urgent “crisis of humanity” that radically questions the underpinnings of 
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a common humanity. I will return in more detail to this topic in the concluding 
chapter. 
 While there is very significant conceptual overlap inherent in the practice of 
humanitarianism and the practice of human rights, a further caveat should be 
noted, which in fact relates to the perceived strength of human rights for 
humanitarians in search of greater accountability. The concerns summarised by 
humanitarianism are necessarily other-regarding. To express humanitarian concern 
does not imply pure altruism, as we have seen, and can often productively interact 
both with our sense of self and our sense of self-interest. However, the object of 
humanitarian concern is necessarily different from the subject.  In contrast, human 
rights summarise both other-regarding, humanitarian concerns and self-regarding 
concerns. I cannot conduct a humanitarian campaign on my own behalf, but I can 
advocate for my own human rights. Indeed, there is a strong argument, which we 
can find in both John Stuart Mill and Michael Walzer, that the political gains of 
human rights protection are strongest when they represent the result of concerted 
struggle. Marie-Bénédicte Dembour  has recently characterised this perspective as 
the “protest” school of thought.64 
 Here we approach the idea that human rights may be most effective when, 
at least collectively, they become a self-help mechanism. If it is the case, as I have 
argued, that an important way to understand human rights is as the crystallisation 
of humanitarian impulses, and therefore as an important humanitarian project, it 
must nevertheless be recognised that this is by no means the only, nor perhaps the 
most important source of actually-existing human rights. The other dynamic in play 
is the process through which people, and peoples, have struggled to take power 
from the grasp of rulers in the form of rights.65 In doing so, they have frequently 
seized upon the vocabulary of universal human rights to do so. So though universal 
human rights may represent a language formulated amidst the concern for the 
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suffering of others, their embodiment in laws and practices owes much to struggles 
driven by self-help. Moreover, there is no guarantee that human rights can 
represent a stable summary of self-regarding and other-regarding concerns. There 
is no necessary reason for them to always pull in the same direction. 
 While humanitarianism may give voice to a project like human rights, one of 
its potential hubristic excesses is of seeing itself as the sole vehicle through which it 
might come into being. The important point here is not to effect an ultimate 
decoupling of human rights and humanitarianism. Such an endeavour would be vain 
as they, at least in part, issue from the same source, and share a common history. 66 
Rather it is to recognise the inherent complexity of the idea of “action” within 
humanitarianism, which can never be reduced to a single set of agents or acts. 
 This relates to the problem of enforcement, one of the strongest arguments 
against collapsing humanitarianism and human rights together. As Lynn Hunt pithily 
puts it, human rights are “easier to endorse than to enforce”.67 The international 
protection of human rights, as we will see with the humanitarian intervention 
example in the next section, is a highly imperfect science. We might well identify 
greater success in terms of longer-term normative change, and this goes back to the 
point that human rights may be most effective when they become integrated into 
the texture of people’s lives: a local vernacular and not just a kind of moral 
Esperanto. But humanitarianism, understood more broadly, preserves the 
possibility of acting in the last resort, where human rights structures fail or are 
absent. In these cases, it is not clear that we can plausibly create an infinite chain of 
human rights responsibility. Recent scholarship is finding new and creative ways to 
conceptualise human rights responsibility for non-state actors.68 But states clearly 
represent the central bearers of human rights responsibility, for good reasons that 
will be returned to in the next chapter. Furthermore, it is not clear that it is either 
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possible or desirable to create a system in which, in response to a human rights 
violation, another bearer of human rights responsibility can always be found or 
assigned. Perhaps we need to recognise that, in the last resort, we might have to 
return to the presumptions of rescue, examined in the previous chapter. 
 In sum, human rights may be the dominant humanitarian project of our 
time, but conceptually, humanitarianism must always remain the broader category. 
On a commonsense level, the statement “humanitarianism is a human rights 
project” just does not ring true (although, as I suggested in Chapter 1, international 
political theory often comes close to making just such a claim). The clear upshot 
here is that human rights cannot resolve the contingencies of humanitarian action, 
precisely because the latter frequently comes into play where the former ends or 
fails. These issues will now be explored further in the context of the controversial 
practice of military humanitarian intervention. 
 
III Humanitarian Intervention: Contingency Laid Bare 
 
The question of military humanitarian intervention builds in a particularly 
interesting way on the issues raised in the discussion of humanitarian accountability 
and human rights, while bringing out all of the ambiguities inherent in the idea of 
rescue. As I noted in Chapter 1, the subject of humanitarian intervention has been 
examined in great detail by international political theory, as well as in other areas of 
international relations theory and international legal theory.69 I shall not reproduce 
all these discussions here, as I have already implicitly addressed the central points 
of debate such as thresholds of suffering (Chapter 2), the relationship between 
motives, intentions and consequences and the problem of humanitarian violence 
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(both in Chapter 4). Instead, I will consider the practice in the way it illustrates the 
twin impossibility for professional humanitarians of ring-fencing their practice to 
exclude the possibility of humanitarian intervention, and of using the language of 
universal human rights as a means to overcome their own unaccountability, I will 
then assess the potential of the emergent notion of a “Responsibility to Protect” to 
do a better job of resolving this tension, before, in the next section, asking, in the 
context of debates on global justice whether in fact the limited scope of 
responsibility in question is the problem, as far as resolving the contingencies of 
humanitarian action is concerned. 
 David Rieff remarks that “human rights interventions” would be a less 
misleading term for what we commonly term “humanitarian interventions”.70 
Though I will continue with the common term “humanitarian intervention”, Rieff 
reminds us of one of the reasons why humanitarian intervention is controversial 
within professional humanitarianism: that recent discussions of humanitarian 
intervention have taken place on the grounds of human rights protection rather 
than more diffuse conceptions of human suffering. The concept currently functions 
in relation to the protection of human rights, and substantial sections of 
professional humanitarianism see their own task differently. As such, humanitarian 
intervention has been the linchpin of discussions over how far humanitarianism 
should define itself in terms of human rights, and follow the logic of human rights, 
should that logic dictate military intervention. Chris Brown makes clear that there 
can be no beating around the bush. When it comes down to it, “effective 
humanitarian intervention is an act of power”.71 As such, the issue goes to the heart 
of professional humanitarians’ reluctance to see themselves as powerful actors, or 
to see powerful actors as humanitarian. 
 Rieff notes that, “[like] most humanitarians I have known, I am not a 
pacifist”, going on to make the case for military intervention and protectorates in 
certain extreme cases.72 He maintains that “to argue for military intervention on 
political grounds … is not the same thing as arguing for military intervention on 
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humanitarian grounds. For me, that will always be a contradiction in terms. It is a 
perversion of humanitarianism, which is neutral or it is nothing.”73 As should now 
be clear, though, this justification is ultimately untenable, as I have demonstrated 
that “humanitarian grounds” necessarily represent a vision of politics, and the 
“political grounds” acceptable from a humanitarian perspective will precisely be 
those that plausibly represent a politics of humanity. Moreover, as we saw in the 
previous chapter, the use of violent means cannot a priori be excluded entirely from 
the category of humanitarianism, as some potential exclusions might cause us to 
lose faith with our own sense of humanity. When conflict rages precisely over the 
content of common humanity, there is no neutral ground for humanitarians 
 The real issue then becomes one of whether human rights, if they are 
sometimes, in the breach, justification for military intervention, can be isolated 
from other humanitarian concerns. That is, do they represent different, legitimate, 
political grounds, from the political grounds on which professional humanitarians 
act? Again, it is hard to see how this case can now be maintained, as professional 
humanitarians want to use the claim that “you can’t stop a genocide with doctors”, 
as a means to make other political actors face up to their responsibilities.74 In 
making such a call, they effectively become part of the human rights regime, 
because it is hard to see, in relation to this issue, how the advocacy of an MSF in 
asserting its moral authority differs qualitatively from that of Amnesty or Human 
Rights Watch. Any call for political responsibility to take the form of military 
reaction to human rights abuses necessarily conceptualises it as acceptable (in 
response to the unacceptable) in a similar way that the action professional 
humanitarians can offer is acceptable or appropriate. That is, it is acceptable on 
humanitarian terms, and the potential of humanitarian intervention to honour 
human rights adds coherence to professional humanitarians’ response to suffering. 
It addresses the danger of humanitarianism getting into the self-undermining 
position of having less and less to say, the worse the crime against humanity at 
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stake, when humanitarianism is precisely the context in which we are supposed to 
articulate our response to inhumanity. 
 Christopher Coker reveals interesting assumptions, which are worth brief 
exploration, about the problem-solving predisposition of humanitarianism and 
about the timeframe in which humanitarian action following on from that response 
to inhumanity is expected to take place.  
 
Our humanism also rests not as it did in the past on the redemption of 
humanity over time (the purported “end of history”). It rests on “real time”. 
Our age is intensely self-referential. Increasingly we experience events 
without the need for historical perspective that characterized the past. We 
are not products of a grand narrative; instead, we have become our own 
source or object of reflection. Accordingly, our achievements are no longer 
directed at the future. Few of us are much interested in the opinion of the 
next generation. Few if any look to posterity for their reward. Instead, we 
demand immediate recognition. Most of our popular heroes are disinclined 
to postpone the results of their efforts beyond their own personal existence. 
Humane wars are likewise predicated on the belief that martyrdom is 
illegitimate unless freely chosen; that the martyr should no longer be 
expected to bear witness to the future. The victims of history should be 
avenged at the time.75 
 
This statement about humanism seems particularly true of contemporary 
humanitarianism, which demands practical responses and resolutions in the here 
and now, and privileges them over, say, post-facto acts of memorialisation. 
Common humanity must be defended now, and defence may imply an army. There 
are good reasons for this, as we have seen, to do with the desire to stop cruelty and 
suffering. But Coker’s point reveals the magnitude of the task of replacing grand 
narratives with the grand ambition of redeeming humanity in real time, and 
suggests that the task, when it comes to humanitarian intervention as a redemptive 
practice, may be a Sisyphean one. 
 Once enacted, humanitarian intervention brings home with force the 
contingency of even a humanitarianism that takes human rights seriously. The 
paradox to emerge here is that the attempt to establish a humanitarianism based 
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on the protection of human rights led to some of the most unaccountable 
humanitarian action yet. Though professional humanitarians have pursued human 
rights as a vocabulary both to hold the perpetrators of suffering to account, and to 
grudgingly accept that in carrying out humanitarian action they might need holding 
to account themselves as increasingly powerful actors, the ultimate expression of 
this, humanitarian intervention, is profoundly unaccountable, for reasons that 
cannot be reduced to the popular claim that it is always merely a front for self-
interested power politics. 
 The first set of problems here are practical. As much as we might like to 
describe war euphemistically, employing terms like “collateral damage”, 
immaculate war is as unlikely a concept as the immaculate conception: hands are 
always dirtied in the process. Judith Shklar reminds us that “war works in favour of 
the strong and against the interests of the weak”.76 The fact that none of the legal 
institutionalisations of the humanitarian impulse that deal with the conduct of war 
are strictly part of International Human Rights Law is an indication of the practical 
tension here: even the neatest, tidiest war is unlikely to fully respect the human 
rights of those whose lives are radically disrupted, although of course in the 
contexts in which humanitarian intervention is discussed this might represent an 
improvement. But however well-intentioned, invading armies are rarely easily held 
accountable in a battlefield context. There are of course accountability mechanisms 
in place, both internal to those actors, such as military tribunals, and external, such 
as war crimes trials. But these are defined not just by the victim (or the victor) but, 
as Gerry Simpson makes clear, by a complex interaction of different political 
relationships.77 
 There can also be wider processes of accountability, but they tend to reach 
upwards, back to the political leadership or political community that has usually 
asked them to risk their lives. If democratic states are the ones carrying out 
humanitarian interventions, then at least the military force used will be of paid 
volunteers rather than conscripts. Here we might recall the ICRC principle of 
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voluntary service. Indeed, there have been calls for a voluntary UN army, but at the 
present this seems fanciful to say the least, and in any case would not guard against 
the kind of abuses that UN peacekeepers have been guilty of.78 The best that can 
currently be hoped for are volunteer soldiers from democratic states, but even in 
this case, the accountability of a soldier asked to die for his country in the name of 
humanity is at several removes from the likely victims of excesses he might commit. 
 This links to the issue of where humanitarian intervention sits in relation to 
human rights violations, and what it is supposed to deliver: an end to the killing, 
peace, justice or punishment?79 Does humanitarian intervention represent the 
failure, or success of human rights? Success in the sense of an ability to summon 
armies, failure because war is the worst way to honour human rights. Arguably 
humanitarian intervention exists in a liminal space at the edge of human rights 
protection, where the enforcement of the international human rights regime 
reaches its end, and yields once again to the contingencies of rescue. Clearly, this is 
a terrain that only humanitarianism as a concept can fully accommodate, and as 
such, has to acknowledge the possibility of. If humanitarian intervention is the 
human rights regime working, then professional humanitarians must find it difficult 
to detach themselves from seeing that end as desirable. If humanitarian 
intervention is the human rights regime failing, what else but humanitarianism can 
provide a vocabulary to articulate a last resort act of rescue in defence of common 
humanity? 
 These tensions were well summarised by the Independent International 
Commission on Kosovo’s famous description of the NATO intervention as illegal but 
legitimate.80 This put the intervening states, and those who supported them, 
including many NGOs, in the position of acting both irresponsibly, and therefore 
unaccountably, in legal terms, but responsibly in broader humanitarian terms. This 
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cognitive dissonance led to a new attempt at resolution: the Responsibility to 
Protect (R2P). 
 R2P, the product of a high-level commission featuring many of the key 
protagonists of the 1990s debates on humanitarian intervention, linked them to 
ongoing debates on how to reconceptualise sovereignty to resolve the tension 
between sovereignty norms and human rights norms, through notions such as 
Francis Deng’s “sovereignty as responsibility”.81 It created a framework in which, for 
the worst “mass atrocity crimes”, there would always be a responsible agent: in the 
first instance the host state, and if unwilling or unable to fulfil its responsibilities, 
the wider community of states, led by the UN Security Council. Responsibility here 
is conceived of across three parameters: preventing, reacting and rebuilding. A 
watered-down version of R2P was endorsed by the 2005 UN World Summit. 
 Since then there has been much debate on what R2P represents. In the 
absence of new international legal obligations, it is at best a doctrine. But a doctrine 
implies a consistent impact on the shape of international policy-making, which is as 
yet difficult to detect. Alex Bellamy, who has been providing almost real-time 
academic comment on the evolution of R2P, recently concluded that as 
 
indeterminacy makes it unlikely that RtoP will act in the near future as a 
catalyst for international action in response to genocide and mass atrocities, 
it seems reasonable to argue that the most prudent path is to view the 
principle as a policy agenda in need of implementation rather than as a ‘‘red 
flag’’ to galvanize the world into action.82 
 
That is, it provides no shortcut to professional humanitarians in search of reliable, 
consistent action, and a robust internationalised responsibility for mass atrocity 
crimes. R2P offers a change, and perhaps a useful one, in vocabulary, but it does not 
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alter the fundamental problem that faced those professional humanitarians who 
denounced the failure of the West to engage with the Rwandan Genocide in 1994: 
how to generate political will to intervene? Professional humanitarians cannot a 
priori detach themselves from full involvement in this conversation (although some 
organisations may wish to for operational reasons). We are returned to questions of 
how to mobilise the humanitarian impulse and how best to situate this effort in 
contemporary international politics. A plea for an internationalist perspective of 
humanitarian politics will be the subject of the next chapter. 
 But before engaging in that discussion, it is worth considering the other big 
conceptual vocabulary through which humanitarians attempt to avoid contingency 
and unaccountability: the language of justice. 
 
IV Global Justice and the Recognition of Injustice 
 
A more comprehensive, and ambitious, attempt to address human wrongs, than the 
mass atrocity crimes at the centre of R2P, are contemporary projects of global 
justice, which also make the most demanding claims about how common humanity 
is best protected by a comprehensive global scheme of duties of justice. On this 
view, the focus on mass atrocity crimes ignores the crushing everyday poverty in 
which billions live, and should not monopolise humanitarian concern. 
 As with human rights, the question is whether humanitarianism as a project 
should embrace the pursuit of justice, as a way of escaping the contingencies of 
charity. As with human rights, justice is a vocabulary that humanitarians draw upon 
in making claims about the truth of a situation, and the need to hold those 
responsible to account.83 Rather than delve too deep into the intricacies of different 
global justice theories, I would like to situate humanitarianism in relation to the 
project of fixing global duties of justice to account for unacceptable suffering. As 
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with human rights, we will see that injustice creates a space that demands a 
broader account of humanitarianism in response to the question: when justice is 
not done, can nothing be done? 
 In setting humanitarianism against the work being done in international 
political theory on justice, and in particular against the global justice projects 
advocated by cosmopolitan theorists, we come up against an initial conundrum: 
humanitarianism is often thought of as a cosmopolitan category, yet many 
cosmopolitan thinkers see humanitarianism as profoundly unsatisfactory, because 
relying on the contingencies of charity or philanthropy, rather than generating, or 
serving,  an account of justice. So, many accounts begin by contrasting what we owe 
to each other as a matter of justice, with what we might offer out of charity, 
compassion or “mere” humanity.84 There is an initial contrast between justice and 
humanitarianism that, on the account given so far of humanitarianism, represents a 
category error, in the sense that the concern of global justice theorists to formulate 
principles of justice to do away with unnecessary suffering is in almost every case a 
humanitarian concern. The starting assumptions, such as that the child drowning in 
the pond offends our basic humanity, are, in a relatively trivial sense, clearly 
humanitarian.85 Brian Barry relates this assumption to “duties of humanity”.86 So 
too are the moral awakenings that these theorists sometimes describe. For 
instance, Thomas Pogge links his to finding out about the Holocaust when a child in 
Germany: “My discovery of the Nazi crimes was the experience that I had 
misunderstood the world – completely”.87 Pogge then describes a process of 
questioning and rebuilding his moral universe from this negative moment, in a 
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similar manner to those explored in Chapter 2 in the context of “crises of 
humanity”. 
 But putting this aside, the key point here is the distinction between charity 
and justice, which is often identified by humanitarians and cosmopolitans alike as a 
crucial distinction. For instance, David Forsythe quotes Jean Pictet: "One cannot at 
the same time serve justice and charity. It is necessary to choose. The Red Cross, for 
a long time, has chosen charity."88 Should professional humanitarians choose the 
best global justice theory going and devote all their energies to bringing it about? 
For a number of reasons, I argue that the distinction between charity and justice 
presents us with a false choice.  
 Firstly, as I argued in Chapter 3, the discretionary, partial choices we make 
can be vitally important in generating more humane visions of justice. Until it is 
institutionalised as non-discretionary, action is necessarily discretionary. Those who 
act on a discretionary basis frequently feel bound by a sense of justice, and of the 
just way to act, in the absence of an institutionally perfect world. Even Peter Singer 
has to give “to charity” to make his material impact on the world, as indeed he 
does, in impressive amounts.89 Of course, Singer does not accept the discretionary 
nature of the obligation he is acting upon. But would he then require an act of 
charity, defined as opposed to an act of justice, to be one that was understood at an 
individual level as entirely discretionary? As a strict consequentialist, that would 
place him in a rather curious position of caring about precise motivations. 
 But behind this all there is also once again the sense that starting from an 
impartial perspective with a concern for humanity at its heart, will yield a better 
account of justice. This may be true to some extent at any given point in time, but it 
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neglects the historical process through which the abstract, impartial human at the 
centre of the theory is formed. If we now have theories of global justice that can 
make a good case for improving the life chances of women, that is in large part 
because of the struggle of feminists. Few today would want to live under 
nineteenth century conditions of social justice. The fact that such projects are no 
longer on the table is not just through the refinement of our obligations of justice, 
but because discretionary action has built up a broader sense of the demands of 
human solidarity. 
 The key point here, though, comes with the critique made recently by 
Amartya Sen, drawing on social choice theory, of the dominant Rawlsian mode of 
theorising justice, what he calls the transcendental approach. For Sen,  
 
Even if we think of transcendence not in the gradeless terms of ‘right’ social 
arrangements, but in the graded terms of the ‘best’ social arrangements, the 
identification of the best does not, in itself, tell us much about the full 
grading, such as how to compare two non-best alternatives, nor does it 
specify a unique ranking with respect to which the best stands at the 
pinnacle; indeed, the same best may go with a great many different rankings 
at the same pinnacle.90 
  
This has radical implications for justice, especially in so far as it applies to thinking 
about humanitarian action, which by definition takes place under less than ideal 
conditions. Sen goes further, arguing that we neither need the best to rank non-
best alternatives, nor do our rankings yield a “best”. What is central, for Sen, as a 
starting point, is the “identification of redressable injustice”.91 He considers “that 
we can have a strong sense of injustice on many different grounds, and yet not 
agree on one particular ground as being the dominant reason for diagnosis of 
injustice”.92  
 
When Condorcet and Smith argued that the abolition of slavery would make 
the world far less unjust, they were asserting the possibility of ranking the 
world with and without slavery, in favour of the latter, that is, showing the 
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superiority – and greater justice – of a world without slavery. In asserting 
such a conclusion they were not also making the further claim that all the 
alternatives that can be generated by variations of institutions and policies 
can be fully ranked against each other. Slavery as an institution can be 
assessed without evaluating – with the same definitiveness – all the other 
institutional choices the world faces. We do not live in an ‘all or nothing 
world’.93 
 
Judith Shklar, in her The Faces of Injustice, makes a strong case for bringing injustice 
into focus as a central consideration in political theory, and it is her description of “a 
sense of injustice” that will bring the issues so far explored in this chapter into 
focus, and provide a bridge to the more normative turn of the final chapters. 
 For Shklar, injustice, which she contrasts (although she argues that the 
distinction is slippery) with misfortune, is consistently neglected in discussions of 
justice. She uses the example of John Stuart Mill, but her point would hold for most 
theories of justice mentioned above. She argues that theorists such as Mill generally 
begin with the intuition that justice can best be defined by its opposite, and then 
briefly sketch an account of injustice. In Mill’s case, the concern is with injustices 
such as violating laws, breaking promises, rejecting valid claims or punishing 
crimes.94 Shklar suggests that such sketches merely represent a negative image of 
the theory of justice at issue, that the real concern is “to show why justice is binding 
upon us and why it is the first of the social virtues”. Her view is that “injustice 
should not be treated intellectually as a hasty preliminary to the analysis of 
justice”.95 
 This kind of beginning is recognisable in the writing of global social justice 
theorists. For instance, it is frequently employed by Thomas Pogge. To take one 
example, he introduces a major symposium on his work with the following 
paragraph: 
 
Despite a high and growing global average income, billions of human beings 
are still condemned to life-long severe poverty, with all its attendant evils of 
low life expectancy, social exclusion, ill health, illiteracy, dependency, and 
                                                           
93 Ibid., 398. 
94 Shklar, The Faces of Injustice, 18-19. 
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effective enslavement. The annual death toll from poverty-related causes is 
around 18 million, or one-third of all human deaths, which adds up to 
approximately 270 million deaths since the end of the Cold War.96 
 
Arguably, Pogge goes to far greater lengths in his work than most to take injustice 
seriously, in the sense that he always takes pains to demonstrate that such 
appalling states of affairs represent the perpetuation of ongoing, active injustices, 
rather than unredressable misfortunes. He then sets out his grand project of 
institutional reform.97 
 But his project is still characterised by the view that injustice is best 
conceived of as opposed to a “best” vision of justice to work towards. Again, he is 
more careful than most to suggest workable proposals to move towards that ideal, 
and grounds his account on empirical data. But arguably this approach falls prey to 
the critiques of both Sen and Shklar. 
 In the first place, by designating a “best” and the route towards it, his 
account depends entirely on an empirical story that may not prove to be robust. 
Indeed, it is arguably undermined by the work of development economists like Paul 
Collier who characterise the causes of extreme poverty in a more complex and 
plural way than Pogge’s grand narrative allows.98 Pogge’s transcendental 
institutionalism does not really allow him the space to gather Sen’s “strong sense of 
injustice on many different grounds”, and build from that through a comparative 
process of public reasoning. Pogge does give us several grounds for injustice, but 
they all point in the same direction, towards a possible resolution through the 
development of cosmopolitan duties of justice, and continued inhumanity in their 
absence. 
 In fact, as Thomas Nagel points out in response to Pogge’s case in World 
Poverty and Human Rights: “[the] facts are so grim that justice may be a side issue. 
Whatever view one takes of the applicability or inapplicability of standards of justice 
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to such a situation, it is clearly a disaster from a more broadly humanitarian point of 
view.”99 Nagel brings the question back to the issue of empathy discussed earlier in 
this thesis. “The normative force of the most basic human rights against violence, 
enslavement, and coercion, and of the most basic humanitarian duties of rescue 
from immediate danger, depends only on our capacity to put ourselves in other 
people’s shoes.”100 The extent of disagreement over what constitutes justice 
between global justice theorists and their liberal critics has largely hidden the 
broader humanitarian concern they all share, and a broad extent of agreement on 
basic, visceral injustices. It would be absurd to minimise the force of the 
humanitarian vision underpinning Rawls’ work, say. For instance it is easy to neglect 
how transformative his duty of assistance to burdened societies would be if fully 
implemented, and interesting to note that it actually proves a rather better fit with 
the kind of empirical work done by scholars like Collier and, especially, Sen on 
whose work Rawls in fact draws in his account.101 Richard Shapcott also makes the 
point that Rawlsian cosmopolitans display a tendency to reduce “all questions of 
ethics to those of justice”.102 
 Shklar’s injunction to take injustice seriously adds another dimension to the 
question, in that it recognises that justice and a sense of injustice do not quite sit in 
opposition to each other. For instance, a sense of injustice might conceivably be 
sated by revenge, which could not plausibly be accommodated within a conception 
of justice.103 Moreover, Shklar gives the example of the case of Bardell v. Pickwick in 
The Pickwick Papers to show how a misunderstanding between Mr. Pickwick and 
Mrs. Bardell leads to two conflicting, yet fully understandable senses of injustice. 
Any full resolution would require knowledge only accessible to the reader (or to a 
God, presumably).104 A focus on injustice demands that we give voice to the 
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aggrieved party. As such it is victim-centred. But it assumes no harmony of 
grievances among them. This is a particularly important point for humanitarianism, 
which deals with situations in which conflicts of genuine injustices are extremely 
likely. 
 Thus we cannot be confident that a vision of justice represents any kind of 
definitive resolution of injustice. With regard to legislative processes, Shklar writes 
that: “Every social change, every new law, every forced alteration of public rules is 
unjust to someone. The more drastic and sudden the change, the greater the 
grievances.”105 This links back to the point made earlier, that few of us would like to 
live under the blindfolded impartiality of a 19th century conception of social justice. 
In an interesting aside, Shklar notes that the figure of Justice in Giotto’s magnificent 
frescoes in the Scrovegni Chapel in Padua, is not yet blindfolded, as would later 
become the representational convention.106 We have already seen how impartiality 
does not truly capture how humanitarians mobilise concern. But need that mean 
they play no role in the formulation of how we understand justice? 
 In Chapter 3 I mentioned the view expressed by Luc Boltanski that a “politics 
of pity” should be replaced by a “politics of justice”. The work presented since 
suggests that the excesses of humanitarian action can often be traced back to an 
exclusive reliance on pity, or a total belief in justice. Rather than describe the scope 
of humanitarianism with reference to one or other theory of justice or rights, or rely 
on the sometimes degrading experience of pity, I propose that at its best, it might 
be properly described as a politics of injustice. For Shklar, “the sense of injustice is 
eminently political”, and injustice seems like a promising way to capture the 
politicisation involved in the humanitarian rejection of cruelty and inhumanity, and 
attempts to mobilise empathy and concern in response.107 We should not 
essentialise the role of injustice and obsessively try to identify an injustice on every 
occasion, for suffering worthy of humanitarian concern may result from misfortune. 
But we should merely recognise its importance in nourishing humanitarianism and 
in shaping our understanding of common humanity, and prompting us to listen to 
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the voice of the victim of injustice, rather than assume that our model of justice will 
fit. In acting in defence of common humanity, it remains possible that satisfactory 
acts of justice will be within our reach, or that pity will turn out to be our only 
resource, but seeking to enable an empathetic sense of injustice seems a more 
workable way to make sense of and act through the contingencies of humanitarian 
action. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has argued that we cannot find a resolution to the contingencies of 
humanitarian action, notably its unaccountability, in either human rights or global 
justice, but it has provided us with a useful way to account for our visceral sense of 
the unacceptable and the inhuman in a shared sense of injustice, as suggested by 
Judith Shklar, and in Amartya Sen’s useful shift from seeking transcendental 
resolution to problems of injustice, and looking for practical ways of making the 
world less unjust. A definitive sense of accountability remains elusive, largely 
because humanitarianism encompasses actions of last resort, and the moment of 
last resort is by definition an unaccountable one.  But, as Stein argues accountability 
“works best when it is used as an opportunity to widen the conversation about the 
politics, power, and ethics that define humanitarian space”.108 This prompts us to a 
serious engagement with the political context in which humanitarianism exists, the 
distinctive space it sees itself as occupying, and to suggest a way forward for 
articulating human solidarity as the continued development of a shared human 
identity. Such is the topic of the next chapter. 
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6. Humanitarian Identity and Internationalist Solidarity: 
Conducting the “Politics of Humanity” in a World of States 
 
At its most plausible, humanitarianism has always been more than a vapid plea for 
the world to become a nicer place. It is about practical engagement and a visceral 
response to injustice in a messy world. Yet professional humanitarians still try to 
ring-fence a separate, individuated sphere for themselves to act in, often through 
the concept of “humanitarian space”. Especially important to them is preserving 
independence from states. But the possibility of such a distinction seems dubious, 
especially in the context of contemporary professional humanitarianism. Craig 
Calhoun argues that “at the same time that humanitarian assistance has become an 
industry, it remains centrally a state project”.1 Barnett and Synder concur. “States 
have become central players in humanitarian action over the last twenty years.”2  
 Moreover, returning to the question of the scope of humanitarianism, it is 
by now clear that the “politics of humanity” characteristic of humanitarianism is 
always a kind of progressive politics. It is about the envisioning of a better world 
through the provision of solidarity. It represents a will towards that world, a gesture 
of creation. The humanitarian impulse, explored in Chapter 3, provides a good 
description of the intuition that underpins a broadly conceived progressive 
international politics of humanitarianism. Yet an understanding of the mechanisms 
of humanitarian solidarity alone cannot provide us with a full description of such a 
politics. We need to carve out a space in international political theory to 
contextualise that humanitarian concern. This chapter will suggest a broad 
theoretical context which might be useful in elaborating a clearer picture of how to 
operationalise more systematically our humanitarian solidarities. Furthermore, 
going back to the concerns expressed in the introduction regarding the rejection by 
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many professional humanitarians of the state, this chapter will seek to defend a 
vision of a progressive humanitarian politics in a world of states. That is, a world 
that resembles our own, and might be harnessed in the short rather than longer 
term to alleviate suffering. The suggested avenue for enquiry is an engagement with 
the internationalist tradition. This has recently been pointed to by Peter Lawler, 
who recommends a return to what he terms “classical” internationalism in asserting 
the potential of a “good state” against dominant cosmopolitan trends in 
international political theory.3 This chapter’s core argument is that internationalist 
thinking provides insight into how our solidarities are often layered in a way 
favourable to the nesting of the humanitarian impulse within a humanitarian 
internationalist politics. 
 The chapter proceeds in three parts. First, it debunks the last remaining 
potential claim of professional humanitarians to be apolitical, that is in the context 
of their relationship with the state, through an engagement with the key concept of 
humanitarian space. Second, it sets out the advantages of an internationalist 
perspective, defending the agency of states within humanitarianism, their ability to 
harness collective humanitarian understandings, and their advantages in being 
closer to the lived experience both of putative humanitarians and their putative 
objects of concern, than a strictly cosmopolitan perspective. Finally, it illustrates this 
case for a return to internationalist thinking via an engagement with the work of 
Michael Walzer, arguing that his work provides a good example of how 
humanitarian impulses can be situated within a realistic “phenomenology of the 
moral life” that sits comfortably with the workings of the humanitarian impulse 
explored in Chapter 3. 
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I Humanitarian Identity and Independence: Humanitarian Space and 
the State 
 
The chapters so far have argued that however we examine the ethical character of 
humanitarianism, we are always necessarily drawn back towards politics. Even the 
simplest act of rescue involves a complex, contingent and often highly 
presumptuous negotiation of different conceptions of suffering, humanitarian 
concern and appropriate action. This was seen to be ultimately a strength rather 
than a weakness in defining any conception of humanitarianism, as it fits rather well 
some of the fuzzy, less certain spaces within our international ethico-political space. 
Different crystallisations of the humanitarian impulse can represent different 
versions of humanitarian politics. Yet as we turn to the question of collective agency 
within humanitarianism, we are faced with the problem that, even among the 
sections of humanitarianism that are generally recognised to be more “political”, 
the label is still seen as a charge to be denied. Why is this move being made and 
what does it tell us? The argument here is that it is a device for distancing 
humanitarianism from the state, which obscures the different possibilities inherent 
in that relationship.4 To bring this out, let us return briefly to the same text 
examined at the beginning of Chapter 2, James Orbinski’s Nobel Lecture. 
 
Humanitarianism occurs where the political has failed or is in crisis. We act 
not to assume political responsibility, but firstly to relieve the inhuman 
suffering of failure. The act must be free of political influence, and the 
political must recognize its responsibility to ensure that the humanitarian 
can exist. Humanitarian action requires a framework in which to act.5 
 
Several key tropes can be detected here: the idea that an apolitical response to 
political failures is possible, the possibility of detachment from “political influence,” 
the requirement for a humanitarian space existing outside of politics, yet 
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guaranteed and maintained by politics. This begs the question of what Orbinski is 
really declaring independence from. 
 
We affirm the independence of the humanitarian from the political, but this 
is not to polarize the “good” NGO against “bad” governments, or the 
“virtue” of civil society against the “vice” of political power. Such a polemic 
is false and dangerous. As with slavery and welfare rights, history has shown 
that humanitarian preoccupations born in civil society have gained influence 
until they reach the political agenda. But these convergences should not 
mask the distinctions that exist between the political and the humanitarian. 
Humanitarian action takes place in the short term, for limited groups and for 
limited objectives. This is at the same time both its strength and its 
limitation. The political can only be conceived in the long term, which itself is 
the movement of societies. Humanitarian action is by definition universal, or 
it is not. Humanitarian responsibility has no frontiers. Wherever in the world 
there is manifest distress, the humanitarian by vocation must respond. By 
contrast, the political knows borders, and where crisis occurs, political 
response will vary because historical relations, balance of power, and the 
interests of one or the other must be considered.6 
 
This paragraph demonstrates clearly that in fact, Orbinski is equating politics with 
domestic and international state politics, and conceptualising civil society in 
opposition not just to the state, but to politics in general. This is a carefully crafted 
text, so why this equation? Perhaps the key lies in the requirement for unity and 
universality as preconditions for humanitarian action. An acknowledgement of the 
political dimension of humanitarianism would open the door for possible 
contestations of the universality of their conception of humanity, something that 
humanitarians in general are loath to accept. They still want to assert, rather than 
argue for, their vision of humanity, for they recognise that a privileged access to 
human identity lies at the heart of the power of humanitarian identity. This relates 
back to de Waal’s observation, encountered in the previous chapter, that a moment 
of “pure humanity” may be a “necessary fiction” of humanitarian action.7 So in 
displacing politics onto the state, Orbinski is attempting to ring-fence his account of 
a universal humanity. Yet this only makes sense if this kind of discourse has its 
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intended effect, of guaranteeing the humanitarian space it seeks. Arguably the door 
has long been opened. The horse has bolted. As we saw in Chapter 2, professional 
humanitarians frequently function in spaces and contexts in which no such 
guarantee is available. Indeed, in moments of “crisis of humanity”, it is the 
contestation of their putatively universal notion of humanity that precisely lies at 
the heart of the suffering with which they are engaged. 
 The key question then becomes: do humanitarians nevertheless still want to 
identify and ring-fence a distinct humanitarian space, which arguably involves 
collaboration with states anyway, as we will see, or to make all international 
political space more humanitarian? And if so, how best to conceptualise the politics 
of achieving that latter goal? 
 Humanitarian space is a vital trope in recent humanitarian discourse, and 
provides a useful focus for further elaboration of the themes outlined above. It 
serves to describe and ring-fence humanitarian action within an international 
context. For Hopgood, humanitarian identity is intimately intertwined with the 
concept, in the sense that “legitimacy comes from the idea of a humanitarian space 
bordered by neutrality, impartiality, and independence”.8 It can evoke many 
different types of space, rhetorical, physical, legal, political, ethical or functional. If 
we cannot define it outside of or against politics, we can still examine its distinctive 
elements within. 
 In a recent study of state fragility, the question was posed “of whether 
humanitarian space means primarily the space for humanitarian agencies to 
operate safely and effectively on the ground, or whether it relates to a wider social, 
political or geographical space within which human welfare is preserved and 
promoted”.9 The ICRC’s Johanna Grombach Wagner attributes the phrase 
“humanitarian space” itself to Rony Brauman, who defined it as “a space of 
freedom in which we are free to evaluate needs, free to monitor the distribution 
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and use of relief goods, and free to have a dialogue with the people”.10 OCHA, more 
narrowly, views it as a synonym of “humanitarian operating environment”.11 
Brauman’s definition is especially broad, giving humanitarians a privileged status to 
define the terms of debate, access and action.12 For actors such as CARE, who fully 
embrace a rights-based approach, the claim is even more ambitious: 
 
The mobilisation of an emergency response requires an operating 
environment that is conducive to the deployment of relief workers and 
supplies, managed in line with humanitarian principles of independence and 
impartiality. This operating environment is called humanitarian space. 
Humanitarian space refers to geographical space in which there is physical 
access to people in need, and institutional space in which positive social, 
political and military conditions (including security and immunity from 
attack) are ensured. This implies that aid agencies are free to assist 
populations in need, and are not constrained by political or physical barriers. 
For this to be the case, humanitarian agencies need to be free to make their 
own choices, based solely on the criteria of need. 
 Humanitarian space is also defined in terms of the rights of 
beneficiary populations to humanitarian assistance and protection. This 
definition grounds the concept in a rights-based approach, which implies 
that actors-including governments and warring parties-have obligations with 
respect to their right to assist and protect.13 
 
The claim has at times been even more transformative. In 1995, Weiss and Chopra 
posited that 
 
the identity of populations is also expanding beyond nationality to be all-
inclusive of the human species, irrespective of origin. This is the basis of a 
developing global humanitarian space, which is significantly eroding the 
distinction between concepts of "internal" and "external." Because 
humanitarian space is not linked to territory and transcends sovereign 
boundaries, it becomes increasingly difficult to speak of "intervention" 
within it. Consequently, humanitarian assistance shifts from being a 
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potential violation of sovereign rights to being a safeguard for fundamental 
human rights.14 
 
A decade and a half on, this seems like a breathtakingly utopian reading of the 
concept. In the meantime, anticipating somewhat the argument of the next section, 
we could ask ourselves whether we might not plausibly define a state that 
maintains a serious human rights framework within its borders as a rather 
impressive humanitarian space. Could Western liberal democracies then be the best 
examples yet of humanitarian space, and are professional humanitarians missing 
the wood for the trees here in looking for inspiration? 
 The issue here is: how do the various dimensions of humanitarian space 
relate to state and interstate space, and state and interstate agency? The next 
section will then examine the quality and appropriateness of state agency with 
respect to humanitarianism on the basis of the ways in which it is seen to intersect 
with humanitarian space. 
 In practice, of course, humanitarian space is first and foremost a matter of 
access, of being able to reach the object of humanitarian concern and provide relief. 
The simplest way to guarantee this is through belligerent consent, which often 
means the consent of states. Grombach Wagner points out that: 
 
No belligerent in their right mind would consent to the ICRC’s presence if 
they could not trust the organisation, or if they felt that the ICRC was being 
used to as a Trojan horse to promote the enemy’s wider political agenda, 
even if the perceived “enemy” is a properly mandated UN peacekeeping 
mission.15 
 
If avowedly-political humanitarians endorse the limited aims of the ICRC, then 
perhaps they should think twice before rejecting wholesale the methodology of the 
ICRC. Even as they make the case that neutrality is a political choice, they might do 
well to recognise that in many conflict situations, the ability of the Red Cross 
Movement to deliver humanitarian aid depends on that basic ability to gain access. 
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Perhaps a deferral to and functional independence from the states-system is a small 
price to pay? 
 Clearly it is rarely as simple as that. While few humanitarians would disown 
the gains represented by IHL, Forsythe notes that “in places like Somalia, Liberia, 
and former Zaire, few of those with weapons had ever heard of the Geneva 
Conventions and protocols”.16 "When ICRC representatives in Sierra Leone or 
Liberia faced child soldiers on drugs armed with automatic weapons, the details of 
IHL were about as relevant as theoretical physics."17 In such situations, even basic 
access may involve the dirtying of hands. Aid workers in Somalia such as Tony Vaux 
were taken aback by the sight of heavily armed Red Cross vehicles, but noted that: 
“[to] see an ICRC vehicle mounted with a heavy machine gun and a bunch of 
gunmen is a sign of flexibility and compromise that has characterized their 
operations in Somalia”.18 Nevertheless, it would appear that IHL represents a 
humanitarian space within law that humanitarians can defend on their own terms 
against violations by belligerents. In setting out the distinct obligations and rights of 
all parties, there is a clear formal independence. 
 However, the question then arises of the evolution of the legal humanitarian 
space, where a progressive view of the relationship between state and 
humanitarianism seems more plausible than either a conservative or radical one. 
The humanitarian space in international law has been constructed and shaped by 
state and non-state actors alike. The Ottawa Convention is an example of state 
leadership, notably that of Canada, being crucial in taking the process beyond what 
the broad coalition of NGOs that initiated the International Campaign to Ban 
Landmines could otherwise have achieved.19 So while a radical appeal to civil 
society makes sense in hastening the formation of a piece of law, and detachment 
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might be plausible once it is in place, the shaping of it necessarily acknowledges 
that states can be crucial actors within humanitarian endeavours. 
 The next key question is the protection and enforcement of humanitarian 
space, which feeds into a consideration of the question of political authority and 
sovereignty. Peter Redfield argues that humanitarianism “maintains a complex 
relationship to sovereignty, seeking to restrict it and redirect it even while engaging 
in parallel activities”.20 Though it has a broader reach, it makes sense to treat this 
problem initially in terms of physical humanitarian space, such as refugee camps 
and so-called “safe havens” or “safe areas”.21 As we have seen, many humanitarians 
are traumatised by crucial failings in this area, in places like Srebrenica and the 
Rwandan refugee camps, and much of their soul-searching relates to debates about 
whether humanitarians can learn from those failings, or conversely are 
“condemned to repeat.”22 There are many interlocking issues here, but they all 
relate in some way to the question of how to situate and understand political 
authority within humanitarian space. As a starting point, we must exclude the 
possibility that these physical spaces can be political vacuums. On the account given 
above, this already seems highly implausible in theory. Fiona Terry notes that such a 
separation from the political “is seldom possible in practice”.23 
 Questions of internal political authority cannot be escaped. If a distribution 
of food is to take place within a refugee camp, someone is necessarily in control of 
the distribution. So either the food providers, the aid workers, retain that authority 
and control the process, or it is de facto ceded to powerful groups within the camp. 
It may of course be the case that there is a deliberate process of empowerment at 
work, but clearly that will then be a political process negotiated between aid 
providers and recipients. 
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 More problematically, in Rwanda, Terry tells us that 
 
The genocide against the Tutsi and those who were seen as supporting them 
had continued in the camps, and bodies were frequently dragged from the 
lake. In the MSF hospital we strongly suspected that Tutsi children were 
given minimal care, or left to die, when we were not around to supervise. 
We wondered how many of our Rwandan staff – working in the feeding 
center, the hospital, even in our house – had blood on their hands.24 
 
This paragraph sets out some disturbing themes. The absence of a robust 
“humanitarian” political authority allows space for a more murderous brand of 
politics. The assumed advantages of local staff with local knowledge are also shown 
not to be an unbridled good. In this instance, MSF took the decision to leave the 
camps they were operating in. Humanitarians were also unable later to defend 
refugee camps in what was then eastern Zaire against incursions and attacks from 
“Zairean rebels and their Rwandan army allies”.25 Physical humanitarian spaces are 
rarely unaffected by inter- and intra-state politics. 
 This was graphically illustrated in Srebrenica. A humanitarian space that is 
rhetorically whole, but only enough of a physical reality to gather future slaughter 
victims conveniently together in one place, is clearly a profoundly troubling 
construct. Interestingly, one of the few gestures in the direction of humanitarian 
“accountability” was made by a state, when the entire Dutch government 
eventually resigned on the issue of Dutch peacekeepers’ failure to protect the 
“safe” haven.26 
 This should not be seen as a one-way argument towards massive armed 
intervention by or on behalf of humanitarianism. When NATO bombed Serbia in 
1999, it arguably also constructed a half-formed humanitarian space, in creating a 
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and the Fall of Srebrenica: Meaningful Responsibility and International Society", in Can 
Institutions Have Responsibilties? Collective Moral Agency and International Relations, ed. 
Toni Erskine (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003). 
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rhetorical humanitarian space and defending it through military action, without 
providing real physical protection for Kosovars on the ground against ethnic 
cleansing. But what the spectre of the “well-fed dead” of Bosnia tells us is that the 
denial of political responsibility, or simply of politics in the creation of humanitarian 
spaces can have dire consequences, and that humanitarians need to bring into 
humanitarianism and humanitarian space the means to make that space at least 
internally coherent, if not fully externally validated. Often, that will mean accepting 
one of three choices: abandon the project of creating a humanitarian space lest it 
prolong the conflict or increase the danger of those it was designed to protect, fulfill 
some of the functions of states or collaborate with states and/or interstate 
organisations. While this chapter is mainly concerned with exploring the last two 
possibilities, it should be noted that hindsight tells us that, for instance, in the 
Biafran crisis, the more cautious position of the ICRC was perhaps more 
appropriate, and arguably the more interventionist stance of those agencies, and 
the dissident ICRC doctors who went on to form MSF, who airlifted supplies to the 
secessionists may have actually prolonged the war.27 The issue here is not to define 
criteria for action in all circumstances, but rather to get to a more coherent 
understanding of effective humanitarian space, based on the contingencies which 
humanitarians need to acknowledge. 
 These contingencies are particularly apparent when it comes to the 
rhetorical or discursive dimension of humanitarian space. Humanitarianism is often 
seen to provide discursive cover for states’ non-humanitarian activities. At other 
times it is seen as a way to defer responsibility and action onto an unspecified agent 
(often the amorphous “international community”, itself a frequent instrument of 
deferral). By locating problems within humanitarian space, states (among others) 
engage in the maximum acknowledgement of the problem they are prepared to 
make, entailing the minimum in terms of engagement. This returns us to the 
concerns examined in Chapter 2, that were the Holocaust to happen today, it would 
be described as a “humanitarian crisis”. That is, governments would wring their 
                                                           
27 Allen and Styan, "A Right to Interfere? Bernard Kouchner and the New Humanitarianism": 
830. 
 202 
 
hands, express humanitarian concern, and do nothing. The concern is that 
humanitarian language, rather than operationalising calls to “do something,” in 
reality becomes a dangerous threat to the pledge of “never again.” 
 These are challenging claims. On the one hand, they suggest that if a clear 
rhetorical acknowledgement of the political dimension is made, it makes it harder 
to contrast humanitarian space with political space, and thus defer problems into 
the realm of the former. It forces states to find political solutions to political 
problems that have terrible humanitarian consequences. On the other hand, if 
humanitarian space is brought fully into political space, do humanitarian claims 
forfeit in an unacceptable way their privileged status, opening the way for all 
humanitarian claims to be seen as equally valid, or simply give the emperor the 
benefit of some new clothes? 
 One view of this question is that the only way for humanitarian language to 
retain its distinctive status is to fudge the question and keep humanitarian space 
distinct rhetorically at least from political space, even if a tacit acknowledgement is 
made that this move does not quite fit the reality on the ground, and with a pang of 
guilt regarding the human misery and suffering that are kept out of humanitarian 
space, on the grounds that operationally they are impossible for humanitarianism 
to alleviate anyway. A more radical, but even more implausible, solution is to 
maintain a universal humanitarian space, separate from political space, but 
simultaneously to articulate “global civil society” not as political space but as 
humanitarian space. Alternatively, we can accept the intermingling of the two 
spaces, while trying to maintain and describe a distinctive quality and privileged 
status accruing to humanitarian space (for nefarious or worthy reasons, depending 
on one’s interpretation). 
 Ultimately, a pure humanitarian space apart from politics is impossible. A 
humanitarian space apart from other political spaces seems, for humanitarians who 
do not want to get into the business of ruling, undesirable. The question becomes a 
broader one of how to increase the space of humanitarian concerns in international 
politics and better situate the problem of human solidarity. As Thomas Weiss puts 
it: 
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The fact that humanitarian space cannot be opened or maintained by 
humanitarians themselves suggests clear benefits from thinking politically 
and collaborating with diplomatic and military institutions. This political 
vision transforms humanitarianism. At the same time, the political sphere 
needs to be widened to ensure that the international arena is as hospitable 
as possible for both emergency aid and the protection of rights. Politics at its 
best embraces a vision of human solidarity and works to operationalize a 
strategy for making that solidarity real rather than rhetorical.28 
 
II Taking States Seriously: Humanitarianism as Internationalist 
Solidarity 
 
An important initial question to be addressed here, before examining the kind of 
politics at stake, is that of the quality and appropriateness of state agency with 
respect to the conduct of humanitarian action. In a recent essay, Stephen Hopgood 
sets out an interesting problem: “can Wal-Mart be a humanitarian organization?”29 
Here we ask a related, and arguably more complex question. Can the state be, if not 
a purely humanitarian agent (for perhaps such an agent does not exist), then an 
agent of humanitarianism? Agency is understood simply as “the ability to act in the 
world”.30 Humanitarian agency thus refers to the ability to engage in humanitarian 
action in the world. It is useful to note here an assumption that has thus far gone 
unchallenged in this chapter and is rarely challenged in the literature. This is that 
among humanitarian actors, humanitarian NGOs have a privileged and legitimate 
claim to speak, and thus to act, on behalf of “humanitarianism” as a whole. 
Certainly, they are often among the loudest voices, but the humanitarian system is 
a complex one, with many voices and many actors: NGOs, IGOs, states, state 
agencies. These are all collective agents. For humanitarian NGOs, the problems of 
collective moral agency in international relations are as relevant as they are for 
                                                           
28 Weiss, "Principles, Politics, and Humanitarian Action": 21. 
29 Hopgood, "Saying "No" To Wal-Mart?" 98. 
30 Chris Brown, "Moral Agency and International Society: Reflections on Norms, the UN, the 
Gulf War, and the Kosovo Campaign", in Can Institutions Have Responsibilities? Collective 
Moral Agency and International Relations, ed. Toni Erskine (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2003), 51. 
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states. The only examples of humanitarian action entirely conceivable in relation to 
conventional, individual moral agents discussed so far have been the Rescuers of 
Jews during the Holocaust. 
 There is, then, another step to make in discussing the question of moral 
agency within humanitarian agency. That is to acknowledge the assumption that the 
collective moral agency of institutions is at least a possibility. Onora O’Neill makes 
the persuasive point that, “[if] ethical reasoning is accessible only to individuals, its 
meagre help with global problems should not surprise us”.31  This claim is not 
unproblematic, but the key point is that we make this assumption anyway in the 
initial move from individual acts to the acts of collective agents such as 
humanitarian NGOs. Thus, either we have to accept the possibility that there is 
simply no such thing as humanitarianism as we know it (beyond the individual, that 
is), or acknowledge that there is no absolute a priori reason why states cannot lay a 
claim to the moral dimension of humanitarian agency. Toni Erskine argues that for a 
collectivity to be a plausible candidate to be ascribed moral agency, it requires:  
 
an identity that is more than the sum of its constitutive parts and, therefore, 
does not rely on a determinate membership; a decision-making structure; an 
identity over time; and a conception of itself as a unit.32 
 
On this account, states are clearly at least as strong candidates for collective moral 
agency as NGOs or IGOS. In addition to this, it should be made clear that questions 
of humanitarian agency are not uniquely questions of moral agency. They are also 
questions of political agency, though any conceptualisation of humanitarian agency 
entirely divorced from questions of moral agency is difficult to reconcile with the 
argument made in Chapter 4, that humanitarianism needs “moral politicians” to 
enact it. To re-frame the lessons of the previous section and the previous two 
chapters, the moral dimension of humanitarian agency cannot be understood in 
                                                           
31 Cited in Toni Erskine, "Assigning Responsibilities to Institutional Moral Agents: The Case 
of States and 'Quasi-States'", in Can Institutions Have Responsibilties? Collective Moral 
Agency and International Relations, ed. Toni Erskine (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2003), 35. 
32 Ibid. 
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isolation from its political dimension. Even the most classical humanitarian agent 
cannot exercise moral agency without simultaneously exercising political agency. 
We have seen how in defining, creating and defending humanitarian space, political 
acts and choices are inevitable and constitutive of the moral agency being 
exercised, both within and outside of humanitarian space. Humanitarian action is 
never just an “ethical act”, as many would have it, but also a political act, and 
therefore moral agency is not the only quality of agency sought for in a 
humanitarian actor. There may well, then, be a tension here in how these two 
qualities of humanitarian agency are embodied, with individual agents more 
appropriate bearers of moral agency, and collective agents ones more capacious 
political actors.  
 Any collective agent acting within humanitarianism is necessarily acting “in 
the name of humanity”, but will always be a surrogate for a collective agency of 
humanity which, in the light of the argument made so far, will always remain an 
impossibility. So the relative qualities of second-best agents become very important 
and have to be politically negotiated.33 The corporate identity, decision-making 
structure, identity over time and conception of self need to relate plausibly to the 
ways in which we generate and enact our sense of humanity. Moreover, though it 
may be extremely beneficial for MSF or the ICRC to have corporate identities that 
reflect a certain rigour about what kind of moral agency they need to be, they 
cannot claim their humanitarian identity as its only possible expression. They can 
merely make a case for what they, as actors, can do in the world. 
 This makes for a very strong case that we should take states very seriously 
indeed as potential enactors of humanitarianism, given their hefty practical 
capabilities. There are several strands to this argument, to do with processes of 
collective humanitarian identity formation, the ability of “good states” to formulate 
some degree of humanitarian agency related to these, and the cautionary lessons of 
                                                           
33 Following the logic of the same kind of anti-transcendentalist arguments made by Sen as I 
used in the previous chapter. 
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“bad states”. I will examine these issues with reference to the work of Peter Lawler, 
who sees in them the basis of a case for an internationalist account of politics.34 
 Internationalism is not, as such, a neglected term, either in international 
political discourse or mainstream international relations theory.35 But Lawler argues 
that international political theory has largely neglected what he terms “classical 
internationalism”. Indeed there is a strong case that the discourse of international 
political theory has been impoverished by this relative neglect. To take one recent 
example, the idea is absent from the overarching classification in Simon Caney’s 
influential theory of global justice, which makes for a rather dichotomised view of 
the issues he discusses.36 The distinction I make in this section, between articulating 
a cosmopolitan sensibility and an internationalist one, may seem a matter of 
nuance rather than substance. But I wish to argue that it is a nuance that blinds us, 
in considering the embedding of humanitarian solidarity, to precisely those ways in 
which human solidarity can accumulate and become institutionalised in practice. 
 Moreover, Kimberly Hutchings correctly notes that “[one] of the most 
striking things about contemporary liberal/communitarian debates is the extent of 
agreement over practice (most participants support some form of liberal social 
democracy) and the intensity of disagreement over theory”.37 I would add that 
another point of agreement is a deep commitment to humanitarianism. They are 
all, in their writings, clearly motivated by a desire to articulate and defend our 
common humanity. These two areas of rough agreement, the immediate practical 
                                                           
34 Helpfully, Lawler also employs Erskine’s account of collective agency. Lawler, "The Good 
State: In Praise of 'Classical' Internationalism": 442. My account here also has parallels with 
the solidarist wing of the English School, especially in its understanding of the state as the 
local agent of the common good, but with the major twist that the nature of the common 
good is highly contested, indeed is what is being negotiated. 
35 For a prominent recent example see G. John Ikenberry, "Liberal Internationalism 3.0: 
America and the Dilemmas of Liberal World Order", Perspectives on Politics 7, no. 01 
(2009). Good historical accounts are Carsten Holbraad, Internationalism and Nationalism in 
European Political Thought (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003). David Long and Brian 
C. Schmidt, eds., Imperialism and Internationalism in the Discipline of International 
Relations (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005). For a typically idiosyncratic 
perspective see Fred Halliday, "Three Concepts of Internationalism", International Affairs 
64, no. 2 (1988). 
36 Caney, Justice Beyond Borders. 
37 Kimberly Hutchings, International Political Theory: Rethinking Ethics in a Global Era 
(London: Sage, 1999), 29.  
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orientation and the deep, though diversely articulated humanitarian commitment, 
are precisely those that emerge as significant in the argument made so far in this 
thesis. To seek resolution of the theoretical disagreement as an a priori requirement 
of articulating humanitarian political projects is to make a category error about the 
character of humanitarianism as an on-going conversation, hence the benefits of a 
less determined internationalism that nevertheless takes the state seriously. 
 Lawler’s internationalism is understood in terms of the ways in which 
domestic politics, possibly influenced by transnational political discussions, comes 
to shape the identity of states in ways that accommodate genuinely other-regarding 
policies. He contrasts this with two cosmopolitan tendencies to instrumentalise the 
state: one which sees it as an agent of a fixed universal idea of the good, with all the 
hegemonic excesses that implies; another which sees even democratic statehood as 
something to be transcended en route to the pleasures of global civil society. Both 
write off the potential of the state too easily. 
 This reading of cosmopolitanism relates to two points made throughout this 
thesis. Firstly, humanitarian action always contains a necessary element of 
universalising presumption. We are always in the position of foisting our conception 
of humanity on others if we aspire to act in any kind of solidaristic manner. 
However, the excesses of humanitarianism come when we take that conception of 
humanity to be transcendent, rather than something to be argued for and lived in 
our daily lives. Secondly, working out from a transcendental conception of the good 
tells us little about the processes examined in Chapter 3 of actually feeling and 
acting on empathy, a necessarily partial process. What I argued then was that rather 
than an account of what it might mean to be impartial serving as a reliable 
corrective, we have to educate ourselves and others to have a wider potential 
sphere of empathy. Moreover, humanitarian action itself is the result of coalitions 
being built and expressed in ways which do not have to map onto state boundaries, 
but do seek to express themselves in terms of the actually-existing political 
institutions they are embedded in. This was clearly the case in the example of 
British abolitionism. More recently, Lawler affirms that: 
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Much of the current spate of international political activism (anti-
globalisation, anti-war, and so on) is transnational or transversal in genesis 
and organisation but often resolutely internationalist in its policy focus. It 
seeks not the dissolution of states or the transcendence of national 
sovereignty but greater internal and external accountability and 
responsibility on the part of states.38 
 
Calhoun complements this view, pointing out that: 
 
Business leaders attending the World Economic Forum at Davos and social 
movement activists attending the World Social Forum in Porto Allegre 
tended each to think they were the real cosmopolitans. And both tended to 
describe global civil society as more autonomous from states than it really 
was.39 
 
A prime example of this is one of the biggest recent global civil society campaigns, 
the Make Poverty History campaign and its impact on pledges made in 2005 at the 
G8 Gleneagles summit. The political traction of the Make Poverty History campaign 
in Britain cannot be dissociated from the disenchantment of an important left-
liberal constituency opposed to the Iraq war. There are clear echoes here of the 
electoral importance of the abolitionist vote in early nineteenth century Britain as 
made clear by Kaufmann and Pape.40 Furthermore, Britain’s relatively good record 
in sticking to its pledges cannot be dissociated from a political culture in which 
overseas aid is now, even after a change to a right-of-centre government, seen as a 
privileged area of government spending, and a marker of British national identity. 
 The other point to make here is the comparative rarity of cosmopolitan as a 
genuinely “lived category”, to borrow Margaret C. Jacob’s phrase.41 That is, a 
category that corresponds to actual behaviour, to “lived practices and habitudes”.42 
                                                           
38 Lawler, "The Good State: In Praise of 'Classical' Internationalism": 440. 
39 Craig Calhoun, "Cosmopolitanism in the Modern Social Imaginary", Daedalus 137, no. 3 
(2008): 113. There are interesting parallels with the account given by Margaret C. Jacob in 
the same issue of eighteenth century bankers as an example of cosmopolitanism as a lived 
category. Margaret C. Jacob, "The Cosmopolitan as a Lived Category", Daedalus 137, no. 3 
(2008). 
40 Kaufmann and Pape, "Explaining Costly International Moral Action: Britain's Sixty-Year 
Campaign against the Atlantic Slave Trade". 
41 Jacob, "The Cosmopolitan as a Lived Category". 
42 Ibid.: 18. 
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Indeed, it may be significant that many professional humanitarians fall into such a 
category.43 Calhoun notes the danger, which he sees as being encouraged by 
common cosmopolitan perspectives, of confusing “the privileged specificity of our 
mobility for universality. It is easy for the privileged to imagine that their experience 
of global mobility and connection is available to all, if only everyone would ‘be’ 
cosmopolitan.”44 He puts this forward not as an anti-humanitarian perspective. On 
the contrary: “the genuinely attractive ethical orientation toward a common human 
community of fate can be undermined by an unattractive self-congratulation and 
lack of self-critical awareness of privilege”.45 He contrasts the expression “citizen of 
the world” with “man of the world”, the latter implying merely a loose moral 
framework and a tendency towards indulgent over-consumption of the world’s 
pleasures.46 This recalls Michael Walzer’s rejoinder to Martha Nussbaum’s famous 
plea for a cosmopolitan education. He writes that he shares many of her 
conclusions, but ultimately:  
 
I am not a citizen of the world, as she would like me to be. I am not even 
aware that there is a world such that one could be a citizen of it. No one has 
ever offered me citizenship, or described the naturalization process, or 
enlisted me in the world’s institutional structures, or given me an account of 
its decision procedures (I hope they are democratic), or provided me with a 
list of the benefits and obligations of citizenship, or shown me the world’s 
calendar and the common celebrations and commemorations of its 
citizens.47 
 
                                                           
43 Their memoirs often give a sense of “if it’s Wednesday, it must be Afghanistan…” See for 
example Foley, The Thin Blue Line. The title of John Norris’ study of humanitarians is itself 
revealing. Norris, The Disaster Gypsies. 
44 Calhoun, "Cosmopolitanism in the Modern Social Imaginary": 106. Amusingly, he cites LSE 
as the “academic headquarters” of this kind of cosmopolitan hubris. Calhoun, 
"Cosmopolitanism in the Modern Social Imaginary": 108. 
45 Calhoun, "Cosmopolitanism in the Modern Social Imaginary": 106. 
46 Ibid.: 109. 
47 Michael Walzer, "Spheres of Affection", in For Love of Country?, ed. Joshua Cohen 
(Boston: Beacon Press, 2002), 125. 
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Interestingly, in a recent article, Nussbaum appears to have acknowledged the 
strength of these arguments.48 She now draws on Mazzini and Mill in defending a 
“globally sensitive patriotism”, arguing that: 
 
a nation that pursues goals that require sacrifice of self-interest needs to be 
able to appeal to patriotism, in ways that draw on symbol and rhetoric, 
emotional memory and history – as Lincoln, King, Gandhi, and Nehru all 
successfully did. This is all the more true when a nation pursues not only 
internal justice but the goal of global justice as well.49 
 
To take as example one figure from Nussbaum’s list, “internationalist” and 
“humanitarian” speak to our understanding of Nehru’s politics. Cosmopolitan, on 
the other hand, fits less well. Mazzini, one of Nussbaum’s more recent intellectual 
inspirations, is an interesting figure to bring in here. Mazzini’s universalist 
humanitarian beliefs were situated in the context of his liberal nationalism.50 He 
saw that internationalism could provide for bonding and solidarity between 
different, situated individuals, peoples and states. Moreover, he aspired, albeit 
often unsuccessfully and with a surfeit of utopian zeal, to temper the excesses of 
both universalism and particularism, both of which can lead to inaction or worse. 
Mazzini described this when, in an obscure but telling essay which provides us with 
a useful complement to his masterwork The Duties of Man, he affirmed his 
commitment to a “love for all men [sic]”, but cautioned that the cosmopolitan “is 
                                                           
48 Nussbaum, "Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism". 
49 Martha C. Nussbaum, "Toward a Globally Sensitive Patriotism", Daedalus 137, no. 3 
(2008): 93. 
50 Carsten Holbraad also refers to Mazzini as an intellectual father of a category of 
“humanitarian internationalism”. Holbraad’s category is more explicitly cosmopolitan in 
nature and focused within a liberal interventionist tradition, reflecting his earlier work on 
progressive and conservative approaches to the Concert of Europe and Gladstone in 
particular, but interesting in terms of suggesting the juxtaposition of humanitarianism and 
internationalism. Carsten Holbraad, The Concert of Europe: A Study in German and British 
International Theory 1815-1914 (London: Longman, 1970). Holbraad, Internationalism and 
Nationalism in European Political Thought, 9, 41, 45-48. 
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compelled to choose between despotism and inertia.”51 The idea that people have 
often engaged in progressive humanitarian politics both locally and internationally 
is a powerful one. To focus exclusively on either tiny localised or huge global 
problems is surely a recipe for disillusion. More importantly, it fails to reflect the 
complexity of our empathetic, solidaristic responses and commitments. This starts 
to explain why on a very local level how often the same “usual suspects” turn up in 
campaigns for both local, national and international causes. Similarly at state level, 
it is arguably no accident that states with highly developed domestic welfare states 
are often also the most generous givers of aid, and these are the ones most often 
described as internationalist. They recognise boundaries within their spheres of 
solidarity, but see them as a site of adjudication, rather than blanket exclusion or 
inclusion. 
 Indeed, Lawler emphasises the importance of politics at levels other than a 
blanket global civil society, pointing to the work done by Cranford Pratt on how the 
“humane internationalisms” of usual suspect putative “good international citizens” 
like the Scandinavian countries, the Netherlands and Canada have been nourished 
by the character of domestic politics and collective identity formation in those 
states.52 Lawler emphasises though that 
 
                                                           
51 Giuseppe Mazzini, "The Duties of Man", in Life and Writings of Joseph Mazzini, Vol. 4: 
Critical and Literary (London: Smith, Elder & Co., 1891). Giuseppe Mazzini, "Principles of 
Cosmopolitanism", in Life and Writings of Joseph Mazzini, Vol. 3: Autobiographical and 
Political (London: Smith, Elder & Co., 1891), 7-8. For a useful recent selection of Mazzini’s 
writings, that brings his international thought more fully into focus, see Giuseppe Mazzini, A 
Cosmopolitanism of Nations: Giuseppe Mazzini's Writing on Democracy, Nation Building, 
and International Relations, ed. Stefano Recchia and Nadia Urbinati (Oxford: Princeton 
University Press, 2009). For an exception to the tendency for international theory to neglect 
Mazzini, see Martin Wight, Four Seminal Thinkers in International Theory: Machiavelli, 
Grotius, Kant, and Mazzini (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). 
52 Lawler draws on Cranford Pratt, ed., Internationalism under Strain: The North-South 
Policies of Canada, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 1989). Cranford Pratt, ed., Middle Power Internationalism: The North-South 
Dimension (Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1990). See also Peter Lawler, "Janus-
Faced Solidarity: Danish Internationalism Reconsidered", Cooperation and Conflict 42, no. 1 
(2007).On the idea of good international citizenship in practice, see also Peter Lawler, "The 
Good Citizen Australia?" Asian Studies Review 16, no. 2 (1992). Nicholas J. Wheeler and Tim 
Dunne, "Good International Citizenship: A Third Way for British Foreign Policy", 
International Affairs 74, no. 4 (1998). 
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Even if internationalism is an essentially domestically-generated practice 
that reflects, moreover, a culturally-specific account of collective identity, its 
sustenance necessarily requires not only following through rhetorical 
declarations with practical and financial commitments but also an account of 
the international in which practices of solidarity at least become possible 
and can have real consequences.53  
 
Lawler notes that, though they may be attached to an ultimately exclusionary 
sovereignty of their state, Western publics 
 
also seem to empathise with distant publics reacting, often violently, to the 
breach of their state’s sovereignty by coalitions of states supposedly acting 
in the name of humanity, or to a failure to intervene in other, morally 
compelling cases, or to the evident inequity of a globalising world 
economy.54 
 
In other words, an internationalist perspective can be a humane, egalitarian one, if 
the merits of living in functioning, humane states are taken seriously, and if the 
ability to empathise is placed at its heart. Lawler argues that the state remains a 
“viable form of human community”, one that “remains more an aspiration than a 
reality for millions of people and whose dissolution is greeted with foreboding by 
millions of others mindful of what may emerge in its place”.55 For him, this is the 
real danger of a blanket reliance on a deterministic reading of the evolution of 
globalisation and global civil society: 
 
Only a thoroughly benign and linear reading of accelerating 
internationalisation or globalisation coupled with an ahistorical account of 
the practice of sovereignty could lead straightforwardly to a celebration of 
the decline of the sovereign state. Anything else must concede that there is 
a real risk that any further erosion in the capacities of states may not be 
neatly matched by the evolution of effective and legitimate structures of 
local, regional or global public governance. Furthermore, such structures 
that do emerge may exhibit much, perhaps all, of the partiality, inequity and 
unaccountability of the present international order.56 
 
                                                           
53 Lawler, "The Good State: In Praise of 'Classical' Internationalism": 437. 
54 Ibid.: 439. 
55 Ibid.: 434-435. 
56 Ibid.: 440. 
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This raises two important points. Firstly, that if we detach ourselves from the 
“emergency imaginary” and take a broader perspective on the humanitarian gains 
of the last two centuries, it is clear that the development of Western liberal 
democracies has created extremely robust “humanitarian spaces” for those 
fortunate enough to live in them. Though international efforts, especially those of 
Britain, were crucial in abolishing the Atlantic slave trade in the nineteenth century, 
the abolition of slavery itself was largely achieved at national level.57 One way of 
seeing this is as exposing the limitations of what international humanitarianism can 
achieve, and seeing sovereignty as a barrier to humanitarian penetration and 
achievement.  But the abolition of slavery in different countries is no less a 
humanitarian achievement: it was not a matter of agreement between insiders, but 
rather the transformation of non-human outsiders to human insiders within each 
country. The process of identification and recognition had a dynamic that is 
important to acknowledge. Moreover, it would be to do a disservice to all those 
who struggled and in the case of the American Civil War, literally fought for a state 
free from slavery, sometimes on behalf of themselves, sometimes on behalf of 
others. 
 What was made clear in the previous section was the unpalatable nature of 
life in any political space, even “humanitarian ones”, devoid entirely of the qualities 
of the “good state”, whether “quasi-states” or “outlaw states”, to take two possible 
ways of framing the problem.58 It is hard to imagine even the keenest cultural 
relativist writing a paean to life in contemporary Mogadishu. Moreover, the plight 
of the stateless is a famously bleak one, revealing, in Hannah Arendt’s powerful 
phrase, the “abstract nakedness of being nothing but human”.59 Humanitarian 
                                                           
57 Finnemore, The Purpose of Intervention, 68. 
58 Robert Jackson, Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). Rawls, The Law of Peoples. 
59 Cited in R. J. Vincent, Human Rights and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1986), 151. 
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scholarship is, indeed, increasingly cognisant of these problems.60 For Tanja 
Schuemer-Cross and Ben Heaven Taylor: "[the] primary focus of global 
humanitarian efforts must be to support states to safeguard the right to life of their 
own citizens."61 Moreover, it is tangible issues such as these that spurs Lawler to 
note that “the refusal of much critical IR scholarship to engage with foreign policy 
theory and practice, although often framed in a contemporary critical discourse of 
‘re-politicisation’, is simply bad politics: it lets most states off the hook”.62 
 Indeed, while Walzer’s rejoinder to Martha Nussbaum’s plea for a 
cosmopolitan education was set out earlier, Appiah’s is also interesting here, 
coming as it does from a cosmopolitan perspective: 
 
It is because humans live best on a smaller scale that we should defend not 
just the state, but the county, the town, the street, the business, the craft, 
the profession, and the family, as communities, as circles among the many 
circles that are narrower than the human horizon, that are appropriate 
spheres of moral concern. We should, as cosmopolitans, defend the right of 
others to live in democratic states with rich possibilities of association within 
and across their borders, states of which they can be patriotic citizens.63 
 
Humanitarianism cautions against the “the dangers of a presumptive moral 
universalism”, to borrow a phrase from Lawler, and the crusading excesses with 
which a smug accommodation with Western liberal power can engender. 64 But it 
also demands that we allow for the presumptions of a humbler moral universalism, 
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in elaborating an internationalist politics that might take seriously the capacity of 
states to endeavour change, both internally and externally.   
 
III Humanity Through Thick and Thin: Michael Walzer and the 
Internationalist Tradition 
 
This section aims to flesh out the intuition that the internationalist tradition is a 
vital middle ground in international political theory, unstable admittedly, but a 
necessary conduit for our muddled solidarities, and especially the international 
politicisation of a sense of common humanity. It will examine the sort of moral 
minimalism described by Michael Walzer in Thick and Thin, which is a good starting 
point.65 Walzer is a particularly useful figure here because, among other things, 
while his international theory sets itself explicitly against cosmopolitanism, Walzer 
describes himself, and plausibly so, as an internationalist theorist.66 Walzer is also 
always explicit that his theme is solidarity. Analysing how he derives his 
internationalism reveals something about how “old-fashioned” internationalism has 
been somewhat obscured by the dominance of cosmopolitanism, and often left 
unexpressed by many of its other communitarian critics. The point here is that the 
internationalists in international political theory are not necessarily different people 
from the cosmopolitans or communitarians we are familiar with, but that this facet 
of their thought, and the fruitful meeting point it entails, is under-explored.67 
 Jon Elster famously described Walzer as a phenomenologist of the moral 
life.68 Meant as a criticism, for our purposes it constitutes an advantage. Walzer 
studies moral problems and our responses to them as they actually arise. The 
opening of Thick and Thin recounts the experience of witnessing on television 
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people marching on the streets of Prague during the Velvet Revolution, brandishing 
placards bearing simple slogans such as “Truth” and “Justice”. Walzer unpacks the 
implications of this image, asking himself what he can and cannot understand in it. 
He notes that he does not know if he shares the same philosophical perspective on 
“Truth” as the marchers. Probably they do not agree amongst themselves. “Truth” 
and “Justice” will mean very different things to atheists and Christians marching 
side by side.69 The important point is that that particular epistemological debate is 
irrelevant for the political purpose at hand. Walzer can understand that the 
marchers mean by “Truth” that they do not wish to be lied to or deceived any more. 
Similarly, without any agreement on theories of “Justice”, Walzer understands from 
that placard that he is able to empathise and express solidarity with the marchers’ 
dislike of their totalitarian regime. He writes: 
 
What they meant by the “justice” inscribed on their signs, however, was 
simple enough: an end to arbitrary arrests, equal and impartial law 
enforcement, the abolition of the privileges and prerogatives of the party 
elite – common, garden variety justice.70 
 
By “common, garden variety justice”, Walzer is not arguing that there is necessarily 
an exact account of such a thing that could be agreed on between him and the 
marchers, merely that they have a shared understanding, and that he rejects the 
implication that because he cannot assert full agreement with the Prague marchers, 
he must necessarily fully commit to a relativistic disengagement, or post-modern 
ironism, something that neither he nor the marchers would see as a desirable 
outcome.  “Minimalism is not foundational: it is not the case that different groups 
of people discover that they are all committed to the same set of ultimate values.”71 
In short, he asserts both the fallibility of our moral judgments, and the necessity of 
making them. Walzer’s internationalism derives from his commitment to his 
conception of moral minimalism, the importance of which “lies in the encounter it 
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facilitates, of which it is also a product”.72 In this case, the reiterative minimalism 
reflects an internationalist solidarity against totalitarianism. That is, it embodies a 
shared politics of injustice, a common sense of what, tyranny, is being reacted to. 
Walzer does not require all Czechs to agree with him that his preference, social 
democracy would be the best model to replace totalitarianism, in order to be in 
solidarity with them. 
 Moral minimalism, while reflecting this reflexive process, crucially also draws 
on thicker, possibly foundationalist moral conceptions. “Minimal morality is very 
important, both for the sake of criticism and for the sake of solidarity. But it can’t 
substitute for or replace the defense of thickly conceived values.”73 “If we did not 
have our own parade, we could not march vicariously in Prague. We would have no 
understanding at all of “Truth” or “Justice”.74 Walzer, a Jewish American social 
democrat, does not feel that, in expressing solidarity with the Prague marchers, he 
can go further in terms of describing or imposing the shape of the state after the fall 
of the totalitarian regime. But nor can he avoid that expression of solidarity. He 
rejects, at the other extreme, the cynical judgement that he should not be 
concerned about a far-off country of which he knows little. Why is this 
disengagement equally impossible? Walzer does not spell it out, but it is clear from 
his body of work that it is impossible precisely because of the values he holds as a 
thinker in the Jewish political tradition, as an American citizen, as a social democrat, 
that is, the universalising identities that make up his humanity, and contextualise a 
certain kind of humanitarian concern for the suffering of others. These identities 
may suggest limits and boundaries for a set of institutionalised responsibilities 
within the context of citizenship, but that is not the same thing as marking the limits 
of his concern. The scope of his moral concern is defined by his moral minimalism, 
but “[minimalism] leaves room for thickness elsewhere; indeed, it presupposes 
thickness elsewhere”.75 
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 The thick values are the particular values Walzer holds as a Jewish American 
social democrat. Obviously the boundaries for the responsibilities entailed by these 
different identities are not identical. But Walzer places particular emphasis on the 
political community, usually embodied in the citizenship of a state. His account of 
why this is necessary, most famously set out in Just and Unjust Wars, need not 
detain us beyond the fact that Walzer derives the rights of the political community 
from the rights of the individuals that make it up.76 The important point is that the 
political community, which we can identify here – not entirely unproblematically – 
with the state, still remains, at its best, the most complex example of 
institutionalised solidarity. As such it defines the gap between the scope of our 
institutionalised responsibilities (to our fellow citizens) and the scope of our 
concern (all humanity), even as it arguably, through the process of institutionalising 
that domestic solidarity, has expanded the scope of our concern internationally. 
 So, there is a communitarian restriction on the scope of our day-to-day 
responsibilities, yet moral minimalism entails a wider concern, an internationalist 
commitment. Much of Walzer’s work, and the response to it, focuses on that 
restrictive move, that critique of the defining of cosmopolitan responsibilities, Thick 
and Thin itself is mostly written in that vein. It places itself in a conversation with 
contemporary cosmopolitanism, but also arguably fits into debates that go back to 
Mazzini, to the tension between self-determination and broadly conceived universal 
human rights (Walzer draws on J. S. Mill in Just and Unjust Wars to establish his 
take on this issue77), to Woodrow Wilson and the dilemmas of forcibly “self-
determining” others. What will be introduced in the rest of this section is the 
permissive flipside of Walzer’s prevailing restrictive mood. It asks what kind of 
solidarity an internationalism resting on moral minimalism can accommodate, and 
suggests that a more nuanced reading might be fruitful, particularly in its potential 
accommodation of humanitarian solidarities. 
 Returning to the marchers of Prague, Walzer concludes that in general, if we 
are to consider the possibility of military intervention, prudence is of the essence. 
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“Truth” and “Justice” are “better defended with the moral support of outsiders than 
with their coercive intervention”.78 A shared concern about injustice does not 
necessarily put us in a position to enact justice. His reasons for concluding this have 
been well-rehearsed from Just and Unjust Wars onwards: there is value in self-
determination, of earning democratic self-rule, following J. S. Mill; there are always 
perils and excesses involved in the use of military force; the idea of moral 
minimalism limits our critical purchase on what is going on and what to do about it. 
But there has always been a space in Walzer’s thought for humanitarian 
intervention, even if many would consider it an unnecessarily restricted one. This 
space defines the ultimate scope of Walzer’s internationalism, establishing the 
conditions in which we risk ourselves to save others. Thick and Thin contains an 
excellent account of the subtleties of judgement involved: 
 
So we intervene, if not on behalf of “truth” and “justice,” then on behalf of 
“life” and “liberty” (against massacre or enslavement, say). We assume that 
the people we are trying to help really want to be helped. There may still be 
reasons for holding back, but the belief that these people prefer to be 
massacred or enslaved won’t be among them. Yes, some things that we 
consider oppressive are not so regarded everywhere. The consideration is a 
feature of our own maximal morality, and it cannot provide us with an 
occasion for military intervention. We cannot conscript people to march in 
our parade. But minimalism makes for (some) presumptive occasions, in 
politics just as it does in private life. We will use force, for example, to stop a 
person from committing suicide, without knowing in advance who he is or 
where he comes from. Perhaps he has reasons for suicide confirmed by his 
maximal morality, endorsed by his moral community. Even so, “life” is a 
reiterated value and defending it is an act of solidarity. And if we give up the 
forcible defense out of respect for his reasons, we might still criticize the 
moral culture that provides those reasons: it is insufficiently attentive, we 
might say, to the value of life.79 
 
At the core of this very rich paragraph lies a favourite device, a domestic analogy. 
The analogy works in the sense that it establishes the inevitability of a certain 
degree of presumption in our moral life. Specifically here, to rescue is always to 
presume, as we saw in Chapter 4. Fallibility is ever-present. There is a problem in 
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that our willingness to engage in humanitarian intervention may be far less than to 
stop a suicide, as the risks and costs are likely to be much higher. But humanitarian 
intervention is a particularly demanding form of humanitarianism, as well as a 
problematic one, as was made clear in the previous chapter, so there is still a great 
deal of value here in terms of conceptualising rescue in general terms: a very basic 
idea of “life” has to be threatened, and we impulsively respond to that threat, in 
spite of the inevitability of imperfect information and knowledge. Walzer’s 
description of the farther reaches of his internationalism echoes the contingencies 
and the moral mechanisms explored through the idea of the humanitarian impulse 
in the previous chapters. This suggests that his internationalism provides a useful 
international political theoretical context for the humanitarian impulse. 
 The space for the humanitarian impulse – the humanitarian space, then - has 
arguably grown within Walzer’s thought, as he has become slightly more permissive 
on the desirability of humanitarian interventions, though within the scope of very 
similar ideas to those he wrote about three decades ago. We can track this 
evolution via the essays collected in Arguing About War, in particular.80 His essay on 
“The Politics of Rescue” is perhaps the key statement here.81 In effect, in Walzer we 
find two facets of the threshold that defines the possibility of humanitarian 
intervention. From his commitment, an internationalist commitment among other 
things, to the principle of self-determination, he derives the legalist paradigm and 
the prohibition of over-riding the norm of non-intervention except in cases “that 
shock the moral conscience of mankind”.82 We also glimpse another kind of 
threshold, that of the willingness to act that lies within ourselves and draws on our 
thick moral conceptions, the humanitarian urge to rescue, the humanitarian 
impulse that emerges from our own particular mix of solidarities and empathetic 
possibilities. We may argue with Walzer on the balance he strikes on any given 
occasion, but this provides a more useful framework in which to assess the 
desirability of humanitarian intervention than those who attempt to derive, in 
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abstraction from the mechanisms of political will or of solidarity, a set of criteria 
that reflects ideals derived from assertions. In the “The Politics of Rescue”, Walzer 
sets this out in a way that usefully complements the account given in Thick and 
Thin. 
 
Despite all that I have said so far, I don’t mean to abandon the principle of 
non-intervention – only to honor its exceptions. One reads the newspaper 
these days shaking. The vast numbers of murdered people; the men, 
women, and children dying of disease and famine wilfully caused or easily 
preventable; the masses of desperate refugees – none of these are served 
by reciting high-minded principles. Yes, the norm is not to intervene in other 
people’s countries; the norm is self-determination. But not for these people, 
the victims of tyranny, ideological zeal, ethnic hatred, who are nor 
determining anything for themselves, who urgently need help from outside. 
And it isn’t enough to wait until the tyrants, the zealots, and the bigots have 
done their filthy work and then rush food and medicine to the ragged 
survivors. Whenever the filthy work can be stopped, it should be stopped. 
And if not by us, the supposedly decent people of this world, then by 
whom?83 
 
So far we have established that Walzer’s internationalism and his account of moral 
minimalism are amenable to the dynamics of the humanitarian impulse. But we 
have also only given an account of a very particular and controversial aspect of 
humanitarianism, namely humanitarian intervention. Indeed, this thesis has 
critiqued the manner in which international political theorists like Walzer only deal 
with humanitarianism explicitly when discussing that issue. So can we find, building 
out from the account of Walzer’s internationalist moral minimalism, the basis for a 
much broader reading of humanitarianism, and as a consequence, humanitarian 
internationalism? 
 The excerpts from Thick and Thin gloss over what is clearly a very important 
and fertile area of Walzer’s internationalism, the space revealed by allusion to the 
“moral support of outsiders” in defence of “Truth”, “Justice,” and, presumably, 
“Life” and “Liberty” as well. Walzer cautions that we should avoid “missionizing 
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maximalism”.84 This reminds us of the missionary excesses of some of the 
abolitionists in the nineteenth century who envisioned the end of slavery as the 
opportunity either for the slaves to become “good” Christians and/or the subjects 
of a “benevolent” British imperialism. In doing so, it suggests that a dose of “moral 
minimalism” might be beneficial to the politicisation of our humanitarian impulses, 
inevitable as that politicisation, and our moral presumption, may be. Walzer cites 
organisations like Amnesty International as possible models of how to move “from 
the particular to the general,” arguing that they can have an effective critical role to 
play, “so long as they restrain whatever impulse their members have to impose a 
complete set of moral principles across the range of cultural differences.”85 There is 
an interesting set of ideas at play here. Here in Britain, Amnesty relies on the 
support of highly committed moral maximalist actors, religious groups for instance. 
Yet it seems plausible that it has more power contesting torture in a Latin American 
country than a delegation of Church of England bishops. Simultaneously, within that 
Latin American country, it will probably be part of a broader campaign, involving 
perhaps delegations of local priests. So while at first glance Walzer’s 
internationalism may seem rather too minimal in the eyes of many “progressives,”  
this may be deceptive, the thinness contains many possibilities, illustrated by 
Amnesty, the creation of Peter Benenson, a Jewish Old-Etonian Labour lawyer 
whose moral conscience was sparked by classical internationalist causes such as the 
Spanish Civil War.86 Indeed, his initial “Appeal for Amnesty” referred, in words 
similar to those of Walzer cited above, to the motivating potential of moral disgust 
as spur of a practical humanitarianism: 
 
The newspaper reader feels a sickening sense of impotence. Yet if these 
feelings of disgust all over the world could be united into common action, 
something effective could be done.87 
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It is a call to a political humanitarian internationalism, contra the impotence implied 
by Mazzini’s warning of the perils of a jaded cosmopolitanism. Benenson’s call was 
heeded by a coalition familiar to students of abolitionism: Unitarians, Quakers, and 
secular progressives. Interestingly, Stephen Hopgood tells us that initially Amnesty 
had trouble building Southern membership, and evolved its balance between thick 
and thin in a manner parallel to the development of Latin American liberation 
theology “that stressed local circumstances, the preference of God for the poor, 
and the prospect of earthly salvation”, against the blanket universalism of the 
Church.88 Hopgood stresses the marginality and internationalism of Amnesty’s early 
supporters: they resemble the internal critics Walzer celebrates.89 So Walzer, in 
pointing to Amnesty, is highlighting a model that both draws on a similar political 
coalition of humanitarian activists, with thick moral conceptions. Yet it is able to 
function effectively precisely because of the thinness of its message of 
understanding, of rejection of threats to “Life” and “Liberty,” a message to be 
thickened out and implemented locally. 
 This is vital in explicating the space in a Walzerian internationalism for the 
humanitarian impulse. Quite clearly, this space is larger than the dominant debates 
within international political theory would suggest. The previous chapter showed 
how the prioritisation of intervention within international political theory leads to 
an implied identification of humanitarianism and humanitarian intervention. Walzer 
is as guilty of this as the next theorist, but the preceding paragraphs confirm that 
this identification would be quite wrong, for it is precisely the humanitarian 
impulse, and the humanitarian solidarities that emerge from it, that speaks to his 
understanding of internationalism. 
 Walzer has used the analogy of the hotel room to elucidate the meaning of 
moral minimalism. A hotel room replicates in anonymous and often anodyne  form 
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many of the functions of the home, but one cannot be or feel at home in it.90 Yet on 
occasion it can provide much-needed shelter and sustenance. For those who have 
nowhere to feel at home, either because they simply have no home, or because 
their home is lacking in the basic amenities of warmth and shelter (or freedom from 
massacre or enslavement), “hotels” can mean the difference between life and 
death. The obvious parallel to draw in terms of humanitarianism is the plight of the 
refugee discussed earlier, which Walzer alludes to in relation to the hotel room 
analogy in Interpretation and Social Criticism, and explores in more general terms in 
Spheres of Justice.91 As Calhoun notes, the stateless are “citizens of the world” in its 
more terrifying sense of “exclusion from citizenship and rights in particular 
states”.92 Perhaps, then, we might think of the refugee as an involuntary citizen of 
the world, one who exposes the hardship that reliance on that citizenship entails. 
Yet for the refugee fleeing persecution, it is everything. The granting of the status of 
refugee does not solve any of the thicker problems that led to the flight of the 
refugee in the first place, but our urge to rescue demands that we grant it. It is a 
sticking plaster, a term frequently used by humanitarians to describe their efforts. A 
sticking plaster is of course very “thin”, dealing only with symptoms. Yet when the 
patient is bleeding to death, it is vital. No-one can heal a corpse, whoever is paying 
the medical bills. 
 Interestingly, the internationalist account of moral minimalism Walzer 
provides is not entirely antithetical to cosmopolitan thought as an organising 
perspective on our moral life. The recent restatement of philosophical 
cosmopolitanism by Appiah is of particular relevance, for the account it provides of 
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moral agreement and disagreement explicitly bases itself on Walzer’s 
conceptualisation of “thick” and “thin” values. He describes thin concepts as 
“something like placeholders. When notions of right and wrong are actually at work, 
they’re thickly enmeshed in the complications of particular social contexts … 
morality starts out thick”.93 Appiah is concerned with finding agreement through 
encounter and conversation, and so:  
 
It’s when you’re trying to find points of agreement with others, say, that you 
start to abstract out the thin concepts that may underlie the thick ones. 
 Thin concepts seem to be universal; we aren’t the only people who 
have the concepts of right and wrong, good and bad; every society, it seems, 
has terms that correspond to these thin concepts, too. Even thick concepts 
like rudeness and courage are ones that you find pretty much everywhere. 
But there are thicker concepts still that really are peculiar to particular 
societies. And the most fundamental level of disagreement occurs when one 
party to a discussion invokes a concept that the other simply doesn’t have. 
This is the kind of disagreement where the struggle is not to agree but just 
to understand.94 
 
There is a slightly different emphasis here in the understanding of thick and thin, 
and Appiah’s conception of thin concepts certainly reveals itself to be more 
foundational as his argument develops. He arguably is also more optimistic than 
Walzer on how thick agreement might become when we meet on thin terrain. But 
his description of the interaction between thick starting points and mutually-held 
thin conceptions shares with Walzer an understanding of how our moral lives play 
out, and thus serves as a promising zone of agreement, the zone this chapter has 
been searching for. 
 In the final analysis, the use of Walzer’s moral minimalism as a basis for a 
humanitarian internationalism serves three functions, the least important of which 
perhaps turns out to be the “hard-case” value, namely that if we can tie together 
the humanitarian impulse and a liberal communitarian perspective, we a fortiori 
have a package that many cosmopolitans would accept as a minimal improvement, 
especially those who broadly share his picture of moral life, such as Appiah. His 
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phenomenology of our moral life directs our attention to how humanitarian 
problems arise in a world of states, the world in which humanitarians on the ground 
have to work. Finally, it serves to cast our focus on the sources and variety of our 
moral responses in a manner closely related to the account of the humanitarian 
impulse explored in the previous chapters. 
 
Conclusion 
  
This chapter has argued that a hermetically sealed “humanitarian space” is both 
unrealistic and undesirable, especially given professional humanitarians’ misgivings 
about becoming rulers. As such, it was seen that an engagement with the state as 
an actor was inevitable. The argument made was that this engagement should not 
merely be seen as a damage limitation exercise, for the state, in its more benign 
forms, can come to represent precisely the kind of sustained institutionalisation of 
humanitarian gains for which professional humanitarians strive. There is, for 
instance, a strong argument that humans are less “made to suffer” in liberal 
democracies than any other form of polity yet invented. Moreover, as actors in 
international politics, states are capable both of action on a scale inaccessible to 
other kinds of actors, and are also capable of embodying collective understandings 
of what humanitarian politics should entail. This is not without its excesses of 
course. Many of these are the excesses documented throughout the thesis. But a 
modest internationalism suggests a good basis for humanitarian solidarity 
nevertheless. This was illustrated by engaging with the work of Michael Walzer, 
whose thin universalism sets out a useful account of how our identities and 
solidarities structure our moral and political lives, one that realistically reflects the 
muddle of solidarities and empathetic interactions so characteristic of the “politics 
of humanity”, as set out in earlier chapters of this thesis. 
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7. Conclusion: The Struggle for Humanity 
 
The “humanitarian identity crisis” turns out to be something of a proxy war. The 
prominent place of humanitarianism in international public discourse since the end 
of the Cold War has, above all, provided a context in which to express a perennial 
struggle, that over the meaning and content of human identity. This struggle takes 
place through a “politics of humanity”, an inevitably complex politics, the breadth of 
which can never fully be encompassed by any particular practice, even one that 
aspires to always act in its name. This thesis has set out some of the crucial 
parameters of this politics. 
 I suggested, in Chapter 2, that the first area of complexity and negotiation 
concerns human suffering. I argued that it is important to look beyond pre-
determined framings of “emergency” and “crisis”, and to pay attention to how 
concern is prompted and nourished by our responses to suffering, such as a visceral 
rejection of cruelty. It is through these that we come to formulate our sense of 
common humanity, in response to instances of inhumanity that take on a greater 
symbolic power as “crises of humanity”. As such, professional humanitarians may 
indeed be the “sentinels between the human and the inhuman”, but the boundary 
that they patrol is not always clearly marked out in advance.1 Indeed, they cannot 
always be sure themselves of exactly which side of it they are on. 
 Expanding and defending the territory won for “humanity”, depends in part 
on the ability to tell “sad and sentimental stories” that help to see others as “like 
us”. Sometimes, for those with an already rich sense of common humanity, such as 
the Rescuers of Jews during the Holocaust, seeing others as “like us” simply at the 
level of a shared human identity can be enough to prompt action. For such tales to 
have wider traction, they need to both draw on but also expand our capacity for 
empathy. In Chapter 3 I argued that in overcoming indifference and the abstract 
quality that the suffering of others can acquire, sentimental stories can also 
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dehumanise those whose tales they tell, leading to responses of pity at best. Yet 
there seems little else but to tell better, more representative stories, and to work to 
bring together disparate kinds of engagement with suffering into political 
constituencies for a more humane politics. This was seen to be a process that does 
not sit particularly well with a blanket demand for impartial concern, not least 
because it represents a struggle, and struggles are not dispassionate affairs. 
 At the heart of the humanitarian action that does take place are practices of 
rescue. The apparently simple notion of saving a human life must always be central 
to humanitarianism, as I argued in Chapter 4. Yet it presents perhaps the most 
profound conundrum of humanitarian action: attributing significance to humanity 
means that saving a human life is necessarily far more complex than simply saving a 
human body. Any action, claiming to take place in the name of humanity, that fails 
to save human bodies will always be suspect. But so too is action that privileges the 
saving of bodies above all else, for it too will rightly be seen as lacking in humanity 
in its more ineffable sense. The carrying out of even the simplest act of rescue was 
thus seen to be a deeply contingent and presumptuous occasion. It involves taking 
the consequences of action seriously, not least because of the demonstrable 
capacity for humanitarian action to cause harm, but it also requires that we 
understand the broader motivational context in which “good” humanitarian 
consequences come to be envisaged and marked as valuable. Moreover, along with 
problems of unintentional harm comes the irresolvable paradox of humanitarian 
violence. 
 Attempts to overcome, or at least minimise, these contingencies were 
explored in Chapter 5. A core concern of professional humanitarians is their 
unaccountability, but their own efforts to hold themselves to account ultimately 
cannot equate to truly empowering those they aspire to help. Frequently, in fact, it 
renders them more accountable to the donors, and the social contexts of concern, 
that fund and enable them. As such, I examined more ambitious attempts to 
empower current and potential future victims of unacceptable suffering. The 
dominant project in this regard is the language and institutions of universal human 
rights. But in extreme contexts of human rights violation, the possibility of 
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humanitarian intervention returns us to the paradoxes of humanitarian violence, 
and moreover raises the question of what else but humanitarianism can describe 
the sphere of concern and the acts of last resort that lie beyond the inevitable 
failures of any given version of a human rights regime. A similar set of issues affects 
the ambition to devote humanitarianism to seeking a more comprehensive 
engagement with the root causes of suffering through projects of global justice. But 
engaging with such projects yielded two insights important to understanding 
humanitarianism: that we do not necessarily need to find or agree on 
transcendental ideals of justice to improve the world around us, and that 
humanitarians can usefully politicise the unacceptability of the suffering they 
encounter as representing injustice. A common sense of injustice can provide the 
basis for an account of human solidarity. 
 The politics of this human solidarity were then explored in Chapter 6. I 
argued that it is ultimately both impossible and undesirable for humanitarians to 
ring-fence their endeavour within a separate “humanitarian space”, and that, if they 
are to take the politics of their endeavour seriously, they need to take seriously the 
weightiest bearer of political authority, the state. Rather than risk reifying the state 
as the definitive humanitarian actor, I then set out an account of internationalist 
solidarity, one that acknowledges the ways in which states can provide the context 
to institutionalise humanitarian gains, and the potential for expressing a collective 
humanitarian politics in the world. This was illustrated by an engagement with the 
international political theory of Michael Walzer, whose thin universalism provides a 
useful description of how our identities and solidarities structure our lives, and can 
enable a suitably modest humanitarian presumption in interacting with others, 
whether at national or international levels. 
 In the remainder of this concluding chapter, I will first reconsider, in the light 
of the contours I have set out for the “politics of humanity”, David Rieff’s 
contention that “even at its best, humanitarian action is always an emblem of 
failure”.2 I will argue that while expanding the scope of humanitarianism beyond 
the realm of professional humanitarianism has revealed much that is troubling 
                                                           
2 Rieff, A Bed for the Night, 304. 
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about the workings of the humanitarian impulse, it also enables us to counter 
Rieff’s assertion with a note of cautious optimism about the persistence of our 
resources of human solidarity. In the second half of the chapter, I argue that these 
resources will be in high demand, in view of coming humanitarian challenges. In 
particular, I argue that anthropogenic climate change precisely presents us with a 
“crisis of humanity”, in response to which the argument put forward in this thesis 
provides us with useful conceptual tools, but also reveals the daunting 
humanitarian challenge ahead. 
 
I Failing Better? Humanity on a Human Scale 
 
There is little doubt that, whatever definition one employs, humanitarianism is 
intimately linked to the many failures of human solidarity. That much was made 
clear in Chapter 2, wherein our very idea of common humanity was seen to emerge 
through a negative process of defining unacceptable suffering. Indeed, some of 
these failures were seen to be professional humanitarians’ own. But while the 
perspective of professional humanitarians was seen to be a useful starting point for 
the exploration of the dilemmas and paradoxes that characterise the “politics of 
humanity”, it also contains a serious risk of taking the part for the whole when it 
comes to deciding how one might assess at any given point, whether the world has 
made any progress towards becoming a more humane place. 
 The danger here is that because professional humanitarianism is set up to 
deal with the most acute forms of human suffering, because it functions in 
“exceptional” contexts, we read the progress of humanitarian concerns only 
through the suffering they have failed to alleviate or to prevent. There are good 
reasons for this, to do with the struggling, passionate nature of humanitarianism as 
a politics of refusal, one that is prompted by outstanding injustices. But as I argued 
in Chapter 3, humanitarianism is not served by seeing the world only as a place of 
suffering and misery, or rather, of seeing humanity as defined only by its worst 
moments. Rieff himself acknowledges that 
 231 
 
 
The tragedy of humanitarianism may be that for all its failings and all the 
limitations of its viewpoint, it represents what is decent in an indecent 
world. Its core assumptions – solidarity, a fundamental sympathy for victims 
and an antipathy for oppressors and exploiters – are what we are in those 
rare moments of grace when we are at our best.3 
 
But is the formulation of such a package, even in the worst contexts, not an 
achievement in and of itself? Moreover, beyond humanity’s theatres of disgrace, it 
is a package that has been quite substantially institutionalised, as I argued in 
Chapter 6, in a number of liberal democratic states, and interstate organisations, of 
which the European Union is an important example, often through domestic 
humanitarian reform campaigns. Indeed, it is important to remember that in the 
nineteenth century humanitarianism was not the predominantly international 
category it has come to be identified with today. I put forward this argument not to 
defend a complacent view of Western interventionism, the failings and excesses of 
which I have acknowledged throughout this thesis. Rather, I wish instead to point to 
the substantial lived experience of past humanitarian gains. 
 To give one example, the fact that, as a citizen of the United Kingdom, it 
seems in no way unusual that, as far as I can tell, I have no particular disposition 
towards racial prejudice, clearly represents a past humanitarian gain. No 
humanitarian credit should accrue to me for this fact, nor is there any kind of 
humanitarian impulse at stake. It is precisely the banality of no longer seeing others 
through dehumanising lenses that represents the achievement of a humanitarian 
politics in this example. The more general point is that once one moves beyond the 
requirement for a certain kind of active motivation, and the requirement for 
altruism, to be present in every encounter or action, one can take a more expansive 
view of moral progress regarding human solidarity in a Rortean, non-deterministic 
sense.4 Rorty writes that: 
                                                           
3 Ibid., 334. 
4 Though for compelling arguments against the still-powerful humanist hope that underpins 
this thesis, see John Gray, Straw Dogs: Thoughts on Humans and Other Animals (London: 
Granta Books, 2002). John Gray, Black Mass: Apocalyptic Religion and the Death of Utopia 
(New York: Farrar Straus and Giroux, 2007). 
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The view that I am offering says that there is such a thing as moral progress, 
and that this progress is indeed in the direction of greater human solidarity. 
But that solidarity is not thought of as recognition of a core self, the human 
essence, in all human beings. Rather it is thought of as the ability to see 
more and more traditional differences (of tribe, religion, race, customs, and 
the like) as unimportant when compared with similarities with respect to 
pain and humiliation – the ability to think of people wildly different from 
ourselves as included in the range of “us”.5 
 
Furthermore, when it comes to current action, professional humanitarians find it 
especially difficult to accommodate the more partial, in both senses of the term, 
humanitarianisms of the ordinary individuals who make up so-called “global civil 
society”, and of states, the failings of which so often fill their schedules. But the 
popes of humanitarianism have had to recognise their own fallibility in recent years. 
Indeed, those who would have others see them as infallible generally have to issue 
a Bull to that effect, a term arguably as descriptive of such a document’s content as 
it is of its form. Simultaneously, professional humanitarians should be aware that, 
one of the greatest dangers for humanitarianism is to become, or remain, an elite 
project, as then its fate will rest with that of the elite in question. 
 Moreover, on the account presented here, it is precisely the interaction of 
these two kinds of actors, individuals and states, that both determines the 
operating context for professional humanitarians, but also sustains more durable 
humanitarian gains. This is not to say that there is no place, for, say, a humanitarian 
organisation like the ICRC that clearly states the political neutrality of its action, and 
consistently respects its own operating principles. On the contrary, the point is that 
the ICRC does not need to make a hegemonic claim on the identity of 
humanitarianism to succeed in its endeavours. It can truthfully state the principles 
according to which it operates, without needing to state, mendaciously, that this is 
                                                           
5 Rorty, Contingency, Irony and Solidarity, 192. I take Norman Geras’ point that Rorty 
neither needs to or quite succeeds in escaping essentialism entirely here. But this does not 
undermine the relevance of the process he describes. Geras, Solidarity in the Conversation 
of Humankind. 
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the only way to be humanitarian.6 This is important if we are to avoid only seeking 
the kind of bittersweet humanitarian success envisaged by Goethe in 1787: “I must 
admit that I too consider it true that humanity will finally be victorious, but I also 
fear that the world will turn into a vast hospital and each of us will become the 
other’s humane nurse”.7 To do so would be like seeing health only in terms of what 
went on in hospitals. 
 A more tempting vision of humanity is suggested by David Miller, who 
enjoins us “always to see human beings as both patients and agents: needy and 
vulnerable creatures who cannot survive without the help of others, but at the 
same time people who can make choices and take responsibility for their lives”8 
Success on these terms seems both more in keeping with the argument presented 
here, and, though in no way easy, perhaps a more realistic goal to aim for. 
Admittedly, Miller’s political vision of humanity is one that reveals the intractability 
of the dilemmas of humanitarian representation explored in Chapter 3: to take the 
individual for the whole? To portray the vulnerable victim, or the feel-good success 
story? To somehow convey both is both necessary and extremely difficult. It may be 
best achieved through the kind of sustained storytelling, such as in novels, 
identified by both Rorty and Lynn Hunt as crucial to the development of a richer 
sense of common humanity. While humanitarians were seen, in the Introduction, to 
be recognising the political nature of their endeavour and “acknowledging that they 
have been speaking prose”, they cannot afford to forget how to write poetry, if they 
                                                           
6 This relates to the debate on the risks facing aid workers in the field. Laura Hammond 
argues that the integrity of a list of principles is not crucial in determining the safety of aid 
workers, since those attacking them in recent conflicts are concerned with the symbolic 
power of attacking humanitarianism. Indeed, she argues that humanitarian integrity can 
lead to a false sense of security, though they clearly have value in other respects. For her, 
reducing risk is linked to the strength of the relationships they can build with the recipients 
of their aid, and the accountability with which they act with regard to them. Hammond, 
"The Power of Holding Humanitarianism Hostage and the Myth of Protective Principles". 
7 Cited in Alain Finkielkraut, In the Name of Humanity: Reflections on the Twentieth Century 
(London: Pimlico, 2001), 89. 
8 David Miller, National Responsibility and Global Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2007), 21. 
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are to do justice to the revelatory moments of humanitarianism, which take place 
on an intimate scale.9 
 Another way of putting all this is to recognise the importance of a kind of 
democratic impulse in the politics of humanity. We have already seen this in several 
different contexts: the power of a life story, fully told (Chapter 3); the desire of 
professional humanitarians to be accountable to those they aid (Chapter 5); the 
promise of human “rights talk” to empower victims to speak (Chapter 5); the 
importance of bearing witness as a last ditch attempt to preserve the “possibility of 
humanity” (Chapter 4). This is the intuition that, though humanitarian action itself is 
necessarily presumptive (we presume to help the patient, but in doing so may 
constrain the agent), it is at its best when it creates space for the voices of those 
with whose suffering it is concerned, and it considers their felt injustices (and 
indeed perhaps the felt injustices of their enemies) alongside the mobilising 
collective sense of an injustice done to others. 
 By raising the question of a democratic impulse, I make no pretence to be 
articulating a cosmopolitan vision of global democracy. The “politics of humanity” is 
clearly far too contingent for that, not least because it is a politics without political 
community, and because, in answer to the classic question of democratic politics, 
“who are the people?”, the answer must always be both simple, everyone, and 
infinitely contestable, anyone.10 In the absence of a collective agency of humanity, 
claims to act in the name of humanity necessarily serve as surrogates, with the 
totalising excesses that implies. 
 Rather, in pointing to the importance of a democratic impulse, I want to 
make the point that since humanity is political, it is important to consider how we 
approach the “politics of humanity”: do we want a totalitarian understanding of it, 
in which only a privileged few can legitimately speak “in the name of humanity”? If 
                                                           
9 Stein, "Humanitarianism as Political Fusion": 741. 
10 For a recent apposite use of “everyone” as a humanitarian campaign slogan, see Save the 
Children, Everyone: Our Campaign to Save Children's Lives. Available at 
http://everyone.org/en/; accessed on 13 August 2010. The front page of the campaign 
website asks a classic Singerian question: “Q1: What would you give up if you knew it would 
save the life of a child you’ve never met?” The possible answers are: “a cup of tea”, “a 
meal”, “a day’s pay”, “a holiday”, “a car”, “your home”, “nothing at all”, “don’t know”. 
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not, some sense of democracy seems appropriate. Furthermore, I do not want to tie 
the notion to any single definitive characteristic of democracy, such as deliberation, 
for example.11 Indeed, in response to a reification of their master signifier by 
deliberative democracy theorists, Michael Walzer provides a long list of the 
different elements that, for him, characterise the play of democratic politics: 
political education, organisation, mobilisation, demonstration, statement, debate, 
bargaining, lobbying, campaigning, voting, fund-raising, corruption, mundane 
chores, ruling.12 Over the course of the thesis, humanitarianism has been seen as 
implicated in all these political activities at different times. Thus, if a humanitarian 
“politics of humanity” is characterised by anything, it is complexity. The temptation 
will always be to try to resolve that complexity, to find a key that will simplify it. I 
have argued that such an enterprise is doomed. What clarity I offer is as follows: by 
embracing their endeavour as engaged in a particular kind of politics, humanitarians 
of all hues can cease to situate themselves merely as outsiders to various brands of 
politics, the interaction with which either pollutes one or the other party (and 
critiques of humanitarianism are generally concerned with either one or the other). 
Instead, they can start to acknowledge, and in doing so enrich, the real discussion 
they are engaged in, and bring home with greater force the importance for all of us 
of its outcomes. 
 Moreover, the complexity of this politics implies a degree of humility with 
regard to the legitimacy and qualities of its stakeholders. Firstly, if a democratic 
quality is to be preserved, it demands that the voices of those to whom solidarity is 
tendered should be heard, even if they cannot entirely be honoured across all the 
parameters of activity. 
 Furthermore, in contrast to an idealised ethical act, the complex nature of 
the “politics of humanity” is not one particularly well served by a requirement for 
perfect global altruists. In campaigning and mobilising, it may be best not to draw 
                                                           
11 Though, for a more expansive conception of deliberation, argumentation and 
contestation in non-Western democratic traditions, see Amartya Sen, The Argumentative 
Indian: Writings on Indian Culture, History and Politics (London: Allen Lane, 2005). 
12 Michael Walzer, "Deliberation, and What Else?" in Thinking Politically: Essays in Political 
Theory, ed. David Miller (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 2007). 
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on transcendental ideals, recalling Sen’s warning against their value in making 
comparative judgements. We all know people around us who are comparatively 
more empathetic and more humane than us. Is it not better to look to them for 
inspiration, rather than to seek it in a transcendental ideal of perfect humanity, or 
to enact it only with respect to distant strangers? After all, Jean Pictet quotes 
Francis Bacon as saying that “a man who does not treat his neighbour humanely is 
not truly human”13 
 Simultaneously, we need to constantly avoid the peril of this kind of 
comparison reifying humanitarianism as a solely ethical endeavour, and recognise 
that of those empathetic and humane people, those who engage seriously with 
their political context, and take on the responsibility of getting their hands dirty, 
tend to achieve more than those who merely dispense well-motivated charity. 
 This leads to the important last item in Walzer’s list: ruling. Again, this 
reminds us of the half-formed nature of placing one’s faith in global civil society. For 
all of the benefits of a grassroots politics “from below”, there always comes a time 
(if the politics is successful) of rule from “above”.14 Professional humanitarians have 
found themselves ill-suited to this task, and as Chapter 6 argued, the democratic 
state, as imperfect as current incarnations of it might be, still clearly presents the 
most viable option, both in terms of sensitivity to the claims of domestic politics and 
of an internal humanitarian space, and to the possibility, through such claims, of 
taking seriously the needs of others.  
 Humanitarianism may be an emblem of failure: failure because we are still 
impossibly far from stopping people being cruel to each other, and on a smaller, 
more intimate scale, failure for the same mysterious reasons that some families do 
not get along.15 But it also succeeds if we can come to care about cruelty in 
common, shared ways, and that can not entirely be captured by particular practices 
                                                           
13 Pictet, The Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross, unpaginated text. 
14 We might think here of the disillusionment of many of Obama’s supporters almost as 
soon as he took office and began to govern. 
15 There are interesting links here to discussions on the relationship between kinship and 
humanitarian projects, involving discourses such as those referring to a “family of man”. 
See David Mole, Discourses of World Kinship and the United Nations: The Quest for a 
Human Family, unpublished doctoral thesis (London: London School of Economics, 2009). 
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such as the “neutral, impartial provision of relief”, though it helps to explain why 
such practices may well be desirable. If, however, we are to envisage not only 
patients but agents as the objects of humanitarian action, we need to take seriously 
the complexities of the “politics of humanity”, and seek in it the expression of a 
democratic impulse, as the best way to manage a rich and constantly contested 
idea of shared humanity. This more expansive view of the problem of 
humanitarianism is certainly more demanding, but yields a richer sense of the ways 
in which it has already been successful in enabling people to live lives less tainted by 
degradation and inhumanity. 
 
II Humanitarian Futures: The Challenge of Climate Change as a “Crisis 
of Humanity” 
 
There is no indication that the earthquakes, floods, droughts, massacres, civil 
conflicts, wars and forced migratory flows that have kept professional 
humanitarians so busy during their “identity crisis” are on the decrease. In the 
course of this thesis I have attempted to enrich the discussion of the many 
dilemmas and paradoxes that emerge as professional humanitarians tackle them. In 
this final section, though, I wish to argue that the broad concept of humanitarianism 
that I summarised in the previous section allows us not just to have a richer sense of 
the role of humanitarianism in our moral lives, our sense of human identity and the 
possibilities of human solidarity. It also provides us with important conceptual tools 
to make sense of climate change as a humanitarian problem. While the brief 
analysis presented here has no silver bullet policy prescriptions to make, it aims to 
demonstrate the conceptual value-added of my approach in addressing climate 
change, to warn against the wrong turnings taken by dominant international 
political theory approaches, and, in doing so, to suggest the contours of a wider 
research project of establishing more fully the nature of climate change as a crucial 
humanitarian problem. 
 238 
 
 Climate change promises to be the dominant humanitarian concern of the 
twenty-first century, at least indirectly.16 This is because its probable effects, even 
in relatively good-case scenarios, will be substantially to increase the incidences of 
all of the “classic” humanitarian problems mentioned at the beginning of this 
section.17 Even the most optimistic scenarios suggest that extreme weather events 
will become more frequent and more intense, mostly resulting in adverse effects on 
human systems.18 Overall, the weight of scientific analysis behind landmark 
documents such as the Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change and the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC) Assessment Reports, the most 
recent of which came out in 2007, suggests that climate change presents, even in 
best-case scenarios, a daunting challenge to human survival in many parts of the 
world.19 According to John Holmes, the outgoing UN Under-Secretary-General for 
Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator: “[any] credible vision of 
                                                           
16 For a selection of major practitioner reports, see CARE International, Maplecroft and 
OCHA, Humanitarian Implications of Climate Change: Mapping Emerging Trends and Risk 
Hotspots (CARE International, 2008). Available at 
http://www.careclimatechange.org/files/reports/CARE_Human_Implications.pdf; accessed 
on 20 August 2010. Global Humanitarian Forum, The Human Face of Climate Change, 
Forum 2008 (Geneva: Global Humanitarian Forum, 2008). Available at http://www2.ghf-
ge.org/annual_forum/forum_2008_new/index.cfm. IOM, Migration and Climate Change 
(Geneva: International Organization for Migration, 2008). Available at 
http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/lib.nsf/db900sid/ASAZ-
7CGDBH/$file/iom_dec2007.pdf?openelement; accessed on 20 June 2010. UNDP, Fighting 
Climate Change. For a summary of the data as applied to individual countries, see UNDP, 
UNDP Climate Change Country Profiles. Available at http://country-profiles.geog.ox.ac.uk/; 
accessed on 20 August 2010. Another useful resource is CARE, Climate Change Information 
Centre. Available at http://www.careclimatechange.org/; accessed on 20 August 2010. 
17 See for instance Nicholas Stern, A Blueprint for a Safer Planet: How to Manage Climate 
Change and Create a New Era of Progress and Prosperity (London: Bodley Head, 2009), 27-
31. Good popular surveys are Elizabeth Kolbert, Field Notes from a Catastrophe: A Frontline 
Report on Climate Change (London: Bloomsbury, 2007). Mark Lynas, Six Degrees: Our 
Future on a Hotter Planet (London: Harper Perennial, 2008). See also Jared Diamond, 
Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed (New York: Penguin, 2005). 
18 IPCC, Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report. Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III 
to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(Geneva: IPCC, 2007), 12. Available at 
http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/syr/en/contents.html; accessed on 13 
August 2010. 
19 Ibid. Nicholas Stern, The Economics of Climate Change: The Stern Review (London: HM 
Treasury, 2006). Available at http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/stern_review_report.htm; accessed on 13 August 2010.  
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the future must recognise that humanitarian needs are increasing. Climate change 
will be the main driver.”20 
 Indeed, for Holmes, writing in late 2008, these consequences were already 
with us. “Nine out of every ten disasters are now climate-related. Recorded 
disasters have doubled in number from 200 a year to more than 400 over the past 
two decades.”21 The Red Cross movement already sees itself as “in the front line of 
climate change impacts.”22 For instance, the drying up of Lake Chad is pinpointed by 
many as a factor that might merit the description of the crisis in Darfur as “the first 
climate change war”.23 Ban Ki-moon has highlighted the issue of displacement 
within humanitarianism, calling it “arguably the most significant humanitarian 
challenge that we face.”24 Indeed, this area of the humanitarian practice seems 
particularly likely to come under strain in coming decades following the effects of 
climate change.25 It is extremely hard to give detailed displacement scenarios, and 
the predictions of total likely numbers come with clear health warnings attached. 
However, it seems fairly clear that even in the best-case scenarios millions of people 
will be displaced by climate change (among other interrelated factors) within a few 
decades. One widely-used loose estimate predicts 200 million displaced by mid-
century.26 Not only would such scenarios no doubt overwhelm the capacities of 
professional humanitarianism, but they are likely to present a very real challenge to 
                                                           
20 John Holmes, "More Help Now, Please", The Economist: The World in 2009 (19 November 
2008). Available at 
http://www.economist.com/theworldin/displayStory.cfm?story_id=12494621; accessed on 
17 June 2010. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Red Cross/Red Crescent Climate Centre, Red Cross/Red Crescent Climate Guide (The 
Hague: IFRC, 2007), 16. Available at 
http://www.climatecentre.org/downloads/File/reports/RCRC_climateguide.pdf; accessed 
on 13 August 2010. 
23 Anthony Giddens, The Politics of Climate Change (Cambridge: Polity, 2009), 205. Brauman 
also recently noted this, though he pointed out that in terms of dealing with the 
consequences, professional humanitarians had adopted fairly classical procedures. 
Brauman, "Masterclass: A Review of the Last Two Decades of Humanitarian Assistance". 
24 Ban Ki-moon, Report of the Secretary-General on the Protection of Civilians in Armed 
Conflict (S/2007/643) (United Nations Security Council, 2007). 
25 The problem was addressed in some depth in Forced Migration Review, "Special Issue on 
Climate Change and Displacement", Forced Migration Review, no. 31 (2008). 
26 Oli Brown, "The Numbers Game", Forced Migration Review, no. 31 (2008). 
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the more diffuse humanitarian gains illustrated in the previous section. As such, it 
seems appropriate to characterise climate change as an incipient “meta-
emergency” or “meta-crisis” in the conventional sense of “humanitarian crisis”. 
 But in Chapter 2 it emerged that frequently, behind a “humanitarian crisis”, 
we can identify a “crisis of humanity”. This either grounds the concern with 
suffering that characterises our interaction with future “humanitarian crises”, in the 
sense that professional humanitarians’ sense of the fragility of common humanity 
revealed by Auschwitz conditions their understanding of, say, the Rwandan 
Genocide. But a “crisis of humanity” can also be found within the fabric of a 
“humanitarian crisis”, as was also the case in Rwanda. The argument I wish to make 
here, is that, more than a “meta-humanitarian crisis”, climate change also 
represents a “crisis of humanity” in that second sense. That is, the likely “meta-
humanitarian crisis” of climate change reveals in a new way a human capacity to 
endanger the very terms of a common humanity.27 
 Crucial here is the well-established scientific consensus on the 
anthropogenic nature of climate change.28 As Randolph Kent, now director of the 
Humanitarian Futures Programme (HFP) at King’s College, wrote in a tour d’horizon 
of humanitarian crises: 
 
Among the hallmarks of the present age is the fact that human beings have 
become a force that in many ways dictates the course of nature. The 
relationship between nature and humans has to that extent altered 
significantly. Throughout most of history, human beings were subject to 
nature’s whims. Now the actions of humankind not only affect the prospects 
                                                           
27 Another important example of a possible “crisis of humanity” in this sense would be the 
invention of the atom bomb. 
28 Naomi Oreskes, "The Scientific Consensus on Climate Change: How Do We Know We're 
Not Wrong?" in Climate Change: What It Means for Us, Our Children, and Our 
Grandchildren, ed. Joseph F. C. DiMento and Pamela Doughman (London: Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology, 2007). 
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for the survival of the species itself, but also impact on the oceans, the 
lands, the weather and indeed the very stability of the planet.29 
 
The crucial point here, though, is that human impact on the climate constitutes an 
involuntary and uncontrolled collective human agency. It has not been able to 
replace nature’s whims with humankind’s will. It has merely succeeded in raising 
the stakes of the play of nature’s whims.30 The problem of responding to the threat 
of climate change brings home the absence of a meaningful, volitional collective 
agency of humanity with which to respond to the problem, and forces us to place 
our hopes in more diffuse and contingent possibilities of human solidarity. But, for 
the eminent historian David Hollinger: 
 
Global warming is a convenient example of a threat to everyone that is 
difficult to engage from the point of view of any solidarity smaller than the 
species. But any solidarity capacious enough to act effectively on problems 
located in a large arena is poorly suited to satisfy the human need for 
belonging. And any solidarity tight enough to serve the need for belonging 
cannot be expected to respond effectively to challenges common to a larger 
and more heterogeneous population. To be sure, one can have multiple 
affiliations, many ‘we’s,’ some more capacious than others. That we all have 
multiple identities (national, ethnoracial, religious, sexual, geographical, 
ideological, professional, generational, etc.) and are capable of several 
solidarities is widely understood. But the energies and resources and 
affections of individuals are not infinite in supply. 31 
 
As such the humanitarian challenge of climate change goes far deeper than 
increasing the frequency of “humanitarian crises”, it reveals what Hollinger calls the 
“political economy of solidarity”, and brings sharply into focus both the necessity 
and the difficulty of the “politics of humanity” at stake.32 
                                                           
29 Kent, "International Humanitarian Crises": 860. For the HFP’s analysis of climate change, 
see HFP, Humanitarian Horizons: Climate Change and Its Humanitarian Impacts (London: 
Humanitarian Futures Programme, 2009). Available at 
http://www.humanitarianfutures.org/main/hfppubs/climatechange; accessed on 20 June 
2010. See also HFP and FIC, Humanitarian Horizons: A Practitioners' Guide to the Future 
(Boston: Feinstein International Center, 2010). 
30 For an alarming view of nature fighting back, see James Lovelock, The Revenge of Gaia 
(London: Penguin, 2006). 
31 Hollinger, "From Identity to Solidarity": 27. 
32 Ibid. 
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 For Stephen M. Gardiner, in climate change, we have created a “perfect 
moral storm” for ourselves.33  For him, the problem of climate change is 
characterised by a dispersion of causes and effects, a fragmentation of agency, and 
institutional inadequacy. Moreover, these daunting characteristics play out across 
spatial, temporal/intergenerational and theoretical dimensions. Not only does the 
idea of a “perfect moral storm” indicate just how profound the “crisis of humanity” 
might be here, it should also sound a note of caution when it comes to setting out 
the normative contours of the problem. It is here that my approach to 
humanitarianism presents the potential for serious value-added over dominant 
ways of conceptualising the normative challenges ahead. 
 I already alluded, in Chapter 5, to the limitations of conceptualising every 
problem as a human rights problem, taking climate change as an example. The 
other prominent and understandable concern, present in contemporary climate 
change international political theory, is to formulate a theory of climate justice.34 
This intersects with prominent NGO calls for “climate justice”.35 Such work generally 
wishes to provide an account of past, present and future responsibilities for 
greenhouse gas emissions that can both be fair and just, and generate a collective 
emissions trajectory compatible with the extremely demanding global reduction 
requirements associated with less-than-catastrophic climate change. What I wish to 
question here, is not so much the proposals that come out of such work and such 
calls, but the starting assumption that a transcendental ideal of justice that can 
encompass past and present responsibilities for greenhouse gas emissions is at all 
                                                           
33 Stephen M. Gardiner, "A Perfect Moral Storm: Climate Change, Intergenerational Ethics 
and the Problem of Moral Corruption", Environmental Values 15 (2006). 
34 For representative examples of this rapidly expanding literature, see Simon Caney, 
"Cosmopolitan Justice, Responsibility, and Global Climate Change", Leiden Journal of 
International Law 18, no. 04 (2005). Edward A. Page, Climate Change, Justice and Future 
Generations (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2006). 
35 A brief search yielded a plethora of examples, including Climate Justice Action. Available 
at http://www.climate-justice-action.org/; accessed on 03 August 2010. The Climate Justice 
Project. Available at http://www.climatejustice.org.uk/; accessed on 03 August 2010. 
Climate Justice: Enforcing Climate Change Law. Available at http://www.climatelaw.org/; 
accessed on 03 August 2010. Timeforclimatejustice.Org. Available at 
http://www.timeforclimatejustice.org/; accessed on 03 August 2010. Christian Aid, Time for 
Climate Justice. Available at http://www.christianaid.org.uk/ActNow/Countdown-to-
Copenhagen-climate-change/Index.aspx; accessed on 03 August 2010. 
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plausible, let alone possible to implement in practice.  Though they may not be, by 
and large, overly-optimistic about solving the problem in practice, many assume 
that the problem of justice is at least solvable in theory.36 The argument I put 
forward in Chapter 5 prompts three responses to this that suggest the advantages 
of a broad humanitarian perspective over, say, a cosmopolitan justice perspective. 
 Firstly, there is a broad consensus that anthropogenic climate change 
represents, on a number of different levels, a profound injustice, in ways directly 
relevant to the generation of humanitarian concern. For instance, those least 
causally responsible for it are almost certainly going to suffer its earliest effects, and 
its worst effects in the longer term Moreover, the greatest costs are likely to be 
borne largely by people who will not yet have been born during the crucial window 
of opportunity for effective action. Secondly, due to the complexity of the “perfect 
moral storm”, the achievement of an unassailable ideal theory of justice in relation 
to climate change seems deeply implausible. Yet, if we recall Sen’s warning that 
transcendental ideals of justice are not the best guides to making comparative 
judgements between options on the table, we can do without such theories 
perfectly well in making any action taken to mitigate the severity of the problem 
less unjust. Thirdly, it would be, as Shklar suggests, equally delusional to think that 
what mitigation efforts we will engage in will not create further humanitarian 
injustices: there will be trade-offs that directly affect people’s welfare. 
 Furthermore, in working through the politics of climate change, the lessons 
of Chapters 3, 4 and 6 are important. In terms of mobilising action, it was seen that 
rather than try to convince people to become perfect altruists, a humanitarian 
concern for climate change needs to speak to their sense of self and their complex 
identities, if it is to gain political traction and become embedded in collective 
identities and aspirations, notably as embodied by states. If there is any optimism to 
be found in this perspective, it is that a large proportion of those with the most 
excess emissions to shed live in broadly democratic states, and therefore the 
opportunities for humanitarian politics are somewhat larger. 
                                                           
36 If one were to be uncharitable, one could say that solving the problem in theory is more 
important to many international political theorists of climate change, than generating 
concrete action. 
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 The most challenging issue is that, if serious mitigation efforts are to be 
engaged in, the timescale in question is so tight, a peak in emissions within the next 
decade, followed by a rapid decrease, that serious engagement with the most 
powerful actors to hand must be in order. The merits of an internationalist 
perspective, as set out in the previous chapter, are obvious here. Indeed Anthony 
Giddens suggests that rather than awaiting a universal multi-lateral settlement, we 
should resurrect the idea of coalitions of the willing and look to a vanguard of what 
Lawler would term “good states”.37 
 What I have briefly attempted to illustrate in this section is that the 
humanitarian “politics of humanity” approach contains useful conceptual tools for 
thinking about the problem of climate change, an application of the approach that 
merits further academic research. What I was unable to provide was a powerful 
argument for why a humanitarian perspective is very likely to prompt the drastic 
and urgent action that may be required. However, one thing that is clear is that 
should we fail to create a “politics of humanity” commensurate with the problem, 
we will have to look to humanitarianism, and to the resources of human solidarity it 
suggests, to pick up the pieces. It may be that, in a strange way, what might seem to 
be preventive action to mitigate climate change is in fact closer to a last resort 
occasion for rescue. Should this moment pass, acts of rescue, in a basic, visceral 
sense, threaten to be more than ever a core subject matter of international politics. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has briefly concluded the analysis of this thesis, by suggesting that 
while humanitarianism cannot afford the luxury of self-congratulation, a broader 
understanding of the endeavour as a “politics of humanity” contains some hopeful 
hints to the possibility of greater human solidarity. It has also brought out that while 
                                                           
37 This recalls the roots of classical internationalism in the Concert politics of the nineteenth 
century, as studied by Cartsen Holbraad. Giddens, The Politics of Climate Change, 226. 
Holbraad, The Concert of Europe: A Study in German and British International Theory 1815-
1914. 
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the roots and the reach of the humanitarian impulse spread further than any single 
kind of political institution, there is an important place in humanitarian politics for a 
democratic impulse, constantly alert to the excesses of power and totalising 
understandings of humanity that have often characterised the exercise of 
humanitarian action. I then illustrated the applicability of my approach to one of the 
central humanitarian problems of our time, anthropogenic climate change, 
demonstrating that my description of the “politics of humanity” may not take us 
closer to solving such a complex problem, but that it provides the potential to 
understand the scope of the challenge it presents. In addressing it, it seems clear 
that no-one can afford the luxury of turning away from an issue that affects 
humanity in such a fundamental way. Indeed, perhaps the greatest irony of 
humanitarianism is that it usually aspires to change others, yet it is at its best when 
it helps us to change ourselves. We know much about the horrors of which we are 
capable. But we do not yet know what we can become. 
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